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THE FALLACY OF CHOICE:   
THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF SCHOOL 
VOUCHERS ON CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES 
IAN FARRELL* AND CHELSEA MARX** 
This Article addresses the impact of school voucher programs on students 
with disabilities.  We show that for children with disabilities, the price of admission 
into so-called “school choice” programs is so high that it is effectively no real 
choice at all.  School voucher programs require students with disabilities to sign 
away their robust federal rights and protections in the public school system.  
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—the preeminent 
legislative safeguard for students with disabilities—these rights include the 
right to a “free and appropriate public education” delivered through an 
“individualized education plan.”  By giving up these protections, children with 
disabilities are left at the mercy of private schools that have no legal obligation 
to provide them with an appropriate education, and, in the vast majority of 
cases, are not legally prohibited from discriminating against them on the basis 
of their disability.  We argue that school voucher programs—including a proposed 
federal voucher program—put the education of students with disabilities back 
decades, and likely constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a nationally televised interview on March 11, 2017, the U.S. 
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos advocated for the benefits of 
voucher programs, also called “school choice” programs by Secretary 
DeVos and other proponents.1  School voucher programs have long 
been Secretary DeVos’s signature policy initiative, predating her 
tenure in the Trump administration and stretching back to her 
leadership roles in non-profit organizations.2  School voucher programs 
allow qualifying students to attend private schools using public funds, 
in the form of “vouchers,” to pay for part or all of the private school 
tuition.  Critics of school vouchers contend that these programs cause 
funding flight from public school systems and divert public resources 
into the coffers of private—and overwhelmingly religious—organizations.3  
Supporters of school vouchers claim that vouchers provide two 
benefits.  First, they claim that vouchers increase freedom of choice in 
education by allowing parents to place children in the schools of their 
choosing, rather than in underperforming public schools.  Second, school 
voucher proponents claim that vouchers increase competition and 
efficiency in education.4  School choice advocates also claim that 
                                               
 1. Lesley Stahl, Betsy DeVos on Guns, School Choice and Why People Don’t Like Her, 
CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/secretary-
of-education-betsy-devos-on-guns-school-choice-and-why-people-dont-like-her. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id.; School Vouchers, ACLU (2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious-
liberty/religion-and-public-schools/school-vouchers (arguing that school vouchers 
lead to taxpayers funding religious instruction). 
 4. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in 
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). 
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vouchers are especially beneficial for students with disabilities.  
Advocates of voucher programs have made this claim so often that 
students with disabilities have been described as the “poster children” 
of the voucher movement.5  This claim is difficult to reconcile with 
the legal and practical effects of voucher programs on these 
vulnerable students.  To participate in school voucher programs, 
students with disabilities are required to give up most, if not all, of 
their rights under federal law.  Giving up these rights entails giving up 
access to resources that allow them to fulfill their educational 
potential.  These students must also give up the federal right to be free 
from discrimination on the basis of their disability.  
These forfeitures are far from insubstantial.  To alleviate these hardships, 
Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).6  
The IDEA guarantees every child a “free appropriate public education.”7  It 
contains comprehensive substantive and procedural mechanisms for 
delivering this right in a manner crafted to meet the individual needs of 
every student with a disability.8  Indeed, the prospect of a federal school 
voucher program comes at a time when the rights of students with 
disabilities under the IDEA are stronger than ever before.  In 2017, the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the IDEA merely requires 
schools to provide a de minimis education.9  Instead, the Court read the 
IDEA as requiring schools to ensure students achieve appropriate progress 
in attainment of educational goals.10 
This Article argues that existing school voucher programs have a 
profound negative effect on students with disabilities, and their parents, 
and that any future federal program modeled on state programs would 
be similarly detrimental.  These parents have two options.  One is a 
public school education with a legally enforceable guarantee of non-
discrimination and genuine educational advancement.  The other is 
participation in a voucher program that permits participating schools 
to discriminate on the basis of disability—including by simply refusing 
to enroll students with a disability.  A choice that comes with such a 
                                               
 5. Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities:  The Future of Special 
Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 295–96 (2010) (noting that students with disabilities 
are generally seen as having been somehow failed by the public education system). 
 6. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). 
 7. Id. § 1400(d). 
 8. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(C)–(H), (c)(9). 
 9. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017). 
 10. Id. at 999 (finding that a student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) 
must be reasonable considering the student’s condition and must allow for progress 
in the student’s education). 
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price tag is, of course, no true choice at all.  For parents whose 
children have a disability, in other words, voucher programs’ supposed 
freedom of choice is a mirage.  Furthermore, school voucher programs 
cause funding flight that leaves public schools without the resources 
required to adequately provide for the demanding individuated needs 
of students with disabilities—further harming students with disabilities 
whose parents had no real choice but to keep them in underfunded 
public schools.11  
This Article argues that a federal school voucher program would 
be, from a policy perspective, disastrous for students with disabilities.  
Further, this Article contends that, should a federal voucher program 
pass, courts should strike down the program as violating the Equal 
Protection Clause by discriminating against students with disabilities. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses the development 
and history of school voucher programs in the United States, 
including attempts to use voucher programs as vehicles of state-
sponsored segregation in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.12  
This Part also addresses the challenges that voucher programs have 
faced under the religion provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions, and the current push for voucher programs by both 
state governments and the Trump administration. 
In Part II, the Article’s focus switches from voucher programs 
specifically to the general policy and legal history of special education 
in the United States.  This Part points out that in the 1970s, Congress 
found millions of children with disabilities were receiving no education 
and that millions more were receiving an inadequate education.13  This 
crucial finding became the catalyst for modern special education law.  
Part III describes in detail the substantive rights for children with 
disabilities that were subsequently enacted in federal law, including 
the IDEA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 
504),14 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).15  This Part 
                                               
 11. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Betsy DeVos Tweeted a Bizarre Self-Own About 
Michigan’s Public Schools, VOX (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2018/3/13/17112392/devos-michigan-naep-tweet (indicating that a 
graph tweeted by Secretary DeVos demonstrates that Michigan public school 
performance has significantly declined since Michigan’s school voucher program 
redirected funding away from public schools). 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (“Before the date of enactment of the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-142), the educational needs of 
millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met.”). 
 14. 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 (2012). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
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describes the key provisions of the IDEA, most notably the robust 
guarantee of a “free appropriate public education”16 implemented via an 
“Individualized Education Program” (IEP).17  This Part then contrasts 
the protections of the IDEA, which students with disabilities must forego 
to participate in voucher programs, with the far more limited 
protections afforded to private school students—especially students 
in religious schools, which constitute the vast bulk of schools 
participating in voucher programs. 
Part III of the Article presents the current Indiana school voucher 
program as a case study.  The Indiana program has been strongly 
endorsed by the Trump administration and is therefore a likely 
model for a federal school voucher program.18 
Part IV drills down on the detrimental effects that a federal 
voucher program would impose on students with disabilities. These 
include foregoing their right to a free appropriate public education; 
the lack of options for students with disabilities; and the ability of 
private schools to refuse admission to students with disabilities. 
Moreover, school vouchers would, if used by a student with 
disabilities, only cover a fraction of the high tuition charged by the 
small minority of private schools that provide adequate support for 
children with disabilities.  Given these harms, this Article calls for 
political resistance to any federal voucher program and argues for 
rescinding current state voucher programs. 
Finally, Part V of the Article uses these detrimental and disparate 
effects as the foundation for arguing that a federal school voucher 
program, if enacted, would violate the constitutional rights of 
students with disabilities.  This Part concludes that the courts should 
strike down any federal voucher program as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
I.    THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGALITY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
School choice has been a controversial and well litigated issue for 
decades.  In 1925, the Supreme Court held that parents have a constitutional 
right to send their children to private schools, including private schools with 
                                               
 16. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). 
 17. Hensel, supra note 5, at 292. 
 18. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Mike Pence’s Claim that Indiana Has the Largest School 
Voucher Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/08/12/mike-pences-claim-that-indiana-has-the-largest-school-voucher-
program (noting that Vice President Mike Pence often touts that his home state of 
Indiana has the largest voucher program). 
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religious affiliations.19  In the ninety years since that decision, the debate 
over school choice has continued to permeate discussions about education 
in America, largely as part of a greater national conflict20 over “immigration, 
religion, race, and national identity.”21 
Despite this connection to deep national conflicts, “education is 
primarily a state and local responsibility.”22  The federal government, 
for example, provides only eight percent of total funding for public 
education at the elementary and secondary level.23  The states’ 
education laws—including school voucher programs—do, of course, 
have to comply with the U.S. Constitution.24  The few federal court 
challenges to school choice programs have primarily been challenges 
that this state involvement in religious education violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.25  At the state level, 
many challenges to state-run voucher programs have also centered on 
concerns about public funds going to religious schools despite state 
statutory and constitutional provisions that govern the state’s 
responsibility to educate its children.26  Notwithstanding the success of 
such challenges, vouchers are gaining popularity across the country.27 
A.   The History and Legality of Voucher Programs 
The origins of school voucher programs demonstrate the paradox 
between theory and reality.  The free market economist, Milton Friedman 
was the first to explore the concept of school voucher programs.28  
Friedman conceptualized a school voucher program in which the 
                                               
 19. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 20. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice:  Law, Education, and 
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 816–19 (2011) (describing the conflict between 
the movement towards compulsory education and private, religious education). 
 21. Id. at 818. 
 22. The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last modified May 25, 2017). 
 23. Id.  The eight percent includes funds from the Department of Education, the 
Department of Health and Human Services for the Head Start Program, and the 
Department of Agriculture for the School Lunch Program.  Id. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07 (1971) (invalidating state 
statutes that reimbursed or supplemented secular teachers’ salaries and reimbursed 
nonpublic schools for secular materials); Minow, supra note 20, at 829. 
 26. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4. 
 27. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 28. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 4. 
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government gives parents public funds to enroll their child in a school 
of their choosing, public or private.29  He theorized that this program 
would improve schools by increasing market competition.30  Under his 
model, the government’s role in education is limited to disbursal of 
funds and “assuring that the schools met certain minimum standards.”31 
As Friedman fervently advocated for school vouchers, southern 
states started to use the concept as a means to avoid court ordered 
desegregation.32  For example, in Virginia, Prince Edward County 
ultimately “chose to close its entire public school system in 1959 
rather than operate integrated schools.”33  While the County’s schools 
were locked, white children used public funds to attend the all-white, 
private, Prince Edward Academy through a state-adopted “tuition 
grant program.”34  For five years, most of the County’s 1700 black children 
had no educational opportunities until the Supreme Court finally held 
the closure of all public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.35  
Even after Prince Edward County was ordered to re-open the schools, 
it used vouchers to perpetuate segregation36 and spent twice the amount 
of funding on “tuition grants” as it did on court-mandated integrated 
schools.37  Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
                                               
 29. See id.; see also Kevin Carey, Dismal Voucher Results Surprise Researchers as DeVos Era 
Begins, N.Y. TIMES:  UPSHOT (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/ 
upshot/dismal-results-from-vouchers-surprise-researchers-as-devos-era-begins.html (quoting 
Friedman’s essay, which argues that “the government should pay for all children to go to 
school” through vouchers given to parents for “approved educational services”). 
 30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Minow, supra note 20, at 822 (adding that white Southerners used both 
school choice and anti-Brown associations to evade integration). 
 33. Chris Ford et al., The Racist Origins of Private School Vouchers, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (July 12, 2017, 11:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
education-k-12/reports/2017/07/12/435629/racist-origins-private-school-vouchers/ 
(noting that the pushback against Brown and school integration in the South was 
known as “massive resistance”).  
 34. Id. 
 35. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964); see also Ford et. al, supra 
note 33 (discussing the “incredible lengths” black parents undertook to educate their 
children due to the school closure). 
 36. Ford et al., supra note 33. 
 37. Id. (“The County’s board of supervisors devoted only $189,000 in funding for 
integrated public schools.  At the same time, they allocated $375,000 that could 
effectively only be used by white students for ‘tuition grants to students attending 
either private nonsectarian schools in the County or public schools charging tuition 
outside the County.’”) (quoting Kara Miles Turner, Both Victors and Victims:  Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, the NAACP, and ‘Brown’, 90 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2004)). 
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District of Virginia held that allowing residents to use state funded voucher 
programs to perpetuate segregation violated the U.S. Constitution.38 
Although this program was ultimately struck down, Prince Edward 
County provided a blueprint for more than 200 southern 
communities to use public money to establish “private segregation 
academies.”39  More than 200 private segregation academies were 
established across the South by 1969.40  In the 1970–1971 school year, 
nearly 75,000 students in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi alone 
attended segregation academies, which were made possible through 
public funds.41  The federal government initially led the charge 
against these segregation academies by challenging their operation 
under the Civil Rights Act of 196442 and the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965.43 
Despite the risk of re-segregating the American education system, 
current supporters of voucher programs argue that vouchers are “an 
instrument of educational opportunity” that properly promote 
religious freedom.44  In the 1990s, school choice advocates joined 
forces with religious institutions which argued that the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause analysis of voucher programs was 
“unfair and unpredictable.”45  Federal courts had previously held that 
the Establishment Clause prohibited public funds from reimbursing 
private schools for secular textbooks and salaries46 and from authorizing 
tax cuts or deductions for private school tuition.47  So a newly formed 
                                               
 38. Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969).  
Notably, the District Court rejected arguments that the constitutional violation 
required restitution grants or even termination of vouchers in that school year.  Id. at 1182. 
 39. Ford et al., supra note 33. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See ROBERT E. ANDERSON JR., THE SOUTH AND HER CHILDREN:  SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 1970–1971 79 (1971). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 43. 20 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012); Ford et al., supra note 33. 
 44. Minow, supra note 20, at 829–32. 
 45. Id. at 830. 
 46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07, 613–14 (1971) (finding that the 
relationship between the states and religious private schools through these programs 
involved “excessive entanglement between government and religion”). 
 47. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797, 798 
(1973) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that New York’s aid provision had a 
“primary effect that advances religion and offends the constitutional prohibition 
against laws respecting an establishment of religion”); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 
827–28 (1973) (finding a Pennsylvania program reimbursing private school tuition to 
parents through public funds is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause). 
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coalition sought to reframe the voucher program debate around the 
free exercise of religion.48 
Leading reformers filed amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton,49 arguing 
that by preventing religious private schools from receiving public 
funds, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions contravened the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.50  The Supreme Court, in a 
5–4 decision, held that public employees could provide remedial 
education at parochial schools so long as this “aid is allocated on the 
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor 
religion.”51  The Supreme Court did not expressly address the Free 
Exercise Clause. Rather, it applied the Establishment Clause, 
concluding that the proper inquiry is “whether the government acted 
with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion.”52  Five years 
later, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,53 the Court held voucher programs 
do not violate the Establishment Clause when they (1) are “neutral with 
respect to religion” and (2) “provide[] assistance directly to a broad class 
of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly 
as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice.”54  
Although the Supreme Court held that vouchers did not run afoul 
of the religion clauses of U.S. Constitution,55 several high state courts 
have struck down voucher programs under state constitutional 
provisions.  For example, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down a 
voucher program under Article 3 of the Vermont State Constitution, 
which prohibits, in pertinent part, any individual from being 
compelled to “support any place of worship.”56  The Vermont Supreme 
Court reasoned that “with no restrictions on the purpose or use of the 
tuition funds,” the program violated Article 3 by compelling taxpayers 
to support religious institutions through the use of public funds to pay 
tuition at private religious schools.57  Furthermore, in 2006, the Florida 
Supreme Court struck down the state’s voucher program for violating 
Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida State Constitution, which created a 
state mandate to provide public education to all Florida children 
                                               
 48. Minow, supra note 20, at 830. 
 49. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 50. Brief Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society at 6–15, Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (No. 96-552). 
 51. Felton, 521 U.S. at 230–32. 
 52. Id. at 222–23 (emphasis added). 
 53. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 54. Id. at 652. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 547 (Vt. 1999). 
 57. Id. at 563. 
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through a state-run school system.58  The Florida Supreme Court found 
that the voucher program diverted state resources to the education of 
children within the state “through means other than a system of free 
public schools.”59  Finally, in 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court also held 
that a program diverting public funds to education savings accounts to 
be used for private school tuition subverts the state’s constitutional 
provisions requiring funding for public.”60 
In addition to provisions mandating the creation of public 
education systems, nearly forty state constitutions61 contain “Blaine 
                                               
 58. Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:  “The education 
of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.  It is, 
therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the 
education of all children residing within its borders.  Adequate provision shall be 
made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free 
public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the 
establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and 
other public education programs that the needs of the people may require . . . .”  
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006). 
 59. Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 407. 
 60. Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 891 (Nev. 2016) (en banc).  Article 11, Section 2 
of the Nevada State Constitution provides:  “The legislature shall provide for a uniform 
system of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each 
school district at least six months in every year, and any school district which shall allow 
instruction of a sectarian character therein may be deprived of its proportion of the 
interest of the public school fund during such neglect or infraction, and the legislature 
may pass such laws as will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school 
district upon said public schools.”  NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 61. The following is a list of the forty states and their respective Blaine provisions: (1) ALA. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 263; (2) ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; (3) ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; id. art. IX, 
§ 10; (4) ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; (5) CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 8, 9(f); id. art. XVI, § 5; (6) 
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; (7) DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; (8) FLA. CONST. art I, § 3; (9) GA. CONST. 
art. I, § 2, para. 7; (10) HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; (11) IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §§ 5, 6; (12) ILL. 
CONST. art. X, § 3; (13) IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; (14) KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c); (15) KY. CONST. 
§ 189; (16) MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; id. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2; (17) MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
id. art. VIII, § 2; (18) MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; (19) MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 208; (20) MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. IX, § 8; (21) MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; (22) NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; 
(23) NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 9, 10; (24) N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII; (25) N.M. CONST. 
art. XII, § 3; id. art. XXI, § 4; (26) N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; (27) N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5; 
(28) OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; (29) OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; id. art. II, § 5; id. art. XI, § 5; (30) 
OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; (31) PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 15, 29; (32) S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; (33) S.D. 
CONST. art. VI, § 3; id. art. VIII, § 16; id. art. XXII, para. 4; (34) TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. 
VII, § 5(c); (35) UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. III, § 4; id. art. X, §§ 1, 9; (36) VA. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 16; id. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11; (37) WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; id. art. IX, § 4; id. art. XXVI, para. 4; 
(38) W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; (39) WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; id. art. X, §§ 3, 6; (40) WYO. 
CONST. art. I, § 19; id. art. III, § 36; id. art. VII, § 8; id. art. XXI, § 28. 
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Amendments.”62  Although the language of these provisions varies 
slightly, Blaine Amendments prohibit states from distributing public 
education funds to religious schools.63  Although Blaine’s proposed 
amendment failed at the national level, Congress began encouraging 
existing states to adopt similar provisions, and conditioned statehood 
on states including similar provisions in their new constitutions.64 
While Blaine Amendments have been the basis of several legal 
challenges to school choice, only a few states’ high courts have 
invalidated voucher programs under these provisions.  In 2009, for 
example, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down two state voucher 
programs, one created for students with disabilities and the other for 
foster children, for violating Arizona’s Blaine provision.65  In 2015, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that a local school district’s voucher 
program violated Colorado’s version of the Blaine Amendment.66  
Furthermore, the Supreme Courts of Florida and Nevada each declined to 
address the challenges brought under the Blaine provisions of those states, 
deciding instead on the education mandate provisions discussed above.67  
                                               
 62. These provisions are named for Representative James Blaine of Maine, who 
proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Mark Edward DeForrest, An 
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:  Origins, Scope, and First Amendment 
Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 556 (2003).  Blaine’s proposed amendment 
stated: “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State 
for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any 
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, 
nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects 
or denominations.”  Id. (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 
205 (1875)).  Blaine sought to capitalize on President Grant’s agenda for “good 
common school education” and attack on “sectarian schools” to purportedly to 
protect the separation of Church and State.  Id. at 558.  In Mitchell v. Helms, the 
Supreme Court noted that Grant’s agenda, and the subsequent Blaine Amendment, 
arose from “pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church . . . and it was an open secret 
that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’”  530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (citing Steven K. 
Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992)).  See generally 
DeForrest, supra note 62, at 558–65.  Ultimately, after significant debate, the proposed 
amendment fell short of the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the Senate.  Id. at 569–73. 
 63. DeForrest, supra note 62, at 573–74. 
 64. Mercedes Schneider, The Testing of States’ Blaine Amendments—No Public 
Funding of Religious Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 5, 2017, 11:10 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-testing-of-states-blaine-amendments-no-
public_us_58bcdaf7e4b02eac8876d08a. 
 65. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180, 1185 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 
ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 10). 
 66. Colorado State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325, 2325 (2017). 
 67. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 408–09 (Fla. 2006); Schwartz v. Lopez, 
382 P.3d 886, 902 (Nev. 2016) (en banc). 
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On the other hand, the Indiana and Oklahoma Supreme Court 
upheld voucher programs against Blaine Amendment challenges.  
Echoing the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, the Indiana and Oklahoma Supreme Courts reasoned that 
parents and students, not private religious schools, were the direct 
beneficiaries of the public funds and were able to make an 
independent choice about where to spend those funds.68  Despite this 
mixed record, voucher proponents, including Secretary DeVos’s non-
profit,69 have vilified state Blaine provisions as antiquated, bigoted, and 
contrary to educational and religious freedom.70 
In 2017, the Supreme Court gave voucher proponents a significant 
boost when it held that a policy of Missouri’s Department of Natural 
Resources—based on the state’s Blaine provision—violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.71  Some members of the Court tried to narrow the 
opinion by including a footnote that states:  “This case involves 
express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to 
playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of funding 
or other forms of discrimination.”72  However, this footnote did not 
carry the weight of the majority; although Chief Justice Roberts 
authored the majority opinion, he, Justice Gorsuch and Justice 
Thomas explicitly dissented from that part of the decision.73  
Moreover, on the following day, the Court vacated and remanded the 
Colorado Supreme Court decision striking down a voucher program 
under Colorado’s Blaine provision for further consideration in light 
                                               
 68. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d. 1213, 1226 (Ind. 2013).  Notably, the Indiana 
Supreme Court found that the voucher program did not violate educational 
mandates in the Indiana Constitution, contrary to the Florida and Nevada decisions, 
because the State General Assembly had “broad discretion” about how to fulfill this 
obligation.  Id.; Oliver v. Hofmeister, 368 P.3d 1270, 1277 (Okla. 2016). 
 69. See James G. Blaine:  Who Was He, and How is He Affecting Children’s Education 
Today?, EDCHOICE (May 24, 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/james-g-blaine-
affecting-childrens-education-today (chastising “opponents of educational freedom” for 
using these “antiquated and historically bigoted amendments” to “thwart” school choice). 
 70. DeForrest, supra note 62, at 625; Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the 
Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious Options from School Choice Programs, 18 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 48, 50 (2017); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State 
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 118 (2000); Richard D. Komer & Clark Neily, School 
Choice and State Constitutions:  A Guide to Designing School Choice Programs INST. FOR JUST. 
& AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL 4 (2007), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/ 
school_choice/50statereport/50stateSCreport.pdf. 
 71. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017). 
 72. Id. at 2024 n.3. 
 73. Id. at 2025–26. 
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of Trinity Lutheran.74  Thus, the case “may very well open the door” to 
voucher programs that include religious entities.75 
B.   The Current Push for Voucher Programs 
As of the 2017–2018 school year, there are twenty-six active  
state-funded voucher programs across fifteen states and the District of 
Columbia.76  Many of these states have more than one program.  For 
example, in Ohio, there are five different voucher programs.77  Some 
of Ohio’s programs are statewide and serve a particular student 
population, such as students with autism, while other programs cover 
local areas within Ohio.78  Of the fifteen states with school voucher 
programs, three allow only “Town Tuitioning Programs,” which 
provide public funds for students who live in a town without a public 
school to attend either a public school in another town or a non-
religious private school.79  The voucher programs of the remaining 
                                               
 74. Colorado State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325, 2325 (2017).  
On remand, the Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot at the request of both 
parties after a newly-elected school board voted to end the voucher program.  Erica Meltzer, 
The Douglas County Voucher Case is Finally over, CHALKBEAT (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2018/01/26/the-douglas-county-voucher-case-is-finally-
over; Marianne Goodland, Douglas County School Board Ends Controversial Voucher Program, 
COLORADOPOLITICS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://coloradopolitics.com/douglas-county-school-board-
ends-controversial-voucher-program. 
 75. See William S. Koski, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer Decision:  What Does It 
Mean for School Vouchers?, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (July 4, 2017), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/07/04/trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer-decision-
what-does-it-mean-for-school-vouchers (arguing “Trinity Lutheran should provide 
cause for concern among those who oppose school vouchers generally and those 
who oppose vouchers for religious schools specifically”); Frank Ravitch, Symposium:  
Trinity Lutheran and Zelman—Saved by Footnote 3 or a Dream Come True for Voucher 
Advocates?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2017, 10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017 
/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer-zelman-v-simmons-harris-saved-
footnote-3-dream-come-true-voucher-advocates. 
 76. School Choice:  School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice. 
org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/#map-overlay (last modified June 26, 
2018) [hereinafter Dashboard].  As of February 2018, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin all have voucher programs.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. These states are Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.  Id.; School Choice:  
New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org 
/school-choice/programs/new-hampshire-town-tuitioning-program (last visited Aug. 
17, 2018) [hereinafter New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program].  New Hampshire 
added this program for the 2017 school year and data is not available yet, but in 
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twelve states, require students to:  (1) be in a low-income family; (2) 
attend or be slated to attend a low performing school; (3) have an 
identified disability; (4) be in an active-duty military family; or (5) be in 
foster care.80  For some voucher programs, students are eligible if they 
satisfy one of these factors;81 in other programs, students are only eligible 
if they satisfy two or more of these factors.82  Less than half of the 
voucher programs require a student be enrolled in a public school 
before receiving a voucher, but most provide a variety of ways to waive 
this requirement.83  Furthermore, there are generally only minimal 
requirements for private schools to participate in the program.  A 
school must prove financial stability, secure accreditation by the state or 
an approved accrediting agency, and participate in state assessments.84 
Of the twenty-six voucher programs, half are specifically tailored to 
students with identified disabilities.85  Some of these programs are 
designed to address a particular disability, such as autism or dyslexia,86 
but most are generally available to students with any disability identified 
                                               
Maine and Vermont only 3% and 4% of students statewide are eligible for Town 
Tuitioning Programs.  Id; Dashboard, supra note 76. 
 80. School Choice:  Vouchers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/education/school-choice-vouchers (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 81. School Voucher Laws:  State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/voucher-law-comparison (last visited Aug. 
17, 2018) [hereinafter School Voucher Laws:  State-by-State Comparison] (showing that 
Vermont’s Town Tuitioning Program only requires that the student live in a district 
where there is no operating school). 
 82. Id. (stating Oklahoma’s Lindsey Nicole Henry Students with Disabilities 
Scholarship Program requires that the student with a disability have an IEP and have 
attended a public school during the previous school year). 
 83. Id.  (stating that Arkansas waives the requirement if the student’s parent is in 
the military on active duty, and that North Carolina does not apply this requirement 
to a student that is in foster care). 
 84. Josh Cunningham, Interactive Guide to School Choice Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGIS. (June 15, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/interactive-
guide-to-school-choice.aspx [hereinafter School Choice Laws]. 
 85. Some programs include:  Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarships for Students 
with Disabilities Program, Georgia’s Special Needs Scholarship Program, Louisiana’s 
School Choice Program for Certain Students with Exceptionalities, Mississippi’s 
Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship for Students with Dyslexia Program, and Wisconsin’s 
Special Needs Scholarship Program.  Dashboard, supra note 76. 
 86. School Choice:  Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship for Students with Dyslexia 
Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/mississippi-
dyslexia-therapy-scholarship-for-students-with-dyslexia-program (last visited Aug. 17, 
2018); School Choice:  Ohio—Autism Scholarship Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice. 
org/school-choice/programs/ohio-autism-scholarship-program (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
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under federal law.87  Yet, to accept a voucher, these programs require 
parents to waive their child’s rights under federal law.88  The majority of 
these specialized programs also have fewer accountability requirements 
for participating private schools than the general voucher programs 
because they do not require students to take state assessments.89  Three 
of these programs explicitly create segregated educational systems for 
students with disabilities by requiring the funds be spent at schools with 
specialized instruction.90  Thus, these programs mandate that students 
with disabilities attend a specialized private school, which means that 
they will be at a school with only other students with disabilities.  
Therefore, these students with disabilities will be separated from—and 
unable to interact with—students without disabilities.  Separate schools for 
students with disabilities is the very essence of segregation on the basis of 
disability. 
                                               
 87. See e.g., School Voucher Laws:  State-by-State Comparison, supra note 81 (listing 
student eligibility requirements for voucher programs by state).  Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah all list 
having an IEP or “certain disabilities” as a characteristic making a student eligible for 
the state’s respective voucher program.  Id. 
 88. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Nat’l Disability Policy:  A Progress Report 60 (2012).  
Although the NCD articulated several concerns regarding special voucher programs in 
this report, “[c]hief among these is that once students with disabilities use a voucher to 
attend a private school, they and their family relinquish rights under the IDEA . . . .”  Id. 
 89. See e.g., School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “LA” 
on interactive map).  Louisiana’s general voucher program requires participating 
schools to administer an assessment to all voucher recipients, but they cannot 
administer standardized tests.  The North Carolina Opportunity Scholarship 
Program requires that participating schools be accredited by a state or approved 
agency and administer state or approved national assessment, and allows schools to 
charge voucher students more tuition than non-voucher students.  Id.  (follow 
hyperlink; then click on “NC” on interactive map).  North Carolina Special 
Education Scholarship Grants for Children with Disabilities only requires 
participating schools to: (1) meet with health and safety regulations and (2) comply 
with state and federal antidiscrimination laws.  Id. 
 90. See id. (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on interactive map).  Mississippi 
has two special education school voucher programs:  the Nate Rogers Scholarship for 
Students with Disabilities Program and the Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship 
for Students with Dyslexia Program.  Id.  These programs require that instruction be 
provided by a certified speech therapy pathologist or a licensed dyslexia therapist, 
respectively, by implication this means these students will be educated in segregated 
environments.  Id.  Additionally, Louisiana’s School Choice Program for Certain 
Students with Exceptionalities requires participating schools “must have been in 
operation and providing special education for at least two years.”  Id.  Consequently 
they are filtering these students out of the integrated public school system and into a 
segregated private system.  Id.  (follow hyperlink; then click “LA” on interactive map). 
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However, proponents of special education voucher programs argue 
that the programs allow dissatisfied parents an easier way to leave a 
public school than through the processes set forth under federal 
disabilities laws.91  These voucher advocates minimize the waiver of 
federal disability law protections, specifically the IDEA, equating it to 
waiving the right to use public school facilities, such as the school 
cafeteria.92  These arguments gloss over the significant procedural 
safeguards, due process rights, and school accountability contained in 
the IDEA.93  Additionally, supporters argue that these programs also save 
money by preserving resources that would otherwise be otherwise be spent 
on litigation.94  Like most voucher advocates, these supporters tout freedom 
of choice and emphasize failures of the current educational system.95 
On the other hand, opponents argue that many of these special 
education voucher proponents have another legislative agenda:  the 
advancement of general education voucher programs.96  These opponents 
contend that children with disabilities have become “poster children 
for the voucher movement because it is difficult politically to argue 
against benefits that will serve this vulnerable group.”97  National school 
choice organizations and religious organizations have both lobbied state 
legislators to pass special education voucher programs.98  It is evident that 
these organizations use special needs as a front to pass voucher legislation, 
                                               
 91. Hensel, supra note 5, at 294–95; Stuart Buck, Special Education Vouchers Are 
Beneficial:  A Response to Hensel, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 651, 654–56, 659 (2012); see also Can 
School Choice Help Students with Special Needs?, CHILDREN’S EDUC. SERVS. (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.ces-schools.net/can-school-choice-help-students-special-needs 
(discussing purported “Myths” and “Facts” regarding vouchers for students with 
disabilities).  The Children’s Educational Services asserts as “Fact” that “[e]vidence 
indicates that private schools better serve many students with special needs” because 
of studies into parent reported satisfaction with voucher programs.  Id.  These studies 
are tainted because private schools are not required to complete objective 
assessments and other accountability measures.  Rather private school academic 
reports are subjective and they have an incentive to provide good reports to keep 
students enrolled.  Hensel, supra note 5, at 334–35.  “In Florida, for example, there 
are reports of McKay scholarship students who received high grades in private 
schools only to find that they were several grade levels behind when returning to 
public school.”  Id. at 335. 
 92. See Buck, supra note 91, at 659 (stating that parents who use private school 
vouchers are free to return their children to public schools, at which time all of their 
rights will reappear). 
 93. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 94. Hensel, supra note 5, at 295. 
 95. See generally Buck, supra note 91, at 653–60. 
 96. Hensel, supra note 5, at 295–96. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 296–97. 
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since legislatures enacting special education voucher program immediately 
introduced bills for universal school choice.99 
Additionally, several key disability advocacy groups oppose voucher 
programs,100 which stands in stark contrast to the voucher 
proponents’ narrative that these programs offer parents better 
choices to suit their children’s needs.101  Most notably, the National 
Council on Disability (NCD)102 highlighted several concerns about 
special education voucher programs in its 2012 report to President 
Obama and Congress.103  In the report, the NCD noted “several areas 
of concern.”  The NCD reported that private schools accepting 
vouchers (1) require students relinquish their rights under the IDEA; 
(2) have higher tuition than the dollar amount vouchers cover; (3) 
have a history of refusing admission to students with disabilities; and 
(4) lack a “demonstrable commitment to the IDEA principle of 
accountability in results.”104  To address the detrimental effects these 
programs have on students with disabilities, the NCD made two 
recommendations.  First, recipients of vouchers should not be required 
to forfeit their rights under the IDEA and schools that accept state 
funds should be mandated to publish assessment scores, graduation 
                                               
 99. Id. 
 100. See Wendy F. Hensel, Recent Developments in Voucher Programs for Students with 
Disabilities, 59 LOY. L. REV. 323, 351–53 (2013); see also Milwaukee Voucher Schools Still 
Discriminate Against Students with Disabilities, ACLU OF WIS. (July 19, 2015), 
http://www.aclu-wi.org/media/milwaukee-voucher-schools-still-discriminate-against-
students-disabilities (discussing continued discrimination after ACLU filed complaint 
with the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division because students with 
disabilities were told not to apply for vouchers because the schools could not serve 
them, or, if admitted, did not provide the support and accommodations these 
students required); AGAINST House Bill 1335, “Special Education Vouchers,” RAISE YOUR 
HAND TEX. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.raiseyourhandtexas.org/key-issues/ 
testimony/house-bill-1335-special-education-vouchers (testimony of Dr. Ann Smisko 
before the Texas House Committee on Public Education against special education 
vouchers); Vouchers, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTYS & ADVOCS., INC., http://www.copaa.org 
/page/Voucher (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (recommending against vouchers 
because “[f]ar too many students are being forced to relinquish important civil rights 
in order to access public education funds”). 
 101. See CHILDREN’S EDUC. SERVS., supra note 91 (purporting to address the “myth” 
that “private schools cannot serve and exclude students with special needs”). 
 102. The NCD is an independent federal agency tasked with annual reporting “on 
the nation’s progress in achieving our national disability policy goals.  NAT’L COUNCIL 
ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 1.  The national disability policy goals are “equality of 
opportunity, independent living, full participation and economic self-sufficiency for 
an estimated 54 million Americans with disabilities.”  Id. 
 103. Id. at 60–61. 
 104. Id. 
2018] THE FALLACY OF CHOICE 1815 
rates, and other outcomes concerning disabled students. students with 
disabilities.105  The NCD cautioned that publicly-funded vouchers 
should not be used to create a “segregated educational system for students 
with disabilities.”106  Second, the NCD called on the Department of 
Education (ED) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue 
guidance “to clarify the civil rights violations that may be linked to 
creating a publicly financed . . . segregated educational system for 
students with disabilities,” including the creation of programs that 
segregate “on the basis of a specific disability or disability status more 
generally.”107  As of 2018, neither department has acted on this request.108 
C.   Support for Federally Funded Vouchers  
     Under the Trump Administration 
Like many of the Trump administration’s other first-term 
priorities, the push to create a federally funded school voucher 
program began as a promise on the campaign trail.109  Although then-
candidate Trump was “all over the map” during the campaign on 
educational policies, his “signature education proposal” was to 
provide $20 billion in federal funds to support a national voucher 
program with income-based eligibility.110  To demonstrate this 
commitment, President Trump nominated Betsy DeVos to lead the 
Department of Education (ED) although she never attended a public 
school, nor sent her own children to public schools.  Secretary DeVos 
is a billionaire who spent decades lobbying for the expansion of 
taxpayer funded voucher programs.111 
Throughout its first year, the Trump administration continued 
efforts to divert public funds to school choice programs.  In his first 
ever speech to Congress as President, Trump called for an education 
                                               
 105. Id. at 61. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. 
 108. NCLD Policy Team, President’s FY19 Budget Doesn’t Add Up to Student Success, 
NCLD (2018), https://www.ncld.org/archives/action-center/what-we-ve-done/ 
presidents-fy19-budget-doesnt-add-up-to-student-success. 
 109. Stephanie Saul, Where Donald Trump Stands on School Choice, Student Debt and 
Common Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21 
/us/where-trump-stands-on-school-choice-student-debt-and-common-core.html; 
Trump Promise Checker, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/graphics/politics/trump-promise-tracker [hereinafter Trump Promise Checker]. 
 110. Saul, supra note 109. 
 111. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION (2010), 
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what.html. 
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bill that funds school vouchers for disadvantaged youth.112  However, 
other acts undertaken by the administration which were perceived to 
be more controversial overshadowed the calls for vouchers in the 
administration’s first year.113  Furthermore, in her first budget plan 
for the ED, Secretary DeVos proposed to shift $1.4 billion from 
federal funding of public school to private school vouchers and 
“other alternatives to traditional public schools.”114  Although Congress 
ultimately rejected this proposal,115  Secretary DeVos has indicated she 
will continue to push for a federal voucher program.116 
Secretary DeVos has also made it clear through her public remarks 
as Secretary of Education that she believes school vouchers are the 
best option for students with disabilities.117  This comes as no surprise; 
the voucher lobby organizations she launched and worked with 
previously have lobbied for special needs vouchers programs as part 
                                               
 112. Yamiche Alcindor, Trump’s Call for School Vouchers is a Return to a Campaign 
Pledge, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/us/ 
politics/trump-school-vouchers-campaign-pledge.html. 
 113. Tessa Berenson, Here Are the Promises President Trump Kept and Broke in His First 
Year, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5106302/donald-trump-first-year-promises. 
 114. Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Seeks to Slash Education Department 
but Make Big Push for School Choice, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-seeks-to-slash-education-
department-but-make-big-push-for-school-choice/2017/03/15/63b8b6f8-09a1-11e7-b77c-
0047d15a24e0_story. 
 115. Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Congress Rejects Much of Betsy 
DeVos’s Agenda in Spending Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/education/wp/2018/03/21/congress-rejects-much-of-betsy-devoss-agenda-in-
spending-bill. 
 116. See Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Allies See New Obstacle to School Choice Efforts:  
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/us/ 
politics/betsy-devos-school-choice-vouchers-trump.html (remarking how DeVos has 
reassured her supporters that she has not been deterred); Kimberly Hefling & Caitlin 
Emma, How Betsy DeVos Softened her Message on School Choice, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018, 
7:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/betsy-devos-school-choice-
education-397633 (discussing how DeVos is deliberately softening rhetoric on school 
choice to avoid detractors); see also Stahl, supra note 1 (stating that Secretary DeVos is 
striving for parents to be able to choose where to send their children to school); 
Erica L. Green, In Her Words:  Education Secretary Betsy DeVos Assesses a Year on the Job, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/politics/betsy-
devos.html (discussing how Secretary DeVos has not stopped fighting for the 
expansion of school choice). 
 117. See Valerie Strauss, The Deep Irony in Betsy DeVos’s First Speech on Special 
Education, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/answer-sheet/wp/2017/07/18/the-deep-irony-in-betsy-devoss-first-speech-on-special 
-education (noting that Secretary DeVos ignored that most special education children 
attend public schools, which lack needed resources, and instead focused on school choice). 
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of their broader agenda.118  Ironically, Secretary DeVos championed 
the parents involved in the 2017 Supreme Court decision on the 
IDEA for their “courage” to enroll their son in a private school while 
touting the importance of school choice programs.119  In reality, if these 
parents had accepted a voucher instead of enforcing their son’s rights 
under the IDEA, they would have waived the right to litigate the issue and 
receive compensation for the entire cost of the private school tuition.120 
Thus, despite being championed as a free-market solution to the 
education of American children, vouchers have an ugly history in this 
country. The Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that these 
programs do not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution and recently 
indicated it will not uphold state Blaine provisions that state courts 
previously used to invalidate voucher programs.  And, therefore, in 
the current climate, a federally funded voucher program will likely 
survive any challenges based on the separation of church and state. 
II.   SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICY AND LEGAL HISTORY 
Over the past thirty years, the number of children requiring special 
education services in the United States has risen by over two million.121  
This is largely due to the increase in identified developmental 
disabilities.122  As a result, by 2015, 6.7 million children, or thirteen 
percent of all public school students in America, received special 
education services.123  These children enjoy a right to education 
under federal law;124 however, special education voucher programs 
require children with disabilities to effectively waive these rights upon 
accepting a voucher because private schools are not accountable to 
the same federal disability laws as public schools.  This section 
                                               
 118. Background on Betsy DeVos from the ACLU of Michigan, ACLU OF MICH., 
https://www.aclu.org/other/background-betsy-devos-aclu-michigan (last visited Aug. 
17, 2018); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 61. 
 119. Strauss, supra note 117. 
 120. See infra Section III. 
 121. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHILDREN AND YOUTH WITH 
DISABILITIES tbl. 204.30, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2018) (stating that the number of students who received special 
education services increased from 4,144,000 in the 2001–2002 school year to 
6,677,000 in the 2015–2016 school year). 
 122. Id. (“In school year 2015–2016, a higher percentage of students ages [three]-
[twenty-one] received special education services under the IDEA for specific learning 
disabilities [thirty-four percent] than for any other type of disability.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (ensuring that all children with 
disabilities have access to free and appropriate public education). 
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provides a brief history of federal laws governing education, a 
discussion of special education law, an analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the law, and an examination of how these 
laws are significantly limited in the realm of privatized education. 
A.   The Origins of Federal Special Education Policy 
For most of the twentieth century, public school children with 
disabilities were denied legal protection.  In 1954, the Supreme Court 
made the groundbreaking declaration that separating children of 
different races in public education is “inherently unequal.”125 However, 
it took another twenty years for the federal courts to address the 
exclusion of children with disabilities from public school systems across 
America.126  Before the courts and Congress finally addressed the issue 
in the 1970s, millions of children with disabilities received little 
access—and often no access at all—to educational opportunities.127  In 
1967, state institutions housed nearly 200,000 individuals with 
disabilities.128  These institutions provided “only minimal food, 
clothing, and shelter,” and no education or rehabilitation services.129  
In 1970, only one in five children with a disability was educated at a 
public school.130  Many states excluded all children who were blind, 
deaf, emotionally disturbed, or intellectually disabled.131  While 
Congress passed laws increasing educational opportunities for children 
with disabilities throughout the 1950s and 1960s,132 it was the federal 
courts that brought truly significant change in the early 1970s.133  In 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, a federal 
district court held for the first time that children with intellectual 
disabilities who have been excluded from public education have a 
                                               
 125. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 126. The IDEA 40th Anniversary, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/osers/idea40 (last modified Dec. 1, 2015) (celebrating President 
Ford signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (Pub. L. 94-142) into 
law on November 29, 1975). 
 127. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN 
WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 3 (2010) [hereinafter THIRTY-FIVE YEARS]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 4 (listing legislative efforts including the Training of Professional 
Personnel Act of 1959 (Pub. L. 86-158), the Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961 (Pub. L. 87-
276), and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-10)). 
 133. Id. at 5. 
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colorable due process claim.134  The panel concluded that excluding 
students with disabilities from public schools created “such a stigma or 
badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.”135 
Later that year, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that the D.C. Board of Education violated the Due 
Process Clause when it expelled students with disabilities without a 
prior hearing.136  In support of its holding,137 the district court quoted 
lengthy passages from both Brown v. Board of Education138 and Bolling 
v. Sharpe.139  The judge evoked the Supreme Court’s reasoning that 
education “must be made available to all on equal terms”140 because 
to do otherwise imposes on the excluded children “an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.”141 
In the wake of these decisions, Congress began examining the plight 
of children with disabilities in the American education system.142  The 
investigation found that millions of children were not receiving an 
appropriate education, resulting in long-term societal costs.143  The 
investigation found that: 
of the more than 8 million children . . . with [disabilities] requiring 
special education and related services, only 3.9 million such children 
are receiving an appropriate education. 1.75 million [children with 
disabilities] are receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million 
[children with disabilities] are receiving an inappropriate education.144 
                                               
 134. Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 
279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“We begin with the contention that due process requires a 
hearing before retarded children may be denied a public education.  It is not disputed that 
prior to this suit, parents of retarded children who are plaintiffs were not afforded a hearing 
or, in many instances, even notice of their child’s exclusion from public school.”). 
 135. Id. at 295 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971)) (holding 
that it was a due process violation for the police to post a notice at all retail liquor 
establishments forbidding sales to a Mrs. Constantineau because of her “excessive drinking”). 
 136. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that 
children labeled as “behavioral problems, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed 
or hyperactive” have a right to publicly supported education). 
 137. Id. at 874–75. 
 138. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 139. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 140. 348 F. Supp. at 875 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
 141. Id. (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500). 
 142. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7 (1975) (explaining that the Senate investigation 
will help ensure that new federal legislation “will result in maximum benefits to 
[children with disabilities] and their families”). 
 143. Id. at 9–10; see also PETER W.D. WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR WRIGHT, WRIGHTSLAW:  
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 2007). 
 144. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (emphasis added). 
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The investigation further determined that, at best, it would cost 
taxpayers billions of dollars to maintain the children who were not 
being educated “in a minimally acceptable lifestyle.”145  Furthermore, 
Congress determined that these children may be “needlessly . . . 
forced into institutional settings” where “billions of dollars are 
expended each year to maintain persons in these subhuman 
conditions.”146  In response, Congress passed the Education of All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA),147 the first iteration of what 
later became the IDEA, which codified the right to a free appropriate 
public education for every child with a disability across the country.148 
B.   The Substantive Rights for Children with Disabilities in Federal Law 
This section will first briefly describe federal protections for 
individuals with disabilities that intersect with education.  Next, this 
section will discuss the rights bestowed by the IDEA on students with 
disabilities in public schools, and the IDEA’s process for resolving 
disputes about whether schools are respecting those rights.  This 
section will then explain the crucial differences between the IDEA 
protections, and those provided by section 504 and the ADA.  This 
section will also describe the extent these federal disability laws apply 
to private elementary and secondary schools. 
1. Federal protections for individuals with disabilities that intersect with 
education 
A year before Congress directly addressed disability discrimination in 
public education, it sought to protect individuals with disabilities from 
                                               
 145. Id. at 10. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94–142 § 3(c), 
89 Stat 733 (1975) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012)).  To improve the 
lack of access to education identified by Congress, EAHCA set forth four primary 
purposes of federal special education legislation.  Id.  First, to assure that children 
with disabilities have access to “a free appropriate public education which 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs.”  Id.  Second, “to assure that the rights of [children with disabilities] and their 
parents . . . are protected.”  Id.  Third, “to assist States and localities to provide for 
the education of all [children with disabilities].”  Id.  Fourth, “to assess and assure the 
effectiveness of efforts to educate [children with disabilities].”  Id.  As the law evolved 
through the 1980s and 1990s, provisions were added to govern the following:  early 
intervention programs and services from birth to the age of three; transition services 
and planning from high school to adult living; integration of students with 
disabilities into general education classrooms; and disparities in the education of 
minority children with disabilities.  THIRTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 127, at 6–7. 
 148. Pub. L. 94–142 § 3(c), 89 Stat 733 (1975). 
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discrimination by any government agencies or programs receiving 
federal funds, by enacting the first major federal legislation to 
address disability discrimination in the United States.149  Section 504 
prohibits any agency that receives federal funding from discriminating 
against qualified persons with disabilities in its employment, programs, 
or services.150  It applies to all institutions that receive federal funding, 
including public school districts, higher education institutions, and 
“other state and local education agencies”.151  However, it does not 
protect individuals with disabilities from acts of private discrimination by 
private employers, programs, or facilities.152  Disability rights advocates 
therefore continued to lobby for more comprehensive legislation.153 
Nearly twenty years later, these lobbying edits bore fruit in the form 
of the ADA.  Modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,154 Congress 
passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”155  The regulations under Title II of the ADA prohibit 
discrimination by state and local governments, and the regulations 
under Title III prohibit discrimination by public accommodations, 
including businesses and non-profit service providers.156  Public schools, 
as a part of state or local government, are therefore prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of disability under Title II.  Moreover, the 
Title III definition of public accommodations includes “a nursery, 
elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or post-graduate private school, 
or other place of education.”157 
                                               
 149. RANDY S. CHAPMAN, THE EVERYDAY GUIDE TO SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW:  A 
HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS, TEACHERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 81 (2d ed. 2008). 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (providing that “[n]o otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency”). 
 151. Protecting Students with Disabilities:  Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and 
the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Protecting 
Students with Disabilities]. 
 152. § 794(a). 
 153. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (extending 
more comprehensive legal protections to persons with disabilities in 1990). 
 154. Introduction to the ADA, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Introduction to the ADA]. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 156. Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154. 
 157. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2017). 
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While the ADA contains strong prohibitions against discrimination 
by public accommodations, religious entities—including religious 
private schools—are exempt from the ADA’s requirements.158  Under 
the ADA, a religious entity is defined broadly as “a religious 
organization, including a place of worship.”159  According to a 2014 
survey by the ED, approximately sixty-nine percent of private schools in 
the United States—enrolling roughly 3.6 million students—are 
religious and, therefore, exempt from the ADA.160 
2. The IDEA 
While section 504 and the ADA provided important prohibitions 
against discrimination on the basis of disability, neither specifically 
addressed disability discrimination in education.  Congress finally 
addressed this by passing the IDEA.  The IDEA was specifically designed to 
combat the pervasive problems of exclusion and segregation inhibiting 
access to education for children with disabilities.161  It regulates the 
education of children with disabilities to ensure they have the equal access 
to public education due to them under the Fourteenth Amendment.162  
The IDEA does this in four ways.  First, it establishes the core right of a 
“free appropriate public education,” (FAPE) and defines associated key 
concepts.163  Second, it abrogates state sovereign immunity from 
suit.164  Third, the IDEA creates the Office of Special Education 
Programs within the ED to administer and carry out its functions and 
processes.165  Finally, the IDEA allocates federal funding to supplement 
states’ per-pupil spending for students with disabilities.166 
The IDEA applies to students who have a qualifying disability.167  The law 
ensures children with disabilities have access to meaningful educational 
                                               
 158. § 36.102(e). 
 159. § 36.104. 
 160. Statistics About Nonpublic Education in the United States, OFF. OF NON-PUB. EDUC., 
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).  In 
contrast, of the 31.3% nonsectarian private schools, only 4.8% focus on special education.  Id. 
 161. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 127, at 5–6. 
 162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 163. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–01 (2012). 
 164. § 1403. 
 165. § 1402. 
 166. § 1411.  Although Congress promised to fund “[forty] percent of the average 
cost to educate a child with disabilities” when it initially passed the law in 1975, as of 
February 2018, “the Federal Government pays less than half of what it originally 
promised in 1975.”  NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BROKEN PROMISES:  THE UNDERFUNDING 
OF IDEA 1 (2018) [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISES]. 
 167. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)–(B). 
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opportunities through a number of requirements and protections.  The 
IDEA requires schools to provide students with a “least restrictive” 
educational environment168 and develop an IEP to address the specific 
needs of each qualifying student.169  The IDEA also imposes strict rules 
governing suspensions and expulsions of students with a disability.170  
Moreover, although the IDEA does not expressly govern private 
schools,171 it does impose some responsibilities on public agencies for 
children with disabilities that attend private schools.172  
a. Key definitions, purpose, and process 
The IDEA establishes several key requirements to achieve its mission 
of improving educational access for children with disabilities.  These 
include creating the right to a free appropriate public education 
defining who is a “child with a disability.”173  The IDEA’s stated purpose 
is ensuring a free appropriate public education for children with 
disabilities,174 and defines a “free appropriate public education” as: 
special education and related services that—(A) have been 
provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary school, or secondary school in the State involved; and 
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education 
program required under section 1414(d) of this title.175 
The term “child with a disability” refers to any child who (1) has a 
disability that falls in one of ten categories,176 and (2) “by reason thereof, 
needs special education and related services.”177  For children aged three 
through nine, the term may also include a child with any developmental 
                                               
 168. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 169. § 1414(d). 
 170. § 1415(k). 
 171. Elementary and Secondary Schools are nonprofit institutional day or 
residential schools, including charter schools, that provide the respective level of 
education as determined by state law.  § 1401(6), (27).  Although discussed in the 
Act, “private school” is not a defined term.  § 1401. 
 172. § 1401(32) (defining “State educational agency”). 
 173. § 1401(3), (9). 
 174. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
 175. § 1401(9). 
 176. The ten categories of disability set forth in the IDEA are:  intellectual 
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language 
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance, 
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, and 
specific learning disabilities.  Id. § 1401(3)(A). 
 177. Id. 
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delay that requires “special education and related services” at the 
discretion of the State and local educational agency.178 
Under the IDEA, school districts and state educational agencies 
have an obligation to locate and identify all children with disabilities 
in the state through a process called “child find.”179  The initial 
evaluation process has two goals.  First, the school agency must determine 
whether the child has a disability that makes that child eligible for special 
education under the IDEA.180  Second, the school agency must establish 
the content of the child’s IEP.181  To do this, the school agency must 
identify the child’s present levels of performance and the child’s needs in 
order to progress in a general education setting or other appropriate 
placement.182 
Before the initial evaluation takes place, the school must acquire the 
written informed consent of the child’s parents.183  The school district is 
required to “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather 
relevant functional, developmental, and academic information, including 
information provided by the parent” in the evaluation process.184  Once the 
assessments are completed, a team of professionals and the parents of 
the child meet to determine whether the child has a disability under 
the IDEA and, if so, the educational needs of the child.185  After the 
initial evaluation and commencement of services, the IDEA requires a 
school district to re-evaluate the child at least every three years, or 
whenever a member of the IEP team186—such as a parent or school 
                                               
 178. Id. § 1401(3)(B). 
 179. § 1412(a)(3); see also Pamela Wright & Pete Wright, The Child Find Mandate:  
What Does It Mean to You?, WRIGHTSLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/child.find. 
mandate.htm (last revised Sept. 26, 2007). 
 180. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
 181. Section 1412(a)(4) states that an IEP must meet the eight content 
requirements listed § 1436(d). 
 182. § 1412(a)(4). 
 183. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I).  It is important to note that at this stage, the parent is 
consenting to the evaluation only.  The school district must receive separate consent 
from parents after the IEP is drafted to deliver any special education services.  
CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 21. 
 184. § 1414(b)(2)(A). 
 185. § 1414(b)(4)(A).  Children that are referred before kindergarten are often 
evaluated by a “child find team” for the school district, consisting of educational and 
therapy professionals like speech pathologists, occupational therapists, and 
psychologists that can perform the multi-disciplinary assessments.  See Wright & 
Wright, supra note 179 (describing the “child find” process for infants and children 
under three years of age). 
 186. Further, the IEP is crafted by an IEP team which must include the parents of 
the child with a disability, general and special education professionals, and a 
qualified representative for the school district who has knowledge regarding specially 
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administrator—requests it.187  The school district must also re-evaluate a 
student before the IEP team can determine that the child no longer has a 
qualifying disability, which would render that child no longer eligible for 
special education, services, and other protections under the IDEA.188  
Once a child with a disability has been identified through the initial 
evaluation, the IDEA requires that the school provide the child with the 
“special education” and other “related services” and support that particular 
child needs in order to receive a free appropriate public education. These 
requirements are described in the child’s IEP.189  Special education 
“means specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet 
the unique needs of a child with a disability.”190  The related services 
required by the IDEA consist of “transportation, and such developmental, 
corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a 
child with a disability to benefit from special education.”191  For example, 
suppose a child cannot complete written work because she cannot 
properly grip a pencil.  Occupational therapy that teaches the student 
how to grip a pencil would constitute a supportive service that is required 
                                               
designed instruction, the general education curriculum, and the school district’s 
resources.  Other individuals with special knowledge or expertise about the child 
may be included on the IEP team at the discretion of the parents or school.  For 
example, the team could include the student’s private therapist and, whenever 
appropriate, the child herself.  The statute specifies:  
(i) the parents of the child with the disability; (ii) not less than [one] 
regular education teacher . . . (if the child is, or may be participating in the 
regular [classroom]); (iii) not less than [one] special education  
teacher . . . ; (iv) a representative of the local educational agency who is 
qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed 
instruction . . . is knowledgeable about the general education curriculum, 
and is knowledgeable about the availability of resources at the local 
educational agency; (v) an individual who can interpret the instructional 
implications of evaluation results; and (vi) other individuals with special 
knowledge or expertise regarding the child . . . . 
§ 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 187. § 1414(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 188. § 1414(c)(5)(A). 
 189. § 1401. 
 190. § 1401(29). 
 191. § 1401(26)(A).  The definition provides a comprehensive list of “developmental, 
corrective, and other supportive services,” including: “speech-language pathology and 
audiology services; interpreting services; psychological services; physical and occupational 
therapy; recreation, including therapeutic recreation; social work services; and school 
nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate 
public education as described in the individualized education program of the child; 
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services; 
and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and 
evaluation purposes only.”  Id. 
1826 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
for the child to benefit from her special education.  This occupational 
therapy would therefore be part of the specially designed instruction 
that the school has to provide under the child’s IEP. 
A school district must also provide “supplementary aids and services” to 
enable students with disabilities to succeed in general education 
classrooms.192  These are “aids, services, and other supports that are 
provided in regular education classes or other education-related settings 
to enable children with disabilities to be educated with nondisabled 
children to the maximum extent appropriate.”193 
School districts often provide “supplementary aids and services” in the 
form of “accommodations” and “modifications.”194  Although they are 
similar, accommodations and modifications serve distinct purposes.  A 
“modification” changes the curriculum to enable a student to engage 
with the same subject matter as the rest of the class at a level appropriate 
for that child’s cognitive ability.195  For example, a student in a World 
History class may be given a shorter, easier reading assignment about 
Ancient Egypt than her peers.196  “Accommodations,” in contrast, are 
alterations in the classroom environment, content format, or equipment 
which enable a student with a disability to engage with the same curriculum 
as the rest of his or her peers.197  Accommodations may include extra time 
for testing, sign-language interpretation services, or large print materials.198  
A child with a disability may also use an “assistive technology device,” which 
is defined as “any item, piece of equipment, or product system . . . that is 
used to increase, maintain, or improve functional capabilities of a child with 
                                               
 192. See id. § 1412(a)(5) (requiring that schools receiving financial assistance 
place children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment). 
 193. § 1401(33). 
 194. See 34 C.F.R § 300.320(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mandating that the IEP be in 
writing and contain a description of the supplementary aids and services, 
modifications, and accommodations that are necessary for a child with disabilities to 
achieve his or her learning objectives). 
 195. What is the Difference Between Accommodation and Modification for a Student with a 
Disability?, DISABILITIES, OPPORTUNITIES, INTERNETWORKING, & TECH. (DO IT) (June 28, 
2017), https://www.washington.edu/doit/what-difference-between-accommodation-and-
modification-student-disability [hereinafter DO IT]. 
 196. See Erich Strom, The Difference Between Accommodations and Modifications, 
UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/learning-attention-issues/treatments-
approaches/educational-strategies/the-difference-between-accommodations-and-
modifications (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (providing examples of accommodations 
versus modifications in classroom instruction, classroom tests, standardized testing, 
and “special” classes like gym, music, and art). 
 197. DO IT, supra note 195. 
 198. See id. (listing computer text-to-speech systems and alternative keyboards as 
additional examples of accommodations). 
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a disability” as an accommodation.199  For example, a child with a disability 
that impairs his handwriting may use the talk-to-text feature on a computer 
to complete assignments that are normally handwritten. 
The specific mechanism for providing each child with his or her free 
appropriate public education is an Individualized Education Plan, or 
IEP.  The IEP is a detailed and comprehensive document of a student’s 
individual educational needs that must include statements of: 
(1) the child’s present levels of academic achievement and 
functional performance;200 
(2) measurable annual goals, including academic and functional 
goals;201 
(3) description of the child’s progress toward meeting the annual 
goals;202 
(4) the special education and related services, supplementary aids 
and services, and modifications the school will provide the child to 
“advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals” and “to 
be involved in and make progress in the general education 
curriculum . . . and to participate in extracurricular and other 
nonacademic activities;203 
(5) the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with 
nondisabled children in the regular class and extracurricular and 
other nonacademic activities;204 
(6) any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary 
to measure the academic achievement and functional performance 
on State and districtwide assessments;205 and 
(7) the projected date for the beginning of the services and 
modifications . . . and the anticipated frequency, location, and 
duration of those services and modifications.206 
                                               
 199. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1)(A) (2012). 
 200. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).  This statement must include how the child’s disability 
affects their “involvement and progress in the general education curriculum.”  
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). 
 201. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).  These goals must be crafted to “meet the child’s 
needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and 
make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the child’s 
other educational needs that result from the child’s disability.”  Id. 
 202. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (requiring that the IEP also establish when 
periodic reports on the child’s progress will be issued). 
 203. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 
 204. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V). 
 205. See § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI) (mandating that the IEP also include any 
modifications to the standardized testing process, such as taking an alternate 
assessment). 
 206. § 1414(d)(1)(a)(i)(VII). 
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Finally, the IDEA outlines which agencies are responsible for 
implementing the law at the state and federal level.  Because education 
systems vary from state to state, the IDEA uses generalized terms to 
describe the educational agencies at the local and state level responsible 
for providing free appropriate public education to children with 
disabilities.207  The “state educational agency” is the state’s highest 
governing agency, typically a state department of education, that is 
“primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary 
schools and secondary schools.”208  The state educational agency is 
responsible for ensuring state-wide procedural compliance with the 
IDEA and academic achievement consistent with the mission of the 
IDEA.209  A “local educational agency,” typically a school district, is a 
“public board of education or other public authority legally constituted 
within a State” to control or direct “public elementary schools or 
secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other 
political subdivision of a State.”210  The local educational agency is 
primarily responsible for identifying students with disabilities within its 
borders and developing and administering IEPs for each student with a 
disability who attends a school within its school system.211 “Educational 
service agency” is a broad term that encompasses any public administrative 
agency authorized by state law to manage and assist local educational 
agencies in overseeing a public school.212  At the federal level, the 
IDEA is enforced by the ED’s Office of Special Education Programs 
(OSEP).213  OSEP is charged with “administering and carrying out [the 
IDEA] and other programs and activities concerning the education of 
children with disabilities.”214 
b. The least restrictive environment requirement 
A core tenet of the IDEA is the principle that students with disabilities 
have the right to be educated in the “least restrictive environment”—
attending their neighborhood schools and integrating into general 
                                               
 207. See § 1401(19)(A) (defining a “local educational agency” as a public board of 
education “or other public authority” involved in directing schools; see also id. 
§ 1401(19)(B) (including “any other public institution or agency” directing 
education within the definition of an “educational service agency”). 
 208. § 1401(32). 
 209. § 1412(11). 
 210. § 1401(19)(A). 
 211. § 1412. 
 212. § 1401(5). 
 213. § 1402(a). 
 214. Id. 
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education classrooms—to the maximum extent possible.215  Consequently, 
a school must first consider providing supplementary services in the 
regular classroom before it may separate a student from her peers.216 
Circuit courts are split three ways on how to apply the IDEA’s least 
restrictive environment mandate.  Firstly, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits use a two-part test first enunciated in Daniel R.R. v. Board of 
Education.217  Under this test, the court first assesses whether a school 
can provide an appropriate education in a regular classroom through 
the use of supplemental aids and services.  If the court concludes this 
is not possible, the court next determines whether the school district 
has “mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.”218  
In applying the second part of the test, the court considers the 
following non-exhaustive factors:  first, steps the school district has 
taken to accommodate the child in the regular classroom; second, 
comparison of the academic benefits the child will receive in the 
regular classroom with those she will receive in the special education 
classroom; third, the child’s overall regular educational experience, 
including non-academic benefits; and finally, the effect that the disabled 
student’s presence in the regular classroom will have on that classroom.219 
Secondly, the Ninth, Eleventh, and Seventh Circuits use a slight 
variant of the Daniel R.R. test.  Courts in these circuits apply the two-
part test described above, but when applying the second part of the 
                                               
 215. See id. § 1412(5).  “To the maximum extent appropriate, children with 
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, 
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular 
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a 
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”  Id.  Furthermore, in In L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. 
Nebo School District, the Tenth Circuit stated that, “[e]ducating children in the least 
restrictive environment in which they can receive an appropriate education is one of 
the IDEA’s most important substantive requirements.”  379 F.3d 966, 976 (10th Cir. 
2004) (citing Murray v. Monrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 926 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 216. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 13.  The IDEA provides “[t]o the maximum extent 
appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, 
and special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the 
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of 
a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”  20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A). 
 217. 874 F.2d 1036, 1048–49 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 218. L.B., 379 F.3d at 976 (citing Murray v. Montrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 926 n.10 
(10th Cir. 1995)) (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1989))). 
 219. Id. (citing Murray, 51 F.3d at 926 n.10; Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 
1216–17 (3d Cir. 1993); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–50)). 
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test, they also balance the educational benefits of the child with a 
disability against the cost to the school district of doing so.220 
Finally, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits employ a single-part 
test for assessing the least restrictive environment requirement.  In 
these circuits, “[i]n a case where the segregated facility is considered 
superior, the court should determine whether the services which 
make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-
segregated setting.”221  If these services can be provided in a regular 
classroom, then placing the student in a separate classroom violates 
the least restrictive environment requirement.222 
As the Tenth Circuit points out, the test used by the Fourth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Circuits only applies when the segregated facility is 
considered superior, and is therefore at odds with the mission of the 
IDEA.223  Thus, the majority of Circuits appropriately use the Daniel 
R.R. test and accompanying factors to determine if a school district 
has complied with the least restrictive environment mandate. 
c.  The Individualized Education Program 
The next vital component of the IDEA are the specific requirements 
that govern the process of creating and documenting an IEP.  As 
discussed above, the IEP must include several components that capture 
the child’s current abilities and goals for the next academic year.224  
When developing the IEP, the team must consider the child’s 
strengths, the parents’ concerns for “enhancing the education of their 
child,” the child’s most recent evaluation by the school district, and 
“the academic, developmental, and functional needs of the child.”225  
The IEP must include a description of the supplementary aids and 
services that the school will provide for the student, along with any 
modifications or accommodations.226 
The IDEA also sets forth clear guidelines regarding the IEP for 
transfer students, both within the same state and from out of state;227 
                                               
 220. See id. at 976–77 (referencing Sch. Dist. of Wis. Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671 
(7th Cir. 2002); Sacramento City Unified Sch. District v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 221. DeVries v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. N.W. R-1 
Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 222. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. 
 223. See id. (noting that, alternatively, the Daniel R.R. test is applicable in all cases 
and conforms with the language and goals of IDEA). 
 224. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (2012). 
 225. § 1414(d)(3)(A). 
 226. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 
 227. § 1414(b)(3)(D). 
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transition services for matriculation planning;228 and the process for 
review, revising, and amending the IEP.229 
d. Procedural and disciplinary protections 
The IDEA provides procedural safeguards to ensure that schools 
do not deprive students with disabilities of a free appropriate public 
education.230  The school systems must give parents an opportunity to 
review all school records “with respect to the identification, 
evaluation, and educational placement of the child and the provision 
of a free appropriate public education to such child.”231  They require 
that parents receive “written prior notice,” in their native language, 
whenever the school system proposes or refuses to initiate or change 
“the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or 
the provision of free appropriate public education to the child.”232  The 
IDEA also establishes procedures to protect children whose parents are 
not known, or cannot be located.233  The state may appoint a surrogate 
who is involved in the education or care of the child but does not work 
for any of the educational agencies, state or local.234  Finally, the IDEA 
requires that schools give parents a copy of these procedural safeguards 
in their native language annually, or upon a referral or initial request for 
evaluation, filing a complaint, or request by the parent.235 
A child’s disability may inhibit the child’s ability to comply with school 
behavior and conduct rules.  For example, the disability may impair the 
extent to which the child can exercise self-control, understand the rules, 
or maintain focus and attention throughout the school day.  For a 
student facing these challenges to have an opportunity to flourish in an 
educational environment, it is therefore crucial that they be protected 
from adverse consequences that interfere with their education and 
which stem from behavior that is an instantiation of their disability.236  
Thus, the IDEA shields students by prohibiting the school from taking 
disciplinary action against a student whose conduct is a manifestation of 
                                               
 228. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). 
 229. § 1414(a)(2). 
 230. § 1415(a). 
 231. § 1415(b)(1). 
 232. § 1415(b)(3)–(4). 
 233. § 1415(b)(2)(A). 
 234. Id. 
 235. § 1415(d). 
 236. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–10 (1988) (explaining congressional 
intent to provide procedural safeguards for emotionally disturbed and disabled 
children who were unilaterally excluded from the educational process under 
previous iterations of the IDEA and related legislation). 
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his disability.237  School personnel may not move a child to another 
setting or suspend a child for more than ten consecutive school days in 
the same school year, even if for separate incidents of conduct, without 
first conducting a hearing to determine if the behavior at issue is a 
manifestation of the child’s disability.238  These hearings, known as 
manifestation determination hearings, are also required if a child is 
removed from the school through suspensions or being sent home for 
more than ten school days during any one school year.239  Once the hearing 
process is triggered, the IEP team, including the student’s parents, must 
meet within ten school days to determine if the behavior was a 
manifestation of the student’s disability or the result of the school agency’s 
failure to implement the IEP.240  If the team determines that the violation 
was a manifestation of the disability or failure to implement the IEP, the 
student is entitled to return to the same school with a behavioral plan and 
supplementary aids and services, unless the IEP team agrees that the child’s 
placement should be changed.241  In Honig v. Doe,242 the Supreme Court 
recognized that by creating this disciplinary procedural protection, 
“Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they 
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students.”243 
e. The IDEA and private schools 
The IDEA does not govern private schools.  The IDEA does, however, 
impose some obligations on public school districts with respect to 
children with disabilities within the district attending private school.  
These obligations may arise under one of three situations.  First, a public 
school may place a student with a disability in a private school as a way of 
                                               
 237. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E). 
 238. 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1) (2017). 
 239. § 300.530(b)(2).  School officials may remove a student to an “interim 
alternative education setting for not more than [forty-five] school days” regardless of 
whether the behavior is a manifestation of the student’s disability under “special 
circumstances,” including:  (1) possession of a weapon at school, on school premises, 
or at a local school function; (2) knowingly possessing, using, selling, or soliciting 
illegal drugs or a controlled substance at school, on school premises, or at a school 
function; or (3) inflicting serious bodily injury upon another person while at school, 
on school premises, or at a school function.”  Id. § 300.530(g). 
 240. § 300.530(e)(1). 
 241. § 300.530(e)–(f). 
 242. 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
 243. Id. at 323.  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, referenced the Mills 
decision, which held that the District of Columbia violated the Equal Protection 
Clause by excluding 12,000 to 18,000 disabled students from public education 
without due process due to exclusions, suspensions, and expulsions based on 
disciplinary ground.  Id. at 324. 
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meeting its core obligation under the IDEA to provide the student with 
a free appropriate public education.244  If the IEP team concludes that 
placement in a private school is the most effective way to provide the 
child free appropriate public education in the least restrictive 
environment, it may place the student in the private school—and, 
crucially, cover the cost of tuition at the private school.245  If the IEP 
team places a student in a private school, “the student is entitled to 
the same rights and services the student would receive if the student 
was placed in a public school.”246 
Second, parents may choose to place their child in a private school 
because they believe the public schools are contravening their child’s 
right to free appropriate public education.247  Under these circumstances, 
a court may order the school district to reimburse the parents for 
private school tuition after a due process hearing,248 if the parents 
establish that the school agency did not make a free appropriate 
public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to 
enrollment in the private school.249 
On the other hand, if a parent chooses to enroll a child in a private 
school for reasons other than a dispute over free appropriate public 
education, the IDEA offers little to no protection.  Under the “child 
find” mandate, the school district has an obligation to locate, identify, 
and evaluate all children within its borders.250  This includes children 
whose parents choose to place their children in private schools, 
rather than in the public school system.251  After the school district 
meets its “child find” obligation, however, its obligations towards 
private school students with disabilities differs drastically from its 
obligations to children with disabilities in the public school system.  
                                               
 244. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (2012). 
 245. Id.  The IDEA describes this circumstance of private school placement as a 
“means of carrying out the requirements” of the IDEA by the state.  Id. 
 246. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 75–76. 
 247. See id. at 76 (discussing parental placement as opposed to agency placement 
in a private school). 
 248. See discussion infra Section III.D.3. 
 249. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  Further, a court may reduce or deny 
reimbursement if:  (1) the parents did not inform the IEP team, at the last meeting 
or within ten days of enrollment, that they were rejecting the proposal to provide 
FAPE, including their concerns and intent to enroll the child in a private school; (2) 
the agency told parents it intended to evaluate the child and the parents did not make 
the child available for evaluation; or (3) “upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness 
with respect to actions taken by the parents.”  Id. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(iii). 
 250. See discussion supra Section III.D.2.a. 
 251. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I). 
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Although the district is required to provide a proportionate amount 
of IDEA funds to support services for children with disabilities, it has 
no individual obligation to children with disabilities enrolled in 
private schools.252  That is, none of the comprehensive procedures, 
obligations, and protections described in detail above, apply to 
students enrolled in a private school.  This includes students who are 
enrolled in a private school through a voucher program. 
If, after the initial evaluation process, the evaluators determine that 
a child who is parentally enrolled in a private school has a disability 
covered by the IDEA, that child does not have an individual right to 
free appropriate public education.253  Moreover, parents who choose 
to enroll their child in a private school do not have any of the IDEA’s 
procedural protections or due process rights regarding the education 
of their child with a disability.254  These parents cannot file a 
complaint under any part of the IDEA other than the “child find” 
process.255  In fact, most state departments of education have no 
authority to evaluate or explore complaints of any kind against private 
schools.256  The profound implications of the lack of protections 
children with disabilities voluntarily enrolled in private schools is 
explored in further detail in Part II.D. 
                                               
 252. 34 C.F.R. § 300.137 (2017). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. § 300.140. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See, e.g., Colorado Non-Public Schools, COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/nonpublic_index (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“A 
non-public school is considered a private business.  If you would like to file a 
complaint against a non-public organization, please contact the Attorney General’s 
Consumer Fraud Unit.”); Opening a Private School, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/private-schools/opening-a-private-
school.stml (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“Private Schools in Florida are not licensed, 
approved, accredited, or regulated by the State Board of Education or the local 
(school district) education agency.”); Nonpublic School Services:  FAQ, N.J. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., https://www.state.nj.us/education/nonpublic/faq.htm#Parent_Complaints_and_ 
NJDOE_Regulatory_Authority (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“The NJDOE regulates 
the provision of state and federally funded programs to students in nonpublic 
schools.  The NJDOE does not have the authority to intervene in matters of internal 
policy or parental disputes that are unrelated to the provision of these programs.”); 
Private Schools Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/ps/ 
psfaq.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“Private schools function outside the 
jurisdiction of the California Department of Education (CDE) and most state 
education regulations.  Private schools do not participate in California’s educational 
accountability system and are directly accountable to students and their parents or 
guardians, based on the terms of the private school enrollment period.”). 
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3.    The IDEA’s dispute resolution processes 
Disputes and conflicts may arise among members of the IEP team.  
Not surprisingly, such disagreements arise most commonly between 
the school district representatives and the child’s parents.  Conflicts 
may arise, for example, during the IEP evaluation or re-evaluation 
process, over differences about whether a student is eligible for 
services, the appropriate level of services, or the appropriate 
placement for the child may come to fruition or during manifest 
determination hearings. 
To resolve these disputes and conflicts, the IDEA outlines three 
formal processes:  a state education complaint process, mediation or 
a due process hearing.257  Congress added the mediation procedures, 
which includes a mandatory dispute resolution session prior to a due 
process hearing, in the most recent iteration of the IDEA.258  Mediation 
procedures were added to encourage alternative dispute resolution 
outside of the costly formal hearing processes.259  Generally, the 
primary purpose of the three dispute resolution processes is to remedy 
deficiencies in an IEP or services.260  Typically, the remedies sought 
are compensatory services designed to compensate the child for 
services due under the IDEA that were not provided in violation of 
the law.261  For example, if a child’s IEP requires the school to provide 
two hours of speech therapy a week and those services were not 
provided for the first half of the school year, the school may need to 
provide four hours of speech therapy a week for the second half of 
the year—the two hours required by the IEP and two hours of 
compensatory time.  In limited circumstances, monetary compensation 
may also be awarded.262  For example, if the parents in the above 
scenario paid for private speech therapy when the school failed to 
meet its obligation under the IEP, a school district would be required 
to reimburse the parents for these costs in lieu of compensatory 
services.263  A school district may also be required to take additional future 
actions to meets its obligation to provide a free appropriate public 
                                               
 257. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (2012) (complaint process); § 1415(e) (mediation); 
§ 1415(f) (impartial due process hearing). 
 258. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 48. 
 259. See id. at 50, 61. 
 260. See id. at 47 (“The procedural safeguards notice provides parents with the information 
they need if they disagree with actions of the school district or decisions of the IEP team.”). 
 261. See discussion infra Section III.D.3. 
 262. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b) (providing that remedies for denial of appropriate 
services may include compensatory services or monetary reimbursement). 
 263. Id. 
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education for a particular student.264  If a dispute is not resolved by either 
the state agency complaint process or mediation, and instead a due 
process hearing takes place, the hearing officer may impose additional 
remedies, such as those discussed below. 
Under the IDEA, the first stage of the formal dispute resolution 
process is the state education agency complaint process.265  The IDEA 
requires that all state education agencies make available internal 
processes to receive and resolve complaints about IDEA violations.266  A 
complaint may be filed by any individual or organization within one 
year of the alleged violation and must include:  (1) a statement that the 
public agency violated the IDEA; (2) facts that support the allegation; 
and (3) the complainant’s signature and contact information.267  If the 
complaint is about the school’s treatment of a specific child, it must 
also include the name and residence of the child, the school the child 
attends, and a proposed resolution to the problem alleged in the 
complaint.268  As a part of the mandate to resolve complaints, the 
state education agency may investigate the facts and circumstances 
underlying the complaint.269  If the state education agency determines 
that a child was denied appropriate services in violation of the IDEA, 
the agency may require a school to take corrective action, such as 
compensatory services or monetary reimbursement, and/or require 
appropriate future services for the child.270  The state complaint 
process provides parents with an option for resolution outside a 
formal hearing process.  This option is most effective when the violation 
is objectively clear on the facts of the complaint.271  When there are 
disagreements over the appropriateness of certain services or placement 
options, a formal due process hearing is a more effective forum for 
resolving the dispute, since this procedure has a due process hearing 
officer who can evaluate all the facts and circumstances.272 
                                               
 264. Id. § 300.151(b)(2) (requiring resolution of state complaint procedures to 
include both retrospective and prospective remedies as best practices for ensuring a 
free appropriate public education). 
 265. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2012). 
 266. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151. 
 267. § 303.153. 
 268. § 303.153(b)(4). 
 269. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 58 (describing the differences between a 
state education agency complaint and a due process hearing complaint). 
 270. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b). 
 271. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 59 (providing scenarios with clear facts in 
which the state complaint process would be most useful). 
 272. See id. 
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Second, under the IDEA, every state and local education agency 
must establish procedures to allow parties to resolve any disputes 
through a mediation process.273  The mediation process must be:   
(1) voluntary on the part of both parties; (2) not used to deny or 
delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing or other rights; and 
(3) is conducted by a qualified, impartial, trained mediator.274  The 
state must bear the cost of the mediation process and is responsible 
for maintaining a list of mediators knowledgeable in the special 
education laws and regulations.275  All mediation discussions are 
confidential and may not be used as evidence by either party in any 
subsequent due process or civil proceeding.276  If the parties reach an 
agreement through the mediation process, the parties then execute a 
legally binding agreement that sets forth the resolution.277  Mediation 
can be an excellent option for parents to resolve disputes under the 
IDEA because they can often navigate the mediation process without 
an attorney, they do not waive any rights to further proceedings, and 
the state bears the costs.278 
Finally, if a dispute is not resolved by either the state complaint 
process or mediation, a parent also has a right to an impartial due 
process hearing to resolve disputes or complaints alleging a violation 
of the IDEA.  A parent initiates the due process hearing procedures 
by providing the school with a due process complaint notice.279  
Furthermore, a parent must file this notice within two years of the 
date the parent or agency has actual or constructive knowledge about 
the alleged action that gives rise to the complaint.280  The complaint 
notice must include:  (1) the name, address, and school of the child 
who suffered the alleged violation; (2) “a description of the nature of 
such problem . . . including facts relating to the problem”; and (3) “a 
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and 
                                               
 273. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2012). 
 274. § 1415(e)(2)(A). 
 275. § 1415(e)(2)(C)–(D).f 
 276. § 1415(e)(2)(G). 
 277. § 1415(e)(2)(F).  The legally binding agreement must (1) state that all 
discussions that occurred during the mediation process are confidential and may not be 
used in subsequent hearings; (2) be signed by both the parent and a representative of the 
school district; and (3) be enforceable in any State or Federal court.  Id. 
 278. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 51 (outlining the mechanics of the mediation 
process when resolving disputes under the IDEA). 
 279. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). 
 280. § 1415(f)(3)(C). 
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available to the party at the time.”281  The substance of this initial 
complaint is critical because a party is not allowed to raise any issues 
at a due process hearing that were not raised in the due process 
complaint notice.282  The purpose of the complaint notice is to give 
the school district or the state education agency an opportunity to 
resolve the problem before a due process hearing convenes.283 
Once a parent sends a due process complaint notice, the school 
district can respond by either responding to the specific issues 
outlined in the complaint or challenging its sufficiency.284  If the 
school district decides to respond to the substantive issues in the 
complaint, it must send the response within ten days of receiving the 
notice.285  On the other hand, if the school district alleges the 
complaint is legally insufficient, it has fifteen days from receiving the 
complaint to respond.286  A hearing officer must make a determination 
about the legal sufficiency of the complaint within five days of receiving a 
response from the school district.287  If a parent is concerned about the 
sufficiency of, or substantive issues contained in, the complaint, they may 
amend it if either the school district consents to resolve the issues through a 
resolution meeting; or the hearing officer grants permission to amend the 
complaint no later than five days before the due process hearing.288 
Both sides have significant procedural rights and protections 
during an impartial due process hearing.  These rights and 
protections consist of the following:  (1) the right to be accompanied 
and advised by counsel and by individuals with specialized knowledge 
and training regarding children with disabilities; (2) the right to 
present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel attendance 
of witnesses; (3) the right to a written, or, at the option of the 
parents, electronic verbatim record of the hearing; (4) the right to 
written, or at the option of the parents, electronic findings of fact and 
                                               
 281. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii).  State educational agencies are mandated to develop a 
model form to assist parents in filing these complaints in accordance with the 
statutory requirements.  § 1415(b)(8). 
 282. § 1415(f)(3)(B). 
 283. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 48 (explaining that the due process 
complaint notice is a mandatory prerequisite to having a due process hearing under 
the IDEA, whereas it was optional under prior versions). 
 284. See id. at 49 (noting that the school district must respond to the substantive issues 
of the complaint and may exercise the option to challenge its sufficiency at its discretion). 
 285. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 286. § 1415(c)(2)(A), (C). 
 287. § 1415(c)(2)(D). 
 288. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i). 
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decisions.289  The IDEA is silent on burden of proof, but the Supreme 
Court has held that the party challenging the IEP bears the burden of 
proof,290 although some states have statutorily imposed the burden on 
the school district.291  A hearing officer, who meets several 
qualifications under the IDEA,292 must generally render a final 
determination of whether the child’s right to free appropriate public 
education was violated, within forty-five calendar days.293 
After the due process hearing concludes, either party can file an 
administrative appeal or a civil action in state or federal court under 
procedures outlined in the IDEA.294  States can opt for either a one tier 
hearing system, where the state education agency conducts the 
hearing, or a two tier system with an initial review by a local authority 
that can be appealed to the state education agency.295  After exhausting 
the administrative process, either side can contest the hearing officer’s 
final decision in state or federal district court within ninety days of the 
final decision, or within the time frame explicitly provided by the state.296 
Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the IDEA dispute 
resolution process is the requirement that a school district must continue to 
adhere to the IEP in place for the student at the time the complaint is filed 
throughout the entire hearing and appeals process.297  Known as the “stay-
put” rule, this provides very strong protections for parents who are 
disputing a proposal to change an IEP to the student’s detriment.298  For 
example, if a school district plans to move a child from an integrated 
                                               
 289. § 1415(h). 
 290. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–58 (2005) (relying on traditional 
notions of the burden of proof and examining congressional intent). 
 291. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 54–55 (clarifying that while the burden of proof 
is typically on the parent, as the likely complaining party, there is no prohibition on 
state legislation that shifts the burden). 
 292. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3).  The hearing officer must:  (1) not be an employee of 
the state or local education agency involved in the education or care of the child; (2) 
not have a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person’s objectivity 
in the hearing; (3) possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the 
provisions of the IDEA, federal and state regulations pertaining to the IDEA; and 
legal interpretations of the IDEA by federal and state courts; (4) possess the 
knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate, standard 
legal practice, and (5) possess the knowledge and ability to render and write 
decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice.  Id. 
 293. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)(1) (2017). 
 294. § 1415(g), (i). 
 295. § 1415(g); see also CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 56 (discussing the different 
ways states manage the appeal process under the IDEA). 
 296. § 1415(i)(2). 
 297. § 1415(j). 
 298. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 57–58. 
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classroom to a segregated placement, the student may not be moved until 
the due process hearing and all avenues of appeal have been exhausted.  
However, the “stay-put” rule does not always benefit parents and students, 
since it merely entrenches the status quo for the duration of the dispute 
resolution and appeals processes.  If the parent is dissatisfied with the 
current IEP and therefore requests a change to the IEP, which the school 
district rejects, the “stay-put” rule means that the IEP remains in place and 
unchanged throughout the legal processes.  This may cause significant 
frustration, as the parent may wait years for a legal resolution.  The parent 
is, however, free at any time to move the child to a different school district 
or try to find a private placement through the dispute process.299 
Through this impartial due process hearing, parents may be entitled 
to additional remedies beyond an order for services or a particular 
placement.  Victorious parents may also be awarded attorney’s fees at 
the hearing level or on appeal, although they are not entitled to 
recover expenses related to expert witnesses.300  A court may reduce fee 
awards for a variety of reasons, including:  (1) if the parent unreasonably 
protracted the case; (2) if the fees unreasonably exceeded prevailing 
community rates; or (3) if the parents rejected a settlement offer 
substantially similar to the hearing outcome.301   
4. Key differences between the IDEA, section 504, and the ADA 
Two other federal laws—section 504302 and the ADA303—touch on 
the rights of children with disabilities in a variety of settings.  The 
degree to which a federally funded voucher program may trigger new 
obligations for private schools under either section 504 or the ADA has 
not fully been explored.  However, neither of these laws is perfectly 
coextensive with the IDEA.  To the contrary, both of these laws—even 
if they were to apply to private schools as part of a federal voucher 
program—offer fewer rights and protections than the IDEA provides 
to students with disabilities.304  These include key differences in what 
                                               
 299. Id. 
 300. § 1415(i)(3)(B); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291, 298–304 (2006) (suggesting that the legislative history does not permit expert 
fees to be recovered).  Furthermore, attorney’s fees are generally not awarded for 
time an attorney spends in IEP meetings, unless the meeting is convened as a result 
of the administrative proceeding or judicial action.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). 
 301. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(c)(2)(i)(C). 
 302. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 303. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 304. A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and Section 504, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. 
FUND, https://dredf.org/legal-advocacy/laws/a-comparison-of-ada-idea-and-section-
504 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND]. 
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disabilities are covered, the educational requirements imposed, and 
the self-limiting provisions included in both section 504 and the ADA.305 
Section 504 and the ADA are, at their core civil rights laws, designed 
to protect individuals with disabilities beyond the context of education, 
thus they contain a broader definition of an individual with a disability 
than the IDEA.306  Under both section 504 and the ADA, an 
individual with a disability is an individual with a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities 
of that individual.307  The non-exhaustive definition of “major life 
activities” includes a spectrum of activities from caring for oneself, seeing, 
walking, learning, concentrating, thinking, and communicating.308  
Consequently, under section 504 and the ADA, a child with a disability 
does not have to benefit from “special education and related services” to 
be protected by these statutes.309  All children eligible for the IDEA 
protections are covered by both section 504 and the ADA, but a child with 
a disability under section 504 and ADA may not qualify for IDEA 
protections.310 
Section 504 has some coextensive provisions to the IDEA, but these 
provisions have less force than those in the IDEA because the 
purpose of section 504 is equal access, rather than ensuring 
meaningful educational opportunities for children with disabilities.  
As a civil rights law, section 504 “is designed to level the playing field for 
individuals with disabilities” by removing barriers to their ability to 
                                               
 305. Pat Howey, Key Differences Between Section 504 and IDEA, WRIGHTSLAW, 
http://www.wrightslaw.com/howey/504.idea (last modified March 22, 2012). 
 306. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4); Compare Supreme Court Decisions’ Narrow Definition of 
“Disability,” FINDLAW, https://civilrights.findlaw.com/discrimination/supreme-court-
decisions-narrow-definition-of-disability (last visited Aug 17, 2018) (analyzing how 
judicial decisions have narrowed the definition of disability), with Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADA AA), WRIGHSTLAW, http://www.wrightslaw. 
com/info/sec504.adaaa.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing the purpose of 
the ADAA AA and how it restored the act to its original inclusive coverage). 
 307. 29 U.S.C. § 705(9); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
 308. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).  This definition also includes impairments of “major 
bodily functions” including “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, 
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, 
and reproductive functions.”  Id. 
 309. For example, a child with a vision impairment has a physical impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the child’s life activities.  However, with glasses the 
child likely does not special education or related services.  This child would be 
covered by section 504 and the ADA, but not the IDEA. 
 310. What is the difference between Section 540 and IDEA?, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON 
ADHD, http://209.126.179.230/faq.cfm?fid=10&varLang=en (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
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access a public education.311  Although this law uses similar language 
(e.g., free appropriate public education, accommodations, assistive 
technology), the protections are not nearly as robust as those of the 
IDEA.312  Section 504 lacks an IEP requirement with specially designed 
instruction to help the student access educational content, and also 
lacks therapeutic support time to help a child reach individualized 
goals.  Both of these shortcomings make section 504 ill-suited to 
provide meaningful educational opportunities to children with 
significant disabilities.  Consequently, this law will not protect the 
most vulnerable children with disabilities, namely those who need the 
most rigorous support and intervention.  For many children with 
disabilities, merely removing barriers is not enough; these children 
need proactive supporting measures specifically tailored to their 
unique individual needs.  The IDEA provides for such measures 
whereas section 504 falls short. 
In contrast to section 504, the ADA does not apply only to entities 
that receive federal funding.  Rather, the ADA applies to all public 
schools and non-religious private schools through Title II and Title 
III of the ADA.313  Title II prohibits state and local governments from 
discriminating in all services, programs, and activities—this includes 
public schools.314  Title III prohibits public accommodations—that is, 
businesses that are open to the general public—from discrimination 
but exempts religious entities.315  Consequently, Title III governs secular 
private schools, but not parochial or religious private schools. 
While the ADA prohibits discrimination generally, it does not require 
that schools provide an appropriate education to children with disabilities.  
To be sure, the ADA does require public entities, including school 
districts, to provide auxiliary aids and services to “ensure effective 
communication” such that individuals with disabilities have “an equal 
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, 
program, or activity.”316  However, these auxiliary aids and services pale 
in comparison to those identified by the IDEA.317  This is not altogether 
                                               
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. DEP’T OF JUST., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II REGULATIONS:  
NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES 2 (2010). 
 314. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2012) (defining public entity). 
 315. § 12181 (defining commerce as applied by the statute). 
 316. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b) (2017). 
 317. A Comparison of IDEA, ADA, and Section 504, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CTR., 
http://www.adainfo.org/sites/default/files/A%20COMPARISON%20of%20ADA-
IDEA-504.pdf. 
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surprising, since the purpose of the ADA is merely to allow equal access 
to the entity—in this case, to the school—rather than to ensure a free 
appropriate public education.318 
Section 504 and the ADA provide inadequate protection for the 
right to education for children with disabilities.  Both laws fail to 
include provisions for special education and related services tailored 
to meet the individual student’s needs.319  Neither law provides a 
mechanism for delivering education for eligible students, such as the 
IEP, nor does the federal government provide education funding to 
schools to ensure state compliance with the law.320  And of course, 
since neither law mandates a detailed IEP, neither law contains the 
kinds of rigorous mediation and due process procedures for 
challenging the adequacy of education provided, which are mandated 
under the IDEA.  Most fundamentally, these laws are only designed to 
protect the right to access, not the right to educational benefits.321  
For example, if a child is confined to a wheelchair because of a 
disability, section 504 and the ADA protect that child from 
discrimination and even demand a public or non-religious private 
school to ensure physical access, such as by widening school doors 
and hallways.322  However, if that same child has neurological deficits 
impacting the child’s ability to learn, neither the ADA nor section 
504 demand the child receive an educational benefit while physically 
accessing the school.323  Only the IDEA entitles a child to “specially 
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique 
needs”324 of the child to “enable a child to make [educational] 
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”325  This is, 
                                               
 318. DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, supra note 304. 
 319. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 701 (providing no individualized support and thus 
creating a large gap in educational opportunities); 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 320. At a Glance:  Which Laws Do What, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/ 
school-learning/your-childs-rights/basics-about-childs-rights/at-a-glance-which-laws-
do-what (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (highlighting the absence of any mechanism to 
ensure the targeted students receive the intended result). 
 321. Peter Wright & Pamela Wright, Key Differences Between Section 504, the ADA, and 
the IDEA, WRIGHTSLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/sec504.summ.rights (last 
revised Jan. 31, 2017). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012). 
 325. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (noting 
that each child’s educational needs are unique and will require some level of tailoring). 
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of course, because only the IDEA was enacted to specifically address 
the educational needs of children with disabilities.326 
C.   Supreme Court Decisions in Special Education 
The Supreme Court first grappled with the initial version of the IDEA 
and its free appropriate public education mandate327 in Board of 
Education v. Roweley.328  After a lengthy statutory interpretation analysis, 
Justice Rehnquist determined the that the IDEA required the state to 
comply with the procedures set forth in the IDEA and, substantively, 
to provide an educational program that is “reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits[.]”329  Justice Rehnquist 
specifically noted that the IDEA did not require “that States maximize 
the potential of [children with disabilities],”330 but rather they must 
merely develop an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to 
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade” regardless 
of the child’s potential.331  In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall, Justice White rebuked the majority for narrowly 
interpreting “free appropriate public education” as requiring merely 
“some benefit” rather than the “full educational opportunity to all 
[children with disabilities]” announced in the purpose of the IDEA.332 
While the Supreme Court has issued a handful of other decisions 
regarding the IDEA,333 it did not further clarify the substantive 
                                               
 326. Id. 
 327. Although Federal District Courts evaluated the obligations of the State to 
provide a public education to children with disabilities under the U.S. Constitution 
in PARC and Mills, the Supreme Court has only addressed the issue in the context of 
the IDEA.  See Louie Li, PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of 
Education, DC, ROOTED IN RIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.rootedinrights.org 
/15321-revision-v1 (discussing the impact of PARC and Mills on a child’s right to education). 
 328. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187–91 (1982).  The case was brought 
by parents of a “child with only minimal residual hearing” after school administrators 
denied the parents’ request for a qualified sign-language interpreter for all her 
academic classes.  Id. at 176.  The lower courts held that “although the child 
performed better than the average child in her class and was advancing easily from 
grade to grade, she was not performing as well academically as she would without her 
[disability].”  Id. 
 329. Id. at 207. 
 330. Id. at 189. 
 331. Id. at 204. 
 332. Id. at 212–14. 
 333. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) (holding that 
“[p]arents enjoy rights under the IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to 
prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf”); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006) (determining that the prevailing parents may 
not recover non-attorney expert or consultant fees); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 
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requirement of free appropriate public education until thirty-five 
years later.334  In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1,335 a 
unanimous Supreme Court infused the IDEA with renewed vitality.336  
The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation that an “IEP is 
adequate as long as it is calculated to confer an ‘educational benefit 
[that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.’”337  Instead, the Supreme 
Court declared that “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under the 
IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a 
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”338  
In his reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts relied on the purpose of the 
IDEA and its origins as a Congressional response to the prior 
exclusion of children with disabilities from educational opportunities.339  
Chief Justice Roberts argued that “[a] substantive standard not 
focused on student progress would do little to remedy the pervasive 
and tragic academic stagnation that prompted Congress to act.”340  
                                               
56 (2005) (holding that a student challenging a school under the IDEA in an 
administrative hearing bears the burden of proof as the party seeking relief); Cedar 
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999) (finding that continuous 
nursing service for a quadriplegic student qualifies as “related services” to access 
public education under IDEA); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 7 
(1993) (concluding that “[a] court may order reimbursement for parents who 
unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate 
education under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an 
education that is otherwise proper under IDEA,” but does comply with all of the 
Act’s procedures); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323–26 (1988) (interpreting the “stay-
put” provision to prohibit state or local school authorities from unilaterally excluding 
disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing 
out of their disabilities during the pendency of review proceedings); Sch. Comm. v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–72 (1985) (holding that a reviewing court has the 
authority to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on 
a private special education if the court determines such placement, rather than 
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act even if the parent changed the placement 
during proceedings); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 885, 895 (1984) 
(holding “clean intermittent catheterization” is a “related service” under the Act 
when medically necessary for a student to access FAPE). 
 334. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017). 
 335. 137 S. Ct. 988. 
 336. Amy Howe, Opinion analysis:  Court’s Decision Rejecting Low Bar for Students with 
Disabilities, Under the Spotlight, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2017 11:26 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-courts-decision-rejecting-low-
bar-students-disabilities-spotlight. 
 337. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-
1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 338. Id. at 999 (emphasis added). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
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He concluded that a student offered an educational program under 
the Tenth Circuit’s “merely more than de minimis” standard “can 
hardly be said to have been offered an education at all.”341  While the 
Supreme Court did not fully adopt the standard proposed by the 
petitioners,342 advocates for children with disabilities celebrated the 
decision for rejecting “the ‘bigotry of low expectations’ that marked prior 
interpretations of Rowley.”343 
D.   The Limited Protections for Children with Disabilities  
in Private Schools 
Children with disabilities whose parents voluntarily choose to 
enroll them in a private school through a voucher program have few 
protections under federal disability law.  Federal laws apply differently 
to children with disabilities when their parents voluntarily choose to 
enroll them in a private school, rather than when a public school 
places children with disabilities in a private school through the two 
processes codified in the IDEA.344  First, the public school system is 
                                               
 341. Id. at 1000–01. 
 342. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 
988, 997 (2017) (No. 15-827) (declining the family’s invitation to establish a more stringent 
standard that would require public schools to give children with disabilities an opportunity 
to (among other things) “achieve academic success” and “attain self-sufficiency”). 
 343. Endrew Decision Creates Important New Opportunities for Students with Disabilities, 
BAZELON CENT., https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/resmgr/docs/ 
accessible_2017/Endrew_paper_LH__9-8-17-1.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) 
(quoting Brief of Former Officials of the U.S. Department of Education as Amici 
Curiae at 6, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (“[W]e should reject the soft bigotry of 
low expectations and expect all children, including children with disabilities, to 
achieve academic success . . . .”)). 
 344. Under the IDEA, a public school may place a child with a disability in a 
private program “as the means of carrying out the requirements of” the IDEA.  20 
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (2012).  The public school may do this because the tuition 
at the private program is cheaper than the facilities and staffing changes the public 
school would have to undertake to provide a FAPE for that particular child.  This 
placement decision is made through the IEP team process and the IDEA still applies 
to these students while they are in private placement.  A parent may also enroll their 
child in a private program without the consent of the public school system when they 
believe the public school system has not met their FAPE obligation.  In these 
circumstances, the parents may seek tuition reimbursement through an IDEA due 
process hearing.  Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C).  In the due process hearing the parent must 
establish the program offered by the public school system “had not made a free 
appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that 
enrollment.”  Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  If the parent is victorious at the hearing, the 
district would have to substantively modify its program to provide that particular 
child FAPE or agree to continue the child’s enrollment at the private school under 
the private school placement by public agencies provision of the IDEA. 
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released of most of its substantive obligations to a child with a 
disability when the parent chooses to enroll that child in the private 
school system.345  Second, as described above, private schools—especially 
religious private schools—have very few obligations to children with 
disabilities under federal law.346  Third, there are limited educational and 
procedural protections for children with disabilities and their parents 
once they enroll in private school.347  Finally, parents of children with 
disabilities enrolled in private schools have fewer remedies.348  
Under federal law, the public school system has minimal obligations 
to children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private 
schools.  The public school system is only required to evaluate private 
school children with disabilities within their boundaries and spend 
federal IDEA funds “to provide equitable services” to these children 
as a group.349  These students have no individual right to free 
appropriate public education.350  Therefore, they “do not have an 
individual entitlement to services they would receive if they were 
enrolled in . . . a public schools.”351  Under the equitable funding 
requirement, “it is possible that some “parentally placed children with 
disabilities will not receive any services while others will.”352  If a child with 
a disability does receive services from the public school system while 
enrolled in a private school, those services are governed by a “services 
plan” that provides services based on the school district’s allocation of 
funds for private school students, and not on that child’s individual 
needs.353  This is a stark contrast to the IDEA’s expansive protections. 
Moreover, parents who place their children in private schools do 
not have the due process hearing rights to contest the school 
                                               
 345. See 34 C.F.R. 300.137 (2017) (reducing the protections when the child is 
parentally placed). 
 346. 42 U.S.C. § 12181. 
 347. 34 C.F.R. § 300.140. 
 348. Sandhya Gopal, Compensatory Education and the IDEA, U.N.C. SCH. L. BULL.  
15–19 (2004), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/slb/slbspr04/article2.pdf. 
 349. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:  
PROVISIONS RELATED TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES ENROLLED BY THEIR PARENTS IN 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1 (2011). 
 350. Id. (“Parentally placed children with disabilities do not have an individualized 
entitlement to services they would receive if they were enrolled in a public school.”). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. (emphasis added). 
 353. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.138(b) (2017); see also CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 78–79 
(“The services are provided based upon the school district’s allocation of funds for 
private school children and the plan the district has developed, in consultation with 
private school representative, to service private school children.”). 
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district’s services or compliance with a services plan.354  They can only 
use the IDEA’s due process procedures to contest a district’s failure 
to meet its obligation under “child find” to identify, locate, and 
evaluate all children with disabilities within its boundaries.355 
The minimal obligations of the public school system to serve 
children with disabilities placed by their parents in private schools is 
further compounded by the few, if any, duties that private schools 
owe to these children under federal law. As described above, the only 
federal laws that may apply to private schools are the ADA and 
section 504, which have limited scope because they are designed to 
ensure equal access, not confer a right to education.356  Additionally, 
as discussed above, religious private schools are exempt from the 
ADA.357  This is a significant, perhaps even overwhelming caveat, since 
religious schools comprise the vast majority of private elementary and 
secondary schools across America.358  Thus, only section 504 creates any 
substantive obligations for “all entities including private sectarian as well as 
non-sectarian schools that receive, directly or indirectly, federal funds.”359 
A federally funded voucher program would likely trigger section 
504 obligations for private schools that choose to participate in the 
program. However, under section 504, private schools have negligible 
requirements to serve children with disabilities.  Section 504 imposes 
requirements to serve children with disabilities under a broader 
definition of “individual with a disability” than the IDEA definition of 
a “child with a disability.”360  In contrast to the public schools under 
the IDEA, private schools have only three obligations to children with 
disabilities under section 504:  (1) educate the child in the least 
restrictive environment;361 (2) provide the child an equal opportunity 
                                               
 354. 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(a). 
 355. § 300.140(b); id. § 300.131. 
 356. See supra Section II.B.4. 
 357. See id. (discussing the exemptions and providing an overview of the religious 
exceptions). 
 358. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES:  
RESULTS FROM THE 2015–16 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2017) (finding that sixty-
seven percent of private schools had a religious orientation or purpose). 
 359. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) as Applied to Private Schools, FINDLAW, 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-rehabilitation-act-of-1973-
section-504-as-applied-to (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act]. 
 360. See supra Section II.B.4. 
 361. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c) (2017) (subjecting recipients to the least restrictive 
environment mandate codified in 34 C.F.R. § 104.34). 
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to participate in extracurricular activities;362 and (3) provide “minor 
adjustments” to accommodate students with disabilities.363 
Private education institutions that receive federal funds are 
prohibited from excluding a qualified student their disability can be 
accommodated with only “minor adjustments.”364  There is relatively 
little case law on what constitutes a “minor adjustment,” likely 
because of the lack of procedural remedies for children with 
disabilities enrolled in private schools.  However, the case law that 
does exist seems to establish a standard that is highly deferential to 
the private school program.365  Thus, under this minimal standard, 
private schools receiving federal funds can easily exclude children 
with disabilities because they would not be able to meet the 
program’s requirements in spite of their disability without more than 
mere “minor adjustments.”366 The children who benefit most from 
the IDEA can simply be excluded under section 504 from “school 
choice” programs.  Needless to say, such exclusion is the antithesis of 
choice for parents of disabled children with significant needs. 
Moreover, even if the private school does enroll a child with a disability 
and makes accommodations for them, the school is allowed to charge 
higher tuition for that student than for students without a disability.  
Under section 504, a private school may charge more for the “provision of 
an appropriate education to [persons with disabilities] than to [persons 
without disabilities]  . . . to the extent that any additional charge is justified 
by a substantial increase in cost to the recipient.”367  As a result, the school 
may profit from making accommodations for the child with a disability.368  
More importantly, permitting private schools to charge a premium for 
students with disabilities—on top of the often already hefty tuition 
charged—runs completely counter to the IDEA’s key mandate of a free 
appropriate public education. 
                                               
 362. Id. (subjecting recipients to the extracurricular activities mandate codified in 
34 C.F.R. § 104.37). 
 363. Id.; Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359. 
 364. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (emphasis added). 
 365. See Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359.  In Hunt v. St. Peter School, a federal 
district court focused its inquiry on the student, determining that a child with severe 
asthma was not an “otherwise qualified” individual with a disability protected by 
section 504 because the accommodation she required far exceeded the “minor 
adjustment” mandate.  963 F. Supp. 843, 850–51 (W.D. Mo. 1997). 
 366. See id. at 850–53 (discussing the distinction between minor adjustments and 
the burden this particular case would place upon the administration). 
 367. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2017). 
 368. There was no case law on this provision of the regulations to clarify or outline any 
limits on a private school for seeking additional costs to educate a child with a disability. 
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If private schools voluntarily choose to provide special education to 
a child with a disability, they have increased obligations under section 
504.369  If the school provides special education it must comply with 
the evaluation procedures and procedural safeguards of section 
504.370  The evaluation provision merely requires a school to evaluate 
a student prior to placing the student in special education services,371 
in contrast to the robust evaluation guidelines in the IDEA that 
require a school district to use a comprehensive assessment strategy 
to determine if a child has a disability and, if so, the content of the 
student’s individualized education program.372  Section 504 requires 
recipient schools to establish and implement procedural safeguards 
“with respect to actions regarding the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement” of a child with a disability.373  These must 
include (1) notice; (2) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the 
person to examine relevant records; (3) an impartial hearing; and (4) a 
review procedure.374  These extra requirements are vague and slight in 
comparison to the robust procedural protections codified in the IDEA,375 
but more importantly, these provisions only apply if the private school 
voluntarily provides special education.376  That is, even when a private 
school admits a child with a disability, the procedural protections do not 
apply if the school simply does not provide the student with special 
education.  The provisions therefore disincentivize private schools from 
providing special education services to children with disabilities.377 
                                               
 369. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c). 
 370. Id. (subjecting recipients that provide special education services to evaluation 
and placement provisions in § 104.35 and procedural safeguards provision in § 104.36). 
 371. Id. § 104.35. 
 372. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 373. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 376. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c); see The Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359 (noting the 
various avenues through which schools can receive federal funding). 
 377. For example, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend in Indiana, 
issued a guidance document to its schools advising all employees not to write or sign 
any documents “agreeing to any specific accommodations” because it “may create a 
contractual duty.”  DIOCESE FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND CATH. SCHS., SECTION 504 AND 
ACCOMMODATIONS (2011), http://www.marianhs.org (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) 
(search in search bar for “special education”; then follow “Section 504 and 
Accommodations” hyperlink under results). Furthermore, the guidance instructs the 
school to create an “Individualized Catholic Education Plan” because “it does not 
grant legal rights to the student, parent, or guardian . . . .”  Id. This document 
demonstrates the careful steps private schools take under federal law to avoid 
substantive obligations to children with disabilities. 
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Moreover, because the IDEA does not apply, children with 
disabilities educated in private schools lack key protections that would 
ensure the school keeps track of the children’s individual progress.378  
Private schools are not required to provide “specialized instruction” 
developed and monitored through an IEP to ensure a child is making 
meaningful progress from year to year.379  Private schools are not 
bound to employ “highly qualified teachers” under the IDEA, which 
“requires teachers to have at least a bachelor’s degree and either full 
certification as a special educator or successful completion of a state’s 
special education licensing exam.”380  Further, private schools are not 
required to be accountable for the academic achievement of children 
with disabilities because there is no oversight by state departments of 
education or the federal government.381  Finally, a student with a 
disability does not have the same disciplinary protections under the 
IDEA, so they may be expelled for behaviors that are a manifestation 
of their disability.382 
Finally, children with disabilities in private schools lack the 
significant legal remedies codified in the IDEA to protect the 
educational rights of this vulnerable population.  The NCD cites the 
requirement that children and their families waive IDEA rights—
including the right of parents to participate in meetings about 
whether the school is meeting their child’s education needs—as its 
chief concern about special education voucher programs.383  Unlike 
public schools under the IDEA, private schools “are not obligated to 
provide a meaningful education and cannot legally be held accountable 
when a student makes no academic progress.”384  As a result, children 
with disabilities enrolled in private schools by their parents likely will 
suffer the same plight as the undereducated millions of children with 
disabilities that prompted Congress to pass the IDEA in the first place.385 
                                               
 378. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017); see supra 
Section II.B.4. 
 379. Hensel, supra note 5, at 322–23. 
 380. Id. at 325–26.  “The complete absence of quality control over teaching, 
however, runs counter to wealth of evidence reflecting the significance of education, 
training, and professional development on teaching effectiveness.”  Id. at 326. 
 381. Id. at 327–30. 
 382. See supra Section II.D. 
 383. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 60. 
 384. Hensel, supra note 5, at 331. 
 385. See id. (“In the absence of discernable benchmarks of progress and clearly 
identified legal rights, there is a heightened chance that these children will face 
intentional discrimination or seemingly benign indifference.”).  Id. 
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III.   INDIANA—A VOUCHER PROGRAM CASE STUDY 
Enacted by the General Assembly in 2011, Indiana’s Choice Scholarship 
Program is now the largest and fastest growing voucher program in the 
nation.386  The Indiana program provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
consequences of a voucher program that the Trump administration 
strongly favors and endorses.387 
A.   The Indiana Choice Scholarship Program Policies 
The Choice Scholarship Program grants eligible students 
scholarships (i.e., vouchers) that they can use at participating private 
schools.388  A student must be a resident of Indiana, be between the 
ages of five and twenty-two, and be accepted for enrollment by a 
participating nonpublic “Choice School.”389  If a student meets these 
initial eligibility thresholds, there are eight different pathways with 
additional criteria for eligibility:  (1) Continuing Choice Scholarship 
Student Pathway;390 (2) Previous Choice Scholarship Student Pathway391; 
                                               
 386. Lee, supra note 18 (“In 2015–2016, the latest statistics available for Indiana, 
there were 32,695 students participating in [Indiana’s] program, [which] makes this 
program the single largest education voucher program in any state.”).  The 
program’s success can be attributed to the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination 
that the program did not violate the Blaine provision in the Indiana Constitution, in 
a dramatically different application of the provision from the nationwide trend of 
state high courts.  See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1227 (Ind. 2013) (holding 
that “the test for examining whether a government expenditure violates Article 1, 
Section 6, is not whether a religious or theological institution substantially benefits 
from the expenditure, but whether the expenditure directly benefits such an 
institution”) (emphasis removed); supra Section II.B. 
 387. DeVos lobbied for the Indiana Voucher Program and Mike Pence “led the 
charge as the state’s governor to loosen eligibility requirements and greatly expand 
the program’s reach.”  Emma Brown & Mandy McLaren, How Indiana’s School Voucher 
Program Soared, and What It Says about Education in the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Dec. 
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/how-indianas-school-
voucher-program-soared-and-what-it-says-about-education-in-the-trump-
era/2016/12/26/13d1d3ec-bc97-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story; see also Mandy 
McLaren, For Indiana Special Education Students, Choice Comes at a Cost, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/for-indiana-special- 
education-students-choice-comes-at-a-cost/2016/12/26/3b875480-c3bc-11e6-9a51-
cd56ea1c2bb7. 
 388. IND. CODE §§ 20-51-1-4.3, 20-51-1-4.7, 20-51-1-5–8 (2017); Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1219. 
 389. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM:  FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS FOR PARENTS AND STUDENTS, https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/ 
choice/1-choice-parent-faq-february-2018.pdf (lasted visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter 
CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS].  A Choice School is a public or nonpublic school 
participating in the program that meets certain criteria.  IND. CODE § 20-51-1-6. 
 390. See CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389.  Eligibility Requirements: 
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(3) Previous Scholarship Granting Organization Award Pathway;392 (4) 
Special Education Pathway;393 (5) “F” Public School Pathway;394 (6) Two 
                                               
i. The student received a Choice Scholarship in the school year that 
immediately precedes the school year for which the student is applying for a 
Choice Scholarship, and ii. The student is required to have remained 
enrolled at the Choice [S]chool for the entirety of the immediately 
preceding school year, and iii. The student is a member of a household with 
an annual income equal to or below 200% of the amount to qualify for the 
federal free or reduced lunch program. 
Id. 
 391. Eligibility Requirements: 
Either:  i. The student received a Choice Scholarship in a previous school 
year that does not immediately precede the school year for which the student 
is applying for Choice Scholarship; OR ii. The student received a Choice 
Scholarship in the immediately preceding school year but the student exited 
the Choice [S]chool prior to the end of the school year; AND:  iii. The 
student is a member of a household with an annual income equal to or 
below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch 
program. 
Id. 
 392. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The student received a Scholarship Granting Organizations (SGO) 
Scholarship in a previous school year, including a school year that does not 
immediately precede the school year for which the student is applying for a 
Choice Scholarship. 
ii. The approved SGOs are:  Community Foundation of Elkhart County, 
Institute for Quality Education, Inc. (Formerly Educational Choice 
Charitable Trust), LaGrange County Community Foundation, Inc., 
Professional Athletes of Indiana, Sagamore Institute Scholarships for 
Education Choice, School Scholarship Granting Organization of Northeast 
Indiana, The Lutheran Scholarship Granting Organization of Indiana, 
Tuition Assistance Fund of Southwestern Indiana (Closed February 2013). 
iii. The student is a member of a household with an annual income equal to 
or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced 
lunch program. 
Id. 
 393. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The student has a disability that requires special education and related 
services; ii. An IEP pursuant to IC 20-35 or a Service Plan (SP) pursuant to 
511 IAC 7-34 has been developed for the student; and, iii. The student is a 
member of a household with an annual income equal to or below 200% of 
the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch program. 
Id. 
 394. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The student would be required to attend a specific public school based on 
his/her residence that has been assigned an “F” grade.  The list of F schools 
for Choice Scholarship eligibility is posted prior to the beginning of the 
school year.  Note:  This pathway does not require prior attendance at the 
school. ii. The student is a member of a household with an annual income 
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Semesters in Public School Pathway;395 (7) Sibling Pathway;396 and (8) 
Pre-K Pathway.397  A student must satisfy the financial and situational 
criteria of one of the eight pathways to receive the scholarship 
funds.398  Notably, there is no requirement that a child attend a 
public school prior to applying for the private school program.  
Furthermore, the scholarship award is the lesser of:  (1) tuition and 
fees at the participating private school chosen; or, (2) “an amount 
based off the per-student State funding formula for the student’s 
school corporation of residence,” depending on the family income.399  
The Indiana Department of Education pays the scholarship directly to 
the school, but requires the child’s parent or guardian to endorse the 
award.400  Based on these requirements, in 2016, roughly sixty percent of 
Indiana school children were eligible for the program.401 
                                               
equal to or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or 
reduced lunch program. 
Id. 
 395. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The student was enrolled in kindergarten through grade 12 in a public 
school, including a charter school, in Indiana for at least two semesters 
immediately preceding the first semester for which the individual receives a 
Choice Scholarship, and ii. The student is a member of a household with an 
annual income equal to or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the 
federal free or reduced lunch program. 
Id. 
 396. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The sibling of the newly applying student received either a Choice 
Scholarship or an SGO Scholarship in a previous school year, including a 
school year that does not immediately precede the school year for which the 
student is applying for a Choice Scholarship; and ii. The student is a member 
of a household with an annual income equal to or below 150% of the 
amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch program. 
Id. 
 397. Eligibility Requirements: 
i. The student received and used an Early Education Grant under IC 12-17.2-
7.2 to attend Pre-K at an eligible Choice [S]chool. ii. The student is applying 
for a Choice Scholarship at the same Choice [S]chool in which they 
attended Pre-K with an Early Education Grant. iii. The student is a member 
of a household with annual income equal to or below 69% of the reduced 
lunch eligibility (127% of the federal poverty level). 
Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id.  This arrangement is likely to comply with the Zelman-Harris decision that 
vouchers are permissible because they indirectly aid religious institutions because 
they directly aid the parent/students.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 401. Brown & McLaren, supra note 387. 
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In addition to the students meeting certain eligibility requirements, 
participating schools also have threshold requirements.  The Indiana 
Choice Program requires a participating school to meet minimal 
requirements and prohibits any state agency, including the Indiana 
Department of Education, from regulating the educational program 
of private schools receiving state funds from the program.402  A 
nonpublic school is eligible to receive state funds if it:  (1) is located in 
Indiana; (2) requires an eligible student to pay tuition; (3) voluntarily 
agrees to enroll the student; (4) is accredited by either the state board 
or a national or regional accreditation agency; (5) administers 
statewide assessments, at state expense; (6) is not a school that an 
eligible student has a legal settlement with; and (7) submits required 
student performance data to the state.403  State law expressly prohibits 
the Indiana Department of Education, or any other state agency, from 
regulating the educational programs of participating schools.  This 
includes the curriculum, religious instruction or activities, classroom 
teaching, and hiring of teachers.404 
Indiana has adopted few provisions to govern the Special Education 
Pathway program.405  First, Indiana has not adopted express non-
discrimination requirements for participating schools, so the private 
schools have a significant amount of agency and independence in 
admissions decisions.406  Private schools are only limited in discrimination 
against students with special needs by the public accommodations 
provision under Title III of the ADA.407  Since religious private schools 
are exempt from the ADA,408 these schools are free to discriminate 
against students with disabilities in their admission decisions.409  Since 
ninety-seven percent of the private schools that will participate in the 
Indiana program in 2018–2019 are religious entities, the ADA 
                                               
 402. IND. CODE § 20-51-4-1(a) (2017). 
 403. Id. § 20-51-1-4.7. 
 404. Id. § 20-51-4-1. 
 405. See id. § 20-51-4. The only sections addressing special education are Sections 
20-51-4-4(2), 20-51-4-4.5, and 20-51-4-4.6.  Id. 
 406. See id. § 20-51-4-3 (requiring schools to not discriminate based only on “race, 
color, or national origin”); Cory Turner, Indiana’s School Choice Program Often 
Underserves Special Needs Students, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 15, 2017, 4:34 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/15/528502918/indianas-school-choice-program-
often-underserves-special-needs-students (noting that private schools can base admissions 
on grade point average, religion, or the sexual orientation of the student’s parents). 
 407. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 408. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2017). 
 409. See Turner, supra note 406. 
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protections are, for practical purposes, essentially nonexistent for 
students who participate in the program.410 
Second, because the IDEA does not apply to private schools, the 
Indiana Department of Education created a skeletal counterpart to 
the IEP,411 which is a Choice Scholarship Education Plan (CSEP), that 
governs a Choice School acting as the child’s special education 
service provider.412  However, Indiana has not extended any of the 
procedural protections to students of disabilities and their parents 
that are codified in the IDEA.413  For example, the Indiana 
Department of Education’s web site for special education services 
deceptively outlines the rights that parents waive under the voucher 
program.414  The Indiana Department of Education minimizes the 
loss as merely the right to “specific notices for case conference 
committee meetings” and to “established timelines within which the 
public school must do various things.”415  It does not mention the loss 
of the right to free appropriate public education, and it glosses over 
the due process protections in the IDEA.416  Moreover, the program 
requires parents to first file any complaint regarding the CSEP with the 
Choice School before they can file the complaint with the Indiana 
Department of Education.417 
B.   The Indiana Program:  Realities for Disabled Children 
For the 2018–2019 school year, the Indiana Department of Education 
lists 306 participating private schools in the Choice Scholarship 
                                               
 410. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS (Jan. 26, 
2018), https://www.doe.in.gov/choice/2018-2019-participating-choice-schools. 
 411. According to the Indiana Department of Education: 
An IEP is much more comprehensive, contains more details, and is designed 
to ensure that a student receives a [FAPE] . . . An SP is similar to an IEP, but 
is not required to include all the components of an IEP.  For example, an 
IEP must include statements about how and when the students will 
participate with nondisabled students and the student’s need for an 
extended school year, as well as identify the student’s placement in the least 
restrictive environment.  An SP does not require these components. 
CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id.; see also Dana Goldstein, Special Ed School Vouchers May Come with Hidden 
Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/us/school-
vouchers-disability.html. 
 414. See CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id.; supra note 411; see Goldstein, supra note 413 (stating that voucher users 
lose the right to a hearing to challenge disciplinary conduct toward a child). 
 417. 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-49-7 (West 2016). 
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Program.418  Fewer than ten are non-religious or faith-based.419  Of the 
non-religious affiliated schools, only one, the Independence Academy of 
Indiana, was explicitly created to serve children with disabilities.420  This 
school is designed to serve “middle school and high school students with 
high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome.”421  The tuition for 
Independence Academy is over $14,000 per year, so a Choice Scholarship 
Voucher through the Special Education Program would cover less than half 
the tuition for this school.422  
None of Indiana’s top private special needs schools participate in the 
state’s voucher program.423  Notably, Indiana’s Fortune Academy,424 
listed as one of the best fifty private special needs schools by special 
education professionals,425 is not a participating school.  The Academy 
offers a variety of private financial aid opportunities for families to pay 
the tuition, but the Choice Scholarship is not one of them.426  Two of 
the other private schools designed to serve children with disabilities, 
Indiana—Midwest Academy and Worthmore Academy, do not 
disclose the cost of tuition on their websites, but do caution parents 
of the onerous cost.427 
                                               
 418. 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. About, INDEPENDENCE ACAD., https://www.iaindiana.org/about-ia (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2018). 
 422. Tuition + Fees, INDEPENDENCE ACAD., https://www.iaindiana.org/tuition-fees/ 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 423. Indiana Special Education Private Schools, PRIV. SCH. REV., 
https://www.privateschoolreview.com/indiana/special-education-private-schools (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2018); see 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410. 
 424. Fortune Academy is committed to serving students with a variety of 
disabilities, including Attention Deficit Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactive 
Disorder, dyslexia, and anxiety disorders. Who We Are, FORTUNE ACAD., 
https://www.thefortuneacademy.org/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 5, 2018). Fortune 
Academy’s annual tuition is $17,250 for first through eighth grade, and $19,250 for 
ninth through twelfth grade.  Tuition, FORTUNE ACAD., https://www.thefortune 
academy.org/tuition (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 425. The 50 Best Private Special Needs Schools in the U.S., MASTERS IN SPECIAL EDUC. 
PROGRAM GUIDE, https://www.masters-in-special-education.com/50-best-private-special-
needs-schools (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter MASTERS PROGRAM]. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Financial Assistance, MIDWEST ACAD., https://www.mymwa.org/admissions/ 
financial-assistance (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (noting that although its tuition is “set 
at approximately $10,000 less than the national average of schools serving children 
with learning style differences, the cost of a private education is an [onerous] 
obligation for many families“); About Us, WORTHMORE ACAD., http://www.worthmore 
academy.org/about-us.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
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An examination of the websites of participating private schools 
reveals that an overwhelming number of these schools are free to 
discriminate against children with disabilities by excluding them from 
admission.428  Approximately ninety-seven percent of the private 
schools participating in the Indiana Choice Program for the 2017–
2018 school year are exempt from the non-discrimination provisions 
of the ADA because they identify as a religious organization.429  Some 
of these schools already accept federal funds from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) to support school lunch programs,430 and are 
                                               
 428. See 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410; Turner, supra note 
406.  Many private schools impose academic requirements, standardized test scores, and 
interview requirements for admission that may bar some students with disabilities.  See, 
e.g., Admissions Checklist (Grades 7–12), BLACKHAWK CHRISTIAN SCH., http://www.blackhawk 
christian.org/downloads/Admissions-Philosophy-Expectations-Policies-7-12.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing how “high academic standards and equally challenging 
expectations” means that the Blackhawk Christian School “is not the best learning 
environment for every student”); Enrollment Policy, EMMANUEL-ST. MICHAEL LUTHERAN SCH., 
https://www.esmeagles.com/enrollment/steps-to-enroll (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“The 
transfer student’s records (report cards, standardized test results, individual 
education plans) must be provided to Emmanuel-St. Michael Lutheran School for 
enrollment and must indicate that the student has a reasonable expectation for 
success at Emmanuel-St. Michael.  Additional academic screening may be 
required.”); Admissions Policy, ST. PETER’S LUTHERAN CHURCH & SCH., http:// 
www.stpetersfw.org/school/admissions/825-admissions-policy (last visited Aug. 17, 
2018) ("Admission to St. Peter’s Lutheran School is dependent upon St. Peter’s 
having the appropriate academic program/educational plan that fits the student.  St. 
Peter’s Lutheran School may or may not be equipped to service the educational 
needs of students with disabilities.  Students with Individualized Education Plans 
require individualized review and approval for admission."); Application for Enrollment 
Concordia Lutheran School, CONCORIDA LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL, https://www. 
clhscadets.com/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=303585&type=d&pREC_ID=867926 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (requiring disclosure of special education status and 
records on first page of application).  Notably, the Concordia Lutheran School 
Handbook describes how resource teachers will help families receive “auxiliary 
services” through the support of the public school district in the following areas:  
“learning disabilities service, psychological services, and speech correction,” inferring 
that students with other special needs would not be admitted.  See 2017–2018 School 
Handbook, CONCORDIA LUTHERAN SCHOOL, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b7a825_ 
a42aae2d9fef4a5ebb151e4c64033e3c.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 429. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2017). 
 430. Compare Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), IND. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 30, 
2018), https://www.doe.in.gov/nutrition/community-eligibility-provision-cep (click 
on “CEP Site List SY 17–18”) (displaying the schools that participate in the National 
School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs), with 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING 
CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410 (listing the schools that accept vouchers). 
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therefore subject to section 504’s non-discrimination provisions.431  
Some of the religious schools accepting these funds solely mention 
disability in the generic anti-discrimination disclaimer on their school 
lunch pages.432  These schools do not discuss or list any special education 
personnel or programming.433 
Furthermore, the admission policies and practices of many private 
schools participating in the Choice Scholarships Program involve either 
explicit or implicit discrimination against students with disabilities.  
One school’s admissions policy explicitly states that students with 
disabilities face a more rigorous admissions process.434  The school’s 
website states, “St. Peter’s Lutheran School may or may not be 
equipped to service the educational needs of students with 
disabilities.  Students with [IEPs] require individualized review and 
approval for admission.”435  Several other schools employ an admission 
process that is biased against children with disabilities due to onerous 
application requirements.  For instance, schools may require a certain 
score on an entrance exam, disclosure of an IEP, or an in-person 
interview.436  These admissions requirements likely allow the school to 
weed out students with disabilities because they may not meet certain 
admission criteria, such as standardized test score thresholds.437 
                                               
 431. Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Dollars to Discriminate:  The (Un)intended Consequences of 
School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537, 543–52 (2016) (stating that section 504 
forbids federal funds recipients from discriminating against persons with disabilities). 
 432. See, e.g., Lunch Menus, SAINT PETER-IMMANUEL LUTHERAN SCH., 
http://www.stpeterimmanuellutheran.org/lunch-menus (last visited Aug 17, 2018) 
(“In accordance with Federal Law and U.S. Department of Agriculture Policy, this 
institution is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, sex, age, or disability.”). 
 433. Id. 
 434. See Admissions Policy, ST. PETER’S LUTHERAN CHURCH & SCH., http://www.st 
petersfw.org/school/admissions/825-admissions-policy (last visited Aug 17, 2018) 
(explaining that admission is dependent upon the student fitting into St. Peter’s 
current academic program). 
 435. Id. 
 436. See, e.g., School Admission Policy for Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend (Diocesan 
Policy #4060), BISHOP DWENGER HIGH SCH., http://www.bishopdwenger.com/ 
Data/Accounts/Files/1/AdmittancePolcy6-21-17-AddedHomeschoolTransfer.pdf 
(requiring that applicants take school-specific placement exams, disclose IEPs, 
interview with a school administrator (if applying as a transfer student), and submit 
recommendation forms from prior teachers). 
 437. See, e.g., Admissions FAQ, BREBEUF JESUIT PREPARATORY SCH., https://brebeuf.org 
/admissions/faq (last visited Aug 17, 2018) (noting that a student must score at the 
60th percentile on the High School Placement Test, a standardized test that all private 
Catholic schools use in Indianapolis, to gain admission). 
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While some participating schools decry the argument that they 
“only pick the cream of the crop,”438 evidence suggests that these 
participating schools are using these admissions criteria to exclude 
children with disabilities.439  Some participating private schools still 
allege “public schools are just better equipped to work with special 
education students.”440  This practice of telling families of children 
with disabilities that their school cannot serve the child’s needs may 
account for the disparate enrollment rates of special education 
students in public versus private schools in Indiana, despite the 
Special Education Pathway voucher program.  Across the state, public 
schools are serving special education students at a rate of two-to-one 
over their private school counterparts within the same district.441 
The fact that special education students continue to enroll in 
voucher schools at low rates is evidence that “choice” for children 
with disabilities is just a fallacy.  The 2016–2017 Choice Program 
Annual Report reveals that less than four percent of participating 
voucher students are using the Special Education Pathway.442  Further, 
almost half of these students had never attended an Indiana Public 
School.  Thus, it is unlikely that parents of children with special needs 
are choosing private schools because public schools failed their 
children.443  Moreover, while enrollment in other voucher pathways is 
increasing year over year, participation in the Special Education Pathway 
has decreased every year since it was enacted in 2011.444 
One reason for the decline in numbers could be the lack of 
accountability participating Choice Schools have for the education they 
are providing to students with disabilities.445  The IDEA’s mission was to 
                                               
 438. McLaren, supra note 387. 
 439. See Turner, supra note 406 (stating that although seventeen percent of public 
school students in Indianapolis receive special education services, only seven percent 
of Indianapolis students in voucher schools do). 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. (reporting that in Indianapolis the ratio of public schools servicing special 
education students to private schools is 2.4–-to–1 (17%–to–7%), and in Fort Wayne 
the ratio is 2.3–to–1 (15%–to–6.5%). 
 442. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT:  
PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 13 (2017) [hereinafter CSP ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 443. Id. at 16 (documenting that of the 1140 students receiving vouchers through 
the Special Education Pathway in the 2016–2017 school year, 525 students—or 
46.05%—never attended an Indiana public school). 
 444. Id. at 13 (documenting that enrollment in the Special Education Pathway fell 
from 1262 students in the 2014–2015 school year, to 1166 students in the 2015–2016 
school year, and finally to 1140 students in the 2016–2017 school year). 
 445. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE:  
FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS 
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ensure students with disabilities not only received access to education, 
but were also appropriately educated.446  There are no additional 
accountability measures under the Special Education Pathway for 
schools that agree to take state special education funding to serve 
students with disabilities.  Although the Choice Program provides 
state special education funding to participating schools selected as 
the “service provider,”—whether they use the Special Education 
Pathway or any other pathway to access the voucher program—less 
than twenty percent of participating students in 2016–2017 received 
special education services at their private school.447  In other words, 
only one in five children with disabilities who attend private school 
on vouchers are actually receiving special education at the private 
school.  This may be because these schools are not adding the resources 
necessary to support students with disabilities, despite the excess 
funding, because they have no standards with which to comply.448 
Regardless of which school is the designated service provider, the 
performance of students with disabilities participating in the Choice 
Program demonstrates a lack of meaningful educational opportunity.  
Researchers from the University of Notre Dame and the University of 
Kentucky studying the Indiana Choice Program found that special 
education students receiving a voucher suffered significant losses in 
reading and writing.449  Although the Indiana Department of Education 
does not include information about specific reasons for retention, 
studies of other voucher programs indicate that parents withdraw 
their students from the private schools because of the lack of special 
                                               
FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 29 (2017) (“[I]n 2016-[20]17, more than [eighty] 
percent of students in private choice programs designed for students with disabilities 
were enrolled in a program that either provided no information about changes in 
IDEA rights or provided some inaccurate information about these changes.”). 
 446. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“[The purpose of this act is] to ensure that all 
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . .”). 
 447. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 17. 
 448. See id. (noting that a private school may receive state special education 
funding if the school agrees to provide special education services to eligible Choice 
Scholarship students, but the state legislation fails to specify the nature of those 
special education services). Of the participating schools surveyed by the authors, only 
one of the non-special needs participating Choice Schools’ websites discusses a 
special education program.  St. Charles Borromeo School has one special education 
teacher. Faculty and Staff, St. Charles Borromeo Cath. Sch., www.stcharlesschoolfw.org/ 
faculty-and-staff.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 449. Marty Lueken, School Voucher Programs in Indiana and Louisiana, EDUC. NEXT 
(June 28, 2017), http://educationnext.org/school-voucher-programs-indiana-
louisiana (“Special Education voucher students experience a loss of 0.13 standard 
deviations in [English Language Arts] relative to their matched comparison students.”). 
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education and related services offered.450  One mother of a child with 
a disability who enrolled her daughter in a private school, withdrew 
her daughter because her grades continued to fall, despite receiving 
special education services from her local school district.451  The mother 
expected the private school to use teaching methods and 
accommodations specified in the program-mandated equivalent of an 
IEP, but without oversight and accountability measures, the private 
school did not comply with the plan.452  Moreover, the Indiana 
Department of Education’s own review of the only federally funded 
voucher program, the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, found 
that “lack of special needs services” was a paramount concern cited by 
parents that did not continue in the program.453 
Finally, in practice, the Choice Program is taking precious 
resources away from public school districts charged with the 
mandates of the IDEA.  In Fort Wayne alone, Indiana spends $20 
million a year on tuition for voucher students.454  In the 2016–2017 
school year, $1.1 million of the $20 million went to a single private  
K–8 school, St. Jude Catholic.455  In a 2014 formal presentation, the 
                                               
 450. See THE MANHATTAN INST., VOUCHERS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS:  AN 
EVALUATION OF FLORIDA’S MCKAY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, 21 (2003), https://www.manhattan- 
institute.org/pdf/cr_38.pdf (recording that only 49.3% of former participants in the 
Florida McKay Scholarship program responded that their private school provided all 
the special education services it promised to provide); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
EVALUATION OF THE DC OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 24–26 (2010), 
https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104018/pdf/20104018.pdf (finding that 22% of 
parents were unable to find a participating school that offered services for their 
child’s special needs) [hereinafter DC OSP].  
 451. Mindy McLaren, For Indiana Special-Education Students, Choice Comes at a Cost, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/for-
indiana-special-education-students-choice-comes-at-a-cost/2016/12/26/3b875480-
c3bc-11e6-9a51-cd56ea1c2bb7. 
 452. See id.  The private school posted the child’s confidential education plan on 
the wall to encourage compliance.  Id.  This action itself shows the lack of official 
oversight in private schools because the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act 
prohibits schools receiving federal funds from making public student education 
records without parental permission.  Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. https://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2018).  Ultimately, the mother concluded a public program with 
teachers trained in special education was the best place to serve her daughter’s 
educational needs.  McLaren, supra note 451. 
 453. DC OSP, supra note 450 (revealing that 12.3% of parents cited “lack of special 
needs services” as their initial reason for leaving the scholarship program). 
 454. Cory Turner, The Promise and Peril of School Vouchers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 
12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/05/12/520111511/the-
promise-and-peril-of-school-vouchers. 
 455. Id. 
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head of the church championed the voucher program as a solution 
to the church’s budgetary hardships.456  Furthermore, in 2011, the 
first year of the Choice Program, less than six percent of the students 
enrolled at St. Jude participated in the voucher program.  As of 2017, 
over sixty percent of the school is on a Choice Program voucher.457  
In 2016–2017, nearly fifty-five percent of Choice students had never 
attended an Indiana public school.458  Thus, Indiana Choice Program 
is diverting the funds of the notoriously-strapped state education 
budget459 away from public schools—and therefore public school 
students—to pay for the religious-based education of students who 
were never a part of the public school system. 
In conclusion, the Indiana Choice Program demonstrates that the 
promises of school choice proponents do not actualize for students 
with disabilities.  These children are easily excluded from private schools 
on the basis of their disability.  Many private schools specializing in special 
education do not participate in the program.  Moreover, even if they did, 
a voucher would cover a fraction of the tuition.  Most importantly, the 
limited evidence available on student performance reveals that students 
with disabilities who participate in the voucher programs—at a 
significantly higher cost than the value of the vouchers—are academically 
disadvantaged by the Choice Scholarship Program. 
Indiana’s voucher program is therefore not a feasible option for any 
parent who cares about the educational well-being of their disabled 
child.  These parents have no choice but to keep their children in the 
state public education system, and the current voucher system 
continually funnels public school funds to private schools which do not 
service students with disabilities.  Therefore, parents of children with 
disabilities will find it more and more difficult to find schools adequately 
prepared to provide the intensive resources their children need. 
                                               
 456. Id.  The video of the presentation was later removed from the parish’s website.  Id. 
 457. Id. (“This year [2017], according to state data, nearly two-thirds of St. Jude’s 
students now receive public dollars to help pay for their private school tuition.”). 
 458. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 15 (recording that 18,732 of 34,299 
students in the program during the 2016–2017 school year had “No Record of 
Attending an Indiana Public School”). 
 459. Indiana received a “C+” in state funding for education in 2018 Education Week 
Quality Points report.  Quality Counts, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/ 
collections/quality-counts-2018-state-grades/report-card-map-rankings.html. 
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IV.    THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FEDERAL VOUCHERS ON 
 STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
The realities of the Indiana Choice Program demonstrate the harm 
that voucher programs can do to students with disabilities.460  
Federally funded vouchers would be a disaster for the education of 
children with disabilities both on an individual and national level 
because it would undermine the progress made under the IDEA over 
the last forty years.  If the federal government models a voucher 
program on the Indiana system, private schools would be free to 
openly discriminate against children with disabilities—both in their 
admissions policies and in reduction in services for students who are 
admitted.  Moreover, evidence indicates that children with disabilities 
who participate in a federal voucher program will not have improved 
access to private special needs programs.461  The evidence also shows 
that even if children with disabilities do have access to a private 
special needs program via a federal voucher program, they will likely 
regress academically—presumably because such private special needs 
programs do not have to comply with the IDEA’s strict mandates.462  
At a national level, students with disabilities will be injured by segregation, 
further reductions in funding, and removal of the IDEA protections. 
A.   Children with Disabilities will Suffer Harm Under a  
Federally Funded Voucher Program 
First, a federally funded voucher program will hurt students with 
disabilities because private schools have significant authority to 
exclude these students from their programs.  As discussed above, 
private schools are exempt from the IDEA and have only minimal 
obligations under section 504 and under the ADA.  Under either section 
504 or the ADA, even non-religious private schools may exclude a child with 
a disability if doing so would fundamentally alter their program or would 
cause an undue hardship to the school.463  Moreover, nearly eighty percent 
of the private schools in America are exempt from these laws because they 
fit under the definition of “religious organizations.”464 
                                               
 460. See supra Section III.B. 
 461. Lex Frieden, School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY (Apr. 15, 2003), https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/April152003 (identifying 
potential consequences of a federal voucher program, including the lack of access to 
this type of program for disadvantaged families). 
 462. Id. 
 463. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2016). 
 464. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (citing an ED survey detailing the 
number of “religious” private schools in the United States). 
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Second, students with disabilities can only access a federally funded 
voucher if they waive all the procedural safeguards and disciplinary 
protections set forth in the IDEA.  Although Endrew F. revitalized the 
IDEA, this is a Pyrrhic victory for any child with a disability who 
accepts a voucher.  In accepting a voucher, a child with a disability 
loses the right to free appropriate public education, the right to 
special education and related services they would have in the public 
school system, the right to a highly qualified special education instructor, 
and the right to a hearing to dispute disciplinary actions.465  Moreover, 
evidence indicates most parents do not realize what they are implicitly 
waiving by accepting a voucher.466  There is no procedural notice 
requirement to gain informed consent of the parents before giving 
them a voucher that terminates their IDEA rights. 
Third, most private schools created specifically to serve students with 
particular disabilities are cost prohibitive.  Advocates for vouchers argue 
that they help children with disabilities access private schools created to 
serve special needs students without a lengthy due process hearing to 
gain reimbursement.  But most of these schools are prohibitively 
expensive, if they even participate in a voucher program.  As discussed 
above, the preeminent private special needs schools in Indiana do not 
participate in the Choice Program.467  The single participating school for 
children with high-functioning autism would cost roughly $10,000 a year 
after a voucher,468 a significant hurdle considering eighty percent of 
participating families have a household income of $75,000 or less 
annually,469 and the costs of raising a child with a disability are 
quadruple the cost of a typically developing child.470 
Furthermore, private schools designed for children with significant 
support needs are often four times more expensive than other special 
needs private schools.  The current tuition for Denver’s excellent 
Firefly Autism—the private school whose tuition the plaintiffs sought 
                                               
 465. See Goldstein, supra note 413 (detailing the rights given up, often 
unknowingly, by parents participating in the voucher programs). 
 466. See id. (“By accepting the vouchers, families may be unknowingly giving up 
their rights to the very help they were hoping to gain.”). 
 467. See supra notes 418–420 and accompanying text (detailing the small number 
of private schools in Indiana participating in the Choice Program, and of those only 
one is a non-religious school focusing on Special Needs children). 
 468. See supra notes 421–422 and accompanying text (examining Indiana’s 
Independence Academy, a school serving children with Autism). 
 469. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 23. 
 470. Craig Guillot, The Cost of Raising a Special Needs Child, MINT LIFE BLOG (July 23, 
2013), https://blog.mint.com/planning/the-cost-of-raising-a-special-needs-child-0713. 
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reimbursement for in Endrew F.—is $70,000 a year.471  The Joshua 
School, a nationally-acclaimed school serving children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, has a similar tuition rate.472  Both programs are 
designed to serve children with more significant needs, which 
requires highly trained staff, highly individualized classrooms, very 
small teacher to child ratios, and other therapeutic professionals.473  
Even if a federally funded voucher covered ten percent of that cost, 
the majority of families in America could not afford to cover the rest 
of the cost of these therapeutic programs.  This is why it is imperative 
to maintain the IDEA provision that allows parents to request that the 
public school district pay the child’s tuition at one of these schools. 
The cost of tuition at private schools with established special education 
programs will often be less than the cost of the district providing all the 
necessary specialized services and staff within the public school system. 
Fourth, a voucher program would further harm students with 
disabilities by taking more students with disabilities out of an inclusive 
environment.  Students with disabilities make the most progress when 
they are in an inclusive environment—that is, when they are integrated 
into classrooms with students without disabilities.474  Ending the 
segregation of children with disabilities in the American education 
system was the primary purpose behind the IDEA.475  Congress 
recognized that students with disabilities learn better when they are 
integrated with their peers—just as the Supreme Court found over 
seventy years ago in Brown v. Board of Education476 that black students 
receive a better education when they are not segregated from their 
                                               
 471. John Aguilar, Douglas County Schools Must Pay the Private Education Costs of 
Student who has Autism, Judge Rules, DENVER POST (Feb. 12, 2018, 4:54 PM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/12/douglas-county-schools-private-
education-costs (noting that in total, the Endrew plaintiffs may be entitled to upwards 
of seven figures in education reimbursement by the state). 
 472. Amy Bounds, Boulder’s Joshua School for Students with Autism Opens, DAILY 
CAMERA (Jan. 19, 2013, 12:00 PM), www.dailycamera.com/ci_22405355/boulders-
joshua-school-students-autism-opens. 
 473. Joshua School:  School-Age Program, JOSHUA SCH., https://joshuaschool.org/school-
age-program (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 474. Thomas Hehir, A Summary of the Evidence on Inclusive Education, INSTITUTION 
ALANA (2016), https://alana.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/A_Summmary_of_ 
the_evidence_on_inclusive_education.pdf (“A large body of research indicates that 
included students develop stronger skills in reading and mathematics, have higher 
rates of attendance, are less likely to have behavioral problems, and are more likely 
to complete secondary school than students who have not been included.”). 
 475. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (recognizing the main goal in 
enacting IDEA was to combat the segregation of disabled children). 
 476. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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white peers.477  As special education and legal expert Wendy Hensel 
points out, “daily interaction . . . with their typical peers diminishes the 
stigma of otherness associated with disability and normalizes children’s 
understanding of impairments.”478  Inclusive opportunities for children 
with disabilities has such profound positive results for student 
achievement that even intensive needs institutions that cater 
specifically to students with a particular disability work to create 
interaction with typical peers whenever possible.479   
B.   National Harm of Federally Funded Vouchers 
A federally funded voucher program will re-segregate education in 
America, leaving the children with the most significant needs in the 
ever-more-underfunded public school system.  The history of vouchers 
is tied to a desire to segregate students from those perceived to be the 
“other.”480  Due to the ability to discriminate against children with 
disabilities and lack of accountability for private participating schools 
to properly educate children with disabilities under the IDEA, a 
voucher program will likely leave children with moderate to severe 
disabilities relegated to the public school system.  This concern is 
evocatively encapsulated by Senator Maggie Hassan, the mother of 
child with a disability and vocal opponent of Secretary DeVos, who 
warns against vouchers having “the potential for turning our public 
schools into warehouses for the most challenging kids with 
disabilities.”481  In fact, a McKay Scholarship official remarked he was 
not concerned by the lack of special education resources in private 
schools accepting this voucher “because about 85% of McKay 
voucher recipients have only a mild learning disability.”482 
Additionally, diverting the limited federal funds from the public 
school system lessens the resources these schools have to serve 
students with disabilities.  The federal government provides less than 
ten percent of the funding for public education across the country.483  
                                               
 477. Id. at 495. 
 478. Hensel, supra note 5, at 341. 
 479. See Aubyn C. Stahmer et al., Inclusion for Toddlers with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, AUTISM (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC4031244.  Firefly Autism and The Joshua School Early Childhood Center both run 
inclusion programs. 
 480. See supra Section I.A (discussing “Segregation Academies”). 
 481. Turner, supra note 406. 
 482. Hensel, supra note 5, at 323. 
 483. See The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last modified May 25, 2017) 
(estimating the “[f]ederal contribution to elementary and secondary education” to 
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Moreover, the federal government has not fully funded the IDEA 
since it was enacted484 and has received a “C” grade by influential 
quality analysts, “reflect[ing] continued struggles with achievement 
and funding gaps.”485  State school funding is often based on a 
combination of local property taxes and any additional funding that a 
strapped legislature can find in its budget; it is not derived from the 
estimated costs of providing an adequate education to children across 
America.486  If private schools need additional funding to provide a proper 
education, they can increase tuition.  Public schools do not have that luxury. 
Finally, encouraging parents to use a voucher, rather than assert 
their rights under the IDEA, allows systemic problems in public 
school systems to go unchecked.  After Douglas County Public 
Schools lost the Endrew F. case, the Board of Education finally took 
years of complaints from special education parents seriously.487  The 
School Board recently created a Special Education Advisory Task 
Force, made up of staff, parents, and community members, to 
identify “strengths, needs and goals of current special education 
services” with recommendations for the future.488  Additionally, the 
ED Office of Civil Rights investigated and resolved thirty cases of 
systemic disability discrimination in the public school system since 
2009.489  If parents are encouraged to take a voucher, systemic 
maltreatment of students with disabilities by school districts across the 
country will go unhampered. 
C.   Lack of Options for Children with Disabilities 
Given the significant individual and global consequences a federally 
funded voucher program imposes on students with disabilities, it is 
                                               
be eight percent, including funding from the ED and other federal agencies, such as 
the Department of Agriculture’s School Lunch program). 
 484. BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 166, at 20. 
 485. Quality Counts 2018 Redoubles Focus on State-by-State K–12 Systems, EDUC. WK. 
RES. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/collections/quality-counts-
2018-state-grades/report-card-map-rankings.html. 
 486. Cory Turner et al., Why America’s Schools Have a Money Problem, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/why-
americas-schools-have-a-money-problem. 
 487. Alex DeWind, School Board Approves Special Education Task Force, CASTLE ROCK 
NEWS-PRESS (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:15 AM), http://castlerocknewspress.net/stories/ 
school-board-approves-special-education-task-force,258102. 
 488. Id. 
 489. More Case Resolutions Regarding Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/caseresolutions/m-disability-
cr.html (last modified Nov. 4, 2016). 
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important to explore the potential outcomes for these children.  While 
the optimum outcome, from the perspective of children with 
disabilities, would be for the Trump administration to drop its pursuit 
of a federally funded voucher program, this seems highly unlikely.  
The Trump administration could attempt to create some extended 
protections for children with disabilities; however, these would likely 
fail.  Or the legislature could override any policy change the Trump 
administration takes, although this is not likely given the current 
stagnation of Congress.  That leaves the pursuit of litigation as a 
potential path for children with disabilities to block federally funded 
vouchers.  This section explores each of the above options in turn. 
First, there is the possibility the Trump administration will realize 
the conflict a federally funded voucher program creates with IDEA 
enforcement and will decline to move forward with a federally 
funded program.  However, this is not a likely outcome given the 
policy decisions and public comments made by Secretary DeVos.490  
Most notably, Secretary DeVos has pushed a free-market agenda for 
education by lessening regulations put in place by the Obama 
administration to protect students from for-profit universities, and by 
freezing regulations designed to forgive student loans based on 
fraudulent promises by a college or university.491  Additionally, 
Secretary DeVos has continued to undermine civil rights protections 
in the education system by rescinding Obama-era guidance to protect 
transgender student rights and sexual assault victims on college 
campuses and reducing staffing and investigations at the ED Office of 
Civil Rights.492  While these decisions do not directly affect students 
with disabilities, this removal of protections for other vulnerable 
students does raise the question of whether she will similarly decline 
to protect students with disabilities—especially when she views those 
                                               
 490. See infra note 527 and accompanying text (detailing Secretary DeVos’ push 
for a free-market education system); infra note 493 and accompanying text 
(exploring Secretary DeVos’ comments on the privatization of American education). 
 491. See, e.g., Erica L. Green, DeVos to Eliminate Rules Aimed at Abuses by For-Profit 
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/ 
us/politics/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges.html; Erica L. Green, DeVos Proposes to 
Curtail Debt Relief for Defrauded Students, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/betsy-devos-debt-relief-for-profit-
colleges.html; Ella Nilsen & Carly Sitrin, How Betsy DeVos is Quietly Erasing Obama’s 
Education Legacy, VOX (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/10/2/16229474/devos-erasing-obamas-education-legacy. 
 492. Id. 
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protections as getting in the way of her single-minded agenda to 
privatize education.493 
Second, the Trump administration could rescind earlier guidance 
that exempts private schools from the IDEA and other disability laws, 
and extend the entire portfolio of rights enshrined in the IDEA to 
any private school accepting federal voucher funding.  While 
Secretary DeVos seemed to assert a belief that federal law should 
follow federal funds in her confirmation hearing494—after 
demonstrating, it must be noted, a fundamental lack of knowledge 
about the IDEA—her continued rollback of protections indicates this 
is an unlikely path.495  Given that President Trump celebrates his 
unprecedented reduction of regulations on the private sector, 
extending any regulations is unlikely in this administration.  To 
support this initiative, Secretary DeVos pledged to rescind 600 
guidance documents by the ED, including seventy-two guidance 
documents by the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services explicitly outlining the rights of students with disabilities.496  
While the Trump administration argued that all of the 672 guidance 
documents were “out of date,” many advocates argued that the move 
undermines critical protections for minority and disabled students.497 
                                               
 493. Stahl, supra note 1. 
 494. Michelle Diament, Trump Education Pick Seemingly ‘Confused’ About IDEA, 
DISABILITY SCOOP (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/01/ 
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Struggled to Answer, TIME (Jan. 18, 2017), http://time.com/4637642/betsy-devos-
confirmation-education-policy. 
 495. Valerie Strauss, Six Astonishing Things Betsy DeVos Said—and Refused to Say—at Her 
Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/18/six-astonishing-things-betsy-devos-said-and-
refused-to-say-at-her-confirmation-hearing (describing the interaction between Secretary-
to-be DeVos and Senator Hassan when Hassan stated that she was “upset that 
[DeVos] didn’t understand the [IDEA] and urged her to learn more about it”). 
 496. Lauren Camera, Education Department to Withdraw 600 ‘Out-of-Date’ Guidance 
Documents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.usnews. 
com/news/education-news/articles/2017-10-27/education-department-to-withdraw-
600-out-of-date-guidance-documents; see also Moriah Balingit, DeVos Rescinds 72 
Guidance Documents Outlining Rights for Disabled Students, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/10/21/devos-rescinds-
72-guidance-documents-outlining-rights-for-disabled-students. 
 497.  
There can be no further question:  Secretary DeVos is dead set on rolling 
back all the progress we’ve made for our children of color and students 
with disabilities . . . .  If Secretary DeVos indeed moves forward with this 
action, she will be pushing IDEA’s promise of educational equity further 
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Given the likelihood a federally funded voucher program will move 
forward without extending the protections for students with 
disabilities, what options, if any, do these children have in the courts?  
Although the United Nations recognizes education as a fundamental 
human right,498 the Supreme Court held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez499 
that there is no fundamental right to education under the U.S. 
Constitution.500  The best option for students with disabilities could be 
to return to the argument that helped create the IDEA in the first 
place:  equal protection of the laws under the U.S. Constitution.  
Children with disabilities and their families could challenge a federally 
funded voucher program that does not extend the protections of the 
IDEA to private schools under the Equal Protection Clause.  This option 
is discussed in detail in Part V below. 
The Supreme Court has accepted equal protection claims brought 
on behalf of children in a variety of contexts.  The landmark case on 
educational rights and equality in the United States, Brown v. Board of 
Education,501 addressed the inequitable treatment of children of color 
in public schools, and the harmful effects of a segregated school 
system.502  The Supreme Court has also held that laws treating children 
differently based on the non-marital status of their parents violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, because these laws discriminate against 
children on the basis of a characteristic entirely beyond their control.503  
The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in another education 
case, Plyler v. Doe,504 striking down a Texas law that sought to prohibit 
the children of immigrants from attending public schools.505  In Plyler, 
the Supreme Court recognized that although education is not a 
fundamental right, a policy that prohibits children from schools 
                                               
out of reach, worsening the school to prison pipeline, and so much more—
with students of all ages and backgrounds paying the price. 
Camera, supra note 496. 
 498. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 26 (Dec. 
10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to education.”). 
 499. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973). 
 500. Id. at 35 (holding that “[e]ducation . . . is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under [the] Federal Constitution”). 
 501. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 502. Id. at 494–95. 
 503. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968) (holding the Equal Protection Clause protects 
“illegitimate” children from discrimination); see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
 504. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 505. Id. at 220. 
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because of circumstances entirely beyond the child’s control is an 
impermissible violation of the Equal Protection Clause.506 
Based on these precedents and absent a change in the current 
political climate, an equal protection claim brought on behalf of 
children with disabilities could be the only plausible way to block a 
federally funded voucher program, and thereby ensure these 
children continue to have equal access to educational opportunities. 
A federally funded voucher program purporting to improve educational 
outcomes for U.S. children that does not extend IDEA protections to 
private schools participating in the program inherently excludes 
children with disabilities from meaningful access to these opportunities. 
V.    EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS AGAINST  
FEDERALLY FUNDED VOUCHERS 
An alternative to political resistance to school vouchers programs is a 
constitutional challenge.  Though the Supreme Court has rejected 
arguments that voucher programs involving religious schools violate the 
Establishment Clause, the de facto exclusion of children with disabilities 
provides another avenue for constitutional challenge.  Parents could 
argue that requiring students with disabilities to give up their 
educational rights as a precondition to joining a school voucher 
program—either state or federal—is a violation of fundamental rights and 
of equal protection under the U.S. Constitution. 
Such challenges would face significant obstacles, however, at least 
under a traditional application of the Supreme Court’s fundamental 
rights and equal protection jurisprudence.  For the most part, a claim 
under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause 
lives or dies by the standard of review applied.507  If the court applies 
traditional rational basis review, the challenged action is “overwhelmingly 
likely to be upheld,” as it need only be rationally related to serve a 
legitimate government purpose.508  The Supreme Court has invalidated 
only a small number of government actions under this test.509  Conversely, 
                                               
 506. Id. 
 507. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727, 732 (5th ed. 2017). 
 508. Id. at 732. 
 509. Id. (explaining that the strong deference to a government action under the 
rational basis test is due to the low burden on the government to prove a legitimate 
government purpose); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding 
that the criminalization of sodomy failed the rational basis test and served no 
legitimate government purpose); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 450 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that discriminated against persons with 
mental disabilities after finding the ordinance served no legitimate government purpose). 
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if the court applied heightened scrutiny—especially strict scrutiny—the 
challenged law was doomed to fall.510  As has been often repeated, the 
highest level of scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”511 
A.  Heightened Scrutiny 
A challenge to the school voucher programs by students with 
disabilities would therefore have a very high chance of success if a 
court could be persuaded to apply strict scrutiny with respect to either 
fundamental rights or equal protection.  Neither of these is likely, 
however.  Take fundamental rights first.  In order for strict scrutiny to 
apply to a claimed violation of the substantive Due Process Clause, 
the challenged law must infringe upon a fundamental right; 
otherwise, rational basis review applies.512  Unfortunately for disability 
rights advocates, and the students themselves, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that education is not a fundamental right.513  In order for strict 
scrutiny to apply to a fundamental rights challenge, the Court would 
have to overrule its own precedent and hold that education is, in fact, 
a fundamental constitutional right.  
1.   Classification of vouchers as discriminatory 
The duty to provide equal protection of the law also extends to 
equally conferring benefits on citizens.  However, the likelihood of 
courts applying heightened scrutiny to de facto exclusionary school 
voucher programs under an equal protection challenge is also slim, 
for several reasons.  First, while the school voucher programs place a 
greater burden on children with disabilities, the programs do not 
expressly exclude children with disabilities.  For a law to be characterized 
as discriminatory on the basis of a particular characteristic—in this case, 
                                               
 510. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 727. 
 511. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection Clause, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 512. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297–
98 (2006) (concluding that parents do not have the right to reimbursement all costs 
resulting from litigation against a child’s school district); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37–39 (1973) (holding that because education is not a 
fundamental right, funding to a school district does not need to be analyzed under a 
strict scrutiny analysis); CHERMINSKY, supra note 507, at 727–32 (identifying the 
differing levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court may apply). 
 513. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
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disability—the law must either (1) be facially discriminatory, or (2) have 
both a disparate effect and a discriminatory purpose.514 
As described above, school voucher programs that require students 
with disabilities to sign away most, if not all, of their educational 
rights have a substantial disparate impact on these students.515  To 
describe the disparate impact, this section will use the Indiana 
voucher program as a proxy for a federally funded voucher program 
because it is the largest in the nation and most closely connected to 
the Trump administration—and therefore likely to be used as a 
model for a federal voucher program.516 
A federally funded voucher program akin to Indiana’s Choice 
Program will have a disparate impact on students with disabilities for 
a variety of reasons that are described above.517  Several of these 
burdens are worth emphasizing here, because they are tantamount to 
de facto exclusion of students with disabilities.  First, the Indiana 
program prohibits participating schools from discriminating in their 
admission requirements.  However, the bases on which discrimination 
is prohibited are limited to “race, color, or national origin.”518  In other 
                                               
 514. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that a 
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 515. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 413 (explaining the effects that school voucher 
programs have on students with disabilities). 
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Program when he was Governor, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.washington 
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Pence expanded Indiana’s voucher program while Governor). 
 517. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the Indiana Choice Program and its effect on 
disabled children). 
 518. IND. CODE § 20-51-4-3(a) (2017) (“An eligible school may not discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, or national origin.”). 
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words, private schools are permitted to refuse to enroll voucher 
students because they have a disability. 
Second, the administration of the Indiana Choice Scholarship 
Program has a disparate effect on children with disabilities. It 
requires these children to waive the very rights Congress crafted—via 
the IDEA—to assure that children with disabilities were provided 
educational opportunities their typical peers already received.519  
Many state laws explicitly provide that parents who accept vouchers 
must voluntarily waive their child’s right to free appropriate public 
education under the IDEA.520  The D.C. Code includes a provision 
that nothing in the federally funded voucher program “alter[s] or 
modif[ies] the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act,”521 signifying that a federally funded voucher program 
does not require private schools to comply with the IDEA.522  
Moreover, the ED has explicitly issued guidance that the IDEA does 
not govern private schools, even in the context of a voucher 
program.523  Consequently, children with disabilities must waive their 
legal right to a ‘free appropriate public education’ in order to access 
the vouchers that the Trump administration claims is so imperative 
for educational excellence.524 
Third, students with disabilities who enter the voucher program 
would have to give up not only their rights and protections under the 
IDEA, but their rights and protections under both the ADA and 
section 504 as well.  Over ninety-five percent of schools participating 
in the Indiana program are exempt from the anti-discrimination 
                                               
 519. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012). 
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provisions in the ADA and section 504.525  A survey of voucher 
programs across the country reveals that none of the programs have 
explicit nondiscrimination provisions that include disability as a 
prohibited basis of discrimination.526 
Finally, the lifelong stigma that results from inequities in 
educational opportunity has long been recognized by the Supreme 
Court.  In Brown v. Board of Education, the court decried segregation 
with the sanction of law in public schools for the detrimental effect it 
has on “the educational and mental development” of the children in 
the minority group.527  The severity of this concern led to years of 
judicial oversight of public school desegregation.  The judiciary even 
oversaw desegregation in districts that had no official policies 
expressly supporting segregation, but “through its actions over a 
period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated 
character of [city schools].”528  Additionally, the Court noted that 
inequity in educational benefits stigmatizes an individual “each and 
every day of his life.”529  Justice Brennan opined, “denial of education 
to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the 
goals of the Equal Protection Clause:  the abolition of governmental 
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the 
basis of individual merit.”530 
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Two key indicators suggest that a federally funded voucher program 
would continue this trend of permitting schools to discriminate against 
children with disabilities in their admission policies, thereby forcing 
parents to choose between participating in the voucher program or 
giving up their child’s disability education rights.  First, the current 
federally funded voucher program, the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship 
Program, does not include disability in its nondiscrimination provision.531  
Second, the nondiscrimination provision in the model voucher legislation 
developed by the non-profit formally led by Secretary DeVos requires 
compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which courts have consistently held 
prevents racial discrimination and does not extend to disability.532 
Several decades ago, Congress found systemic discrimination against 
children with disabilities pervasive throughout the United States.533  
The exclusion and lack of appropriate education for these children 
resulted in lifelong consequences, including dependence on 
government assistance as a result of the lack of meaningful educational 
opportunities.534  Congress determined that the only way to resolve the 
treatment of these children was to pass the IDEA to guarantee a free 
appropriate public education and protect the rights of children with 
disabilities and their families.535  In recent public remarks, Secretary 
DeVos claimed that “[e]qual access to a quality education should be a 
right for every American and every parent should have the right to 
choose how their child is educated,” advocating a reduction of 
federal control and choice programs as the mechanism for achieving 
that path.536  However, history demonstrates that without federal 
oversight and protection, children with disabilities do not receive a 
quality education.537  Therefore, a federally funded voucher program 
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federal oversight). 
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that requires parents to waive all of the protections created by Congress 
to ensure their children access to a meaningful education imposes a 
substantial and disparate burden on children with disabilities. 
2.   Discriminatory purpose 
For a facially neutral law to be characterized as discriminatory 
against students with disabilities, a disparate effect is not sufficient.  
In Washington v. Davis,538 the Supreme Court held that facially neutral 
government action must be “undertaken with a ‘discriminatory 
purpose’” to violate the Equal Protection Clause.539  To be deemed 
purposefully discriminatory, a government act must be taken because 
of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.540  Any kind of evidence, including past history surrounding 
the government action, legislative history, a departure from normal 
procedure, or the impact itself, may be used to prove the government 
act was taken because of its adverse effects.541  Challengers to a 
federally funded voucher program may therefore prove intentional 
discrimination against students with disabilities through public 
comments, the Trump administration’s departure from normal 
procedure in education governance, the history surrounding children 
with disabilities’ access to educational institutions, and the impact itself. 
a. Evidence of discriminatory purpose in the decision making process 
Although proving discriminatory purpose is traditionally a very 
high bar, challengers to voucher programs can point to the historic 
exclusion of students with disabilities from equal educational 
opportunities, including current state voucher programs, and the 
public record of the Trump administration’s positions averse to—or 
at least wholly ignorant of—disability rights.  In Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,542 the Supreme Court asserted 
that “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged 
decision” and the “administrative history” are examples of evidence that 
is “highly relevant” to an inquiry about discriminatory purpose.543 
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U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541 (1977) (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 230). 
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Educational scholars have posited that legislatures deliberately 
exclude children with disabilities because “these students might be 
too expensive to educate.”544  If there is evidence that the architects 
of a federal voucher program deliberately chose to impose the 
disparate impacts described above to discourage—and hence 
exclude—students with disabilities from participating in the program, 
this would show that the government action was taken because of, not 
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon students with disabilities. 
In her Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary DeVos repeatedly 
emphasized the decision-making authority of states and parents when 
challenged to address federal civil rights law compliance.545  When 
pressed about enforcement of the IDEA, Secretary DeVos suggested it 
was up to states whether or not to comply with the law and seemed 
unaware it was federal law.546  After several senators criticized her 
responses as demonstrating lack of competence for the position, 
Secretary DeVos wrote a letter to the Senate trying to assuage them of 
their doubts about her knowledge of the law.547  Notably, the letter did not 
suggest any mechanisms for enforcement and completely failed to discuss 
the procedural rights bestowed by the law, while taking the opportunity to 
push a school choice agenda for students with disabilities.548 
One year into her tenure, Secretary DeVos continued issuing 
statements pushing for vouchers and against taking protective action, 
evincing an intent to push for vouchers without extending the 
protections Congress found to be vital to meaningful education 
opportunity in 1972.549  In a speech at an OSEP leadership conference 
in the spring of 2017, Secretary DeVos discussed the Endrew F. 
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decision.550  She asserted that parents of children with disabilities 
“should be the ones to decide where and how their children are 
educated” after calling the Supreme Court’s ruling “common sense.”551  
Her comments illustrate her lack of understanding on these issues:  were 
it not for the IDEA protections, Endrew F.’s family would not have had 
the ability to challenge the inferior educational plan for their child. 
As troubling as Secretary DeVos’s comments may be to disability 
rights proponents, they nonetheless do not rise to the level of 
demonstrating discriminatory intent against students with disabilities.  
Secretary DeVos’s statements and positions are indicative of 
ignorance of disability law, or simply an intent to move forward with a 
voucher program that does not protect children with disabilities.  
This falls short of establishing an intent to exclude students with 
disabilities or impose greater burdens on them because they are 
students with disabilities.  In fact, at least as far as Secretary DeVos’s 
public statements are concerned, quite the opposite is true. As we 
described above,552 Secretary DeVos has consistently claimed that 
school vouchers are the best option for students with disabilities, and 
advocated for voucher programs because they are, she claims, 
beneficial for students with disabilities.553 
While Secretary DeVos has engaged in the rhetoric of supporting 
students with disabilities, President Trump explicitly made disparaging 
remarks against individuals with disabilities during his 2016 
presidential campaign.  At a campaign event, for example, then-
candidate Donald Trump openly mocked a journalist with a physical 
disability.554  In the Travel Ban cases of 2017, Federal District and 
Appellate Courts held that a president’s campaign statements could be 
used to evince discriminatory purpose of the administration although 
made prior to his inauguration.555  However, for the discriminatory 
                                               
 550. Betsy DeVos, Sec. of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Address at the Office of 
Special Education Programs Leadership Conference (July 17, 2017), https://www.ed. 
gov/news/speeches/office-special-education-programs-leadership-conference. 
 551. Michelle Diament, DeVos Wants More Options for Students in Special Education, 
DISABILITY SCOOP (July 18, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/07/ 
18/devos-options-special-education/23926. 
 552. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 553. Id. 
 554. Jose A. DelReal, Trump Draws Scornful Rebuke for Mocking Reporter with Disability, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/11/25/trump-blasted-by-new-york-times-after-mocking-reporter-
with-disability. 
 555. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 772–73 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. 
Ct. 377 (2017).  In Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018), the Supreme 
2018] THE FALLACY OF CHOICE 1881 
purpose requirement to be satisfied, a closer link would be required 
between a discriminatory attitude towards people with disabilities in 
general and a decision to create a federal voucher program free from 
disability rights protections.556  There is little—at this nascent stage of 
advocacy for a federal voucher program—to demonstrate any concrete 
purpose to exclude students with disabilities from a federally funded 
school voucher program. 
b.    Departure from normal procedures as evidence of discriminatory purpose 
In Arlington Heights,557 the Supreme Court held that departures 
from normal procedures “might afford evidence that improper 
purposes are playing a role.”558  Secretary DeVos has departed from 
normal procedures in matters affecting students with disabilities on a 
number of occasions.  Less than nine months into her tenure as 
Secretary of Education, Secretary DeVos rescinded seventy-two 
guidance documents “outlining rights for disabled students” from the 
Office of Special Education Programs and the Rehabilitation Services 
Administration.559  A former director of the Office of Special Education 
Programs noted that despite the Administration’s position that this was 
part of a general effort to clean up regulations, the move does not 
                                               
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of preliminary injunction. Id. at 39.  The 
Court came to this conclusion by applying rational basis review to President Trump’s 
executive order because both immigration and national security are core executive 
functions that enjoy substantial deference from the judiciary.  Id. at 32–34.  Chief 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion points out that “the admission and exclusion of 
foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the 
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’”  Id. at 30 
(quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).  This deferential standard of review 
is particularly appropriate “in admission and immigration cases that overlap with ‘the 
area of national security.’”  Id. at 31 (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  Applying this deferential standard, 
said Chief Justice Roberts, required the court to uphold the challenged immigration 
policy “so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”  Id. at 32.  The Court concluded that 
“because there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate 
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we 
must accept that independent justification.”  Id. at 33–34.  Consequently, the majority did 
not address whether President Trump’s social media messages and other statements, 
whether before or after his inauguration, were sufficient to establish discriminatory purpose. 
 556. Cf. Malone v. Greco, No. 92-CV-178S, 1995 WL 222052, at *11–12 (W.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 21, 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendants because statements were 
insufficiently tied to alleged discrimination). 
 557. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 558. Id. at 267. 
 559. Balingit, supra note 496. 
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purport with standard procedures for handling guidance documents.560  
Moreover, during her short tenure, Secretary DeVos has changed the 
mission of the Office of Civil Rights by charging investigators to 
quickly close out individual cases rather than look for systemic 
discriminatory practices across educational institutions.561  Additionally, 
in December of 2017, Secretary DeVos proposed to delay an Obama-
era rule compelling states to address racial disparities in special 
education.562  The IDEA requires states to protect against overclassifying 
minority students as special needs.563  Secretary DeVos acknowledged 
that nearly half of school districts in America are likely violating this 
provision of the IDEA.564  However, she maintained that requiring 
districts to implement the rule without revision would be too costly.565 
However, as with President Trump’s mocking of a person with 
disabilities, the departures from normal procedures by the ED are not 
directly related to the implementation of a federal school voucher 
program, and therefore likely fall short of demonstrating the 
discriminatory intent required for a federal voucher program to be 
classified as discriminatory against students with disabilities. 
c.    Suspect and quasi-suspect classes 
The second reason that courts are unlikely to apply heightened 
scrutiny under an equal protection challenge is that, even if 
arguendo, the law is treated as discriminatory on the basis of 
disability, the Supreme Court has declined to treat people with 
disabilities as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
The Supreme Court has formally created two levels of heightened 
scrutiny:  strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny 
requires the government to prove there is a “compelling state 
interest” behind the action, and that the action is “narrowly tailored” 
                                               
 560. Casey Bayer, DeVos Rescinds Guidance Documents for Disabled Students:  What Does 
it Mean?, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.gse. 
harvard.edu/news/17/10/devos-rescinds-guidance-documents-disabled-students-
what-does-it-mean. 
 561. Nilsen & Sitrin, supra note 491. 
 562. Erica L. Green, DeVos Delays Rule on Racial Disparities in Special Education, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/us/politics/devos-
obama-special-education-racial-disparities.html. 
 563. See id. (explaining that rule was designed to address concerns about the 
overrepresentation of minority students in special education). 
 564. Id. 
 565. See id. (“The [Department of Education] . . . estimated that it would cost 
districts between $50 million and $91 million to implement the rule.”). 
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to achieving that compelling state interest.566  The intermediate 
scrutiny standard has evolved from requiring the government to prove 
that an “important governmental objective”567 underlies the act to an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” requirement.568 
Strict scrutiny applies only when the law discriminates against a 
“suspect class.”569  To date, the Court has only recognized race, national 
origin, and alienage as suspect classes deserving of strict scrutiny.570  
The Court has only recognized two additional categories—namely 
gender571 and a child’s birth status572—as quasi-suspect classes deserving 
intermediate scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court has not recognized that people with 
disabilities are either a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  In City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,573 the Court expressly held that 
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification calling for 
                                               
 566. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 727, 730. 
 567. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976). 
 568. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding gender 
classification must serve an important governmental objective to be valid). 
 569. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982). 
 570. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
371–72 (1971); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 58–59 (5th Cir. 2011); LeClerc 
v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415–19 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 571. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 555–56 (holding equal protection requires gender-
based government action must demonstrate exceedingly persuasive justification for 
that action); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (holding registration of 
men and not women under the Military Selective Service Act to be constitutional); 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 474–76 (1981) (concluding legislatures may 
not make overbroad generalizations based on sex that are entirely unrelated to 
differences between men and women or which demean the social status of the affected 
class); Craig, 429 U.S. at 208–10 (finding classifications by gender must serve important 
government objectives and must be substantially related to attainment of those objectives). 
 572. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent 
children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its 
borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state 
interest.”) (emphasis added) (holding a state law that denied education to 
undocumented children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Trimble v. Gordon, 
430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding a probate law that distinguished between 
legitimate and illegitimate children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (concluding classifying a child 
based on non-marital status is “illogical and unjust,” and holding that law precluding 
children from collecting workers’ compensation benefits because their mother was 
unmarried violated the Equal Protection Clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 
(1968) (holding that classifying children based on parents’ non-marital status is an 
Equal Protection violation). 
 573. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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heightened scrutiny,574 and no decision of the Court has recognized 
disability of any kind as either a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  One 
could argue that the Court should treat disability as a quasi-suspect 
class.  Children with disabilities are in a similar position to the children 
of undocumented immigrants, the most recent classification to which 
the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny.  Further, in Plyler v. Doe,575 
the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, invalidating a Texas 
statute that withheld state funds from school districts that enrolled 
children who had entered the country without documentation.  The 
Court held that the law “imposes a lifetime of hardship on a discrete 
class of children not accountable for their disabling status.”576  The 
Plyler Court further expounded that “[i]f the State is to deny a 
discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it 
offers to other children . . . that denial must be justified by a showing 
that it furthers some substantial state interest.”577  Like the immigration 
status of the students in Plyler, disability is an immutable characteristic for 
which children with disabilities are not responsible.  Therefore, school 
voucher challengers could potentially cite Plyler in support of a claim that 
intermediate scrutiny applies to any deprivation of education to innocent 
children based on disability. 
However, even if the Court could be convinced to recognize that 
children with disabilities were a quasi-suspect class, school voucher 
challengers would nonetheless still fail to have heightened scrutiny apply 
for the reasons set out in the previous section above.578  That is, unlike 
the express exclusion of undocumented children in Plyler,579 state 
voucher programs, on which a federal program is likely to be modeled, 
do not expressly exclude students with disabilities.  These programs do 
have a disparate and adverse impact on students with disabilities, but 
absent evidence of discriminatory intent, the voucher programs would 
not be classified as discriminating on the basis of disability. 
                                               
 574. See id. at 442 (holding that persons with disabilities lack the necessary 
uniformity to be jointly classified as a group deserving of intermediate scrutiny). 
 575. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 576. Id. at 223; see also id. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that “a class-based 
denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 577. Id. at 230. 
 578. See supra notes 573–577 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court 
has not held that persons with disabilities are a suspect or quasi-suspect class). 
 579. 457 U.S. at 206, 229. 
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B.   Rational Basis with Bite 
Although a court is unlikely to apply either strict or intermediate 
scrutiny under a traditional analysis of fundamental rights and due 
process.  This does not mean, however, that a challenge to school 
voucher programs by students with disabilities will necessarily fail. 
Traditionally, the only alternative to either strict or intermediate 
scrutiny was a radically permissive form of rational basis review.  
Under this version of rational basis review, a law would be upheld 
with even the most tenuous and hypothetical relationship to a 
legitimate government interest.580  However, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated an increasing willingness to apply a more rigorous and 
exacting standard of review even in cases where the Court purports to 
be applying mere rational basis review.  Many commentators have 
come to describe this standard as rational basis “with bite.”581 
The Court seems to apply rational basis with bite when it is 
unwilling to identify a fundamental right or suspect class, but 
nonetheless finds evidence of a history of discrimination or animus 
against a class of persons adversely affected by the law.  The two most 
prominent examples are sexual orientation and—fortuitously for 
present purposes—mental disability. 
In Romer v. Evans,582 the Supreme Court struck down “Amendment 
2” to the Colorado State Constitution, which prohibits any state or 
local government actions designed to protect persons from 
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.583  Despite 
declining to designate sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification, the Court nonetheless held that Amendment 2 violated 
the federal Equal Protection Clause.584  Referring to rational basis 
review, the Court declared that “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, 
even this conventional inquiry” because “it lacks a rational relationship 
to legitimate state interests.”585  The Court further explained that laws 
which treat a minority group differently and lack a clear relationship to a 
government interest “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of person affected.”586 
                                               
 580. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, of Okla., Inc. 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
 581. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 732–33. 
 582. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 583. See id. at 626 (holding it is implausible to find Amendment 2 puts 
homosexuals in a similar position as other similarly situated citizens). 
 584. See id. at 635–36 (striking down the Colorado provision because it does not 
promote a legitimate state interest). 
 585. See id. at 632. 
 586. Id. at 634. 
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Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court declared that mental retardation is 
not “a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard 
of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social 
legislation.”587  Yet despite this declaration, the Court held that 
requiring a special building permit for the operation of a home for 
the mentally retarded violated equal protection. The Court explained 
that: 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does 
not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination. 
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes 
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  This standard, we 
believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue 
policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full 
potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that 
burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner.  
The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary 
or irrational.  Furthermore, some objectives-such as “a bare . . . 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group” are not legitimate 
state interests. Beyond that, the mentally retarded, like others, have 
and retain their substantive constitutional rights in addition to the 
right to be treated equally by the law.588 
Individuals with disabilities in general are, of course, 
disadvantaged, ostracized, and subjected to negative stereotypes. 
Their experience is often similar to that of persons with mental 
retardation. Therefore, a prospective government action uniquely 
affecting children with disabilities is just as likely to be prompted by 
animus as the permit requirement struck down in Cleburne.  As the 
Court points out in both Romer and Cleburne, the government action 
will be struck down—and the inference of animus is strongest—when 
the relationship between the distinction and the asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to be arbitrary or irrational.589  According to the ED 
and other advocates of voucher programs, the primary goal of the 
programs is to provide parents with more choices for how and where 
to educate their children.590  However, as we explain above,591 the fact 
that the rights and protections of the IDEA and other federal 
                                               
 587. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). 
 588. Id. at 446–47. 
 589. Id. at 446; Romer, 517 U.S. at 630. 
 590. Dashboard, supra note 76. 
 591. See supra notes 319–321 and accompanying text. 
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antidiscrimination legislation do not apply to private schools that 
participate in voucher programs.  This effectively means that parents 
of students with disabilities do not have the freedom to choose to 
participate in a voucher program; they are arbitrarily excluded from 
goal of the voucher programs. 
Furthermore, another one of the asserted goals of the ED, as we 
describe above, is specifically to improve the education of students 
with disabilities.592  Requiring students with disabilities to give up 
their rights under the IDEA—and in most cases, the ADA and section 
504 to boot—is not merely attenuated to this goal; it is wholly at odds 
with it.  Students with disabilities must give up their legally guaranteed 
right to a free appropriate public education—and all the procedural 
and substantive requirements for delivering that right—as a 
precondition of participating in a voucher program.  A more 
irrational approach to improving the education of students with 
disabilities is difficult to conceive.  Provided that the ED continues to 
assert the benefits to students with disabilities as a major justification 
school vouchers programs, critics will have a viable claim that placing 
a voucher program beyond the protection of the IDEA fails the 
robust rational basis review of Cleburne and Romer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trump administration, and especially the ED under the 
leadership of Secretary DeVos, has clearly signaled its desire to 
implement a federal school voucher program along the lines of the 
program currently in effect in Indiana.  In order to participate in 
such a program, students with disabilities have to forego the 
substantial rights and protections against discrimination that are 
afforded them in public schools under the IDEA and other federal 
laws.  This is an unreasonable cost to place on participation in 
voucher programs and makes a fallacy of the claim that so-called 
“school choice” programs provide parents with greater freedom of 
choice in the education of their children with disabilities.  Disability 
advocates should resist the adoption of voucher programs by the 
federal government on the basis of their harmful and disparate 
effects on students with disabilities.  If this political resistance proves 
futile, federal courts should strike down a federal voucher program as 
discriminating against students with disabilities in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  
                                               
 592. See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text; see also Section II.B.2. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  The Current Landscape of School Voucher Programs 
 
STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
AR Succeed Scholarship 
Program for 
Students with 
Disabilities 
(1) Have an IEP or 
live in foster care;  
(2) Enrolled in 
Arkansas public 
school the previous 
year, unless a child of 
active duty military or 
has a school district 
waiver; and 
(3) Accepted for 
admission into an 
eligible, participating 
private school594 
(1) Meet accreditation 
requirements; 
(2) Demonstrate fiscal 
soundness; 
(3) Comply with 
antidiscrimination 
provisions of  
42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 
(4) Meet state and 
local health and safety 
requirements; 
(5) Be academically 
accountable to parents 
for meeting students’ 
needs; 
(6) Publish school’s 
disciplinary 
procedures; and 
(7) Employ or contract 
with at least one 
teacher who has a 
current, valid license 
in special education 
issued by the State 
Board of Education595 
$6,713 
                                               
 593. Dashboard, supra note 76. 
 594. Succeed Scholarship, ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://arksped.k12.ar.us/documents/ 
policyAndRegulations/SucceedScholarship/SucceedScholarshipProgramExplanator
yPowerPoint.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 595. See id. 
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STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
DC Opportunity 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Household incomes 
no more than 185% of 
the federal poverty 
guideline or receives 
SNAP benefits; and 
(2) Current resident of 
D.C.596 
(1) Have a main 
campus in D.C.; 
(2) Be accredited by an 
accepted accrediting 
agency; 
(3) Have a valid 
Certificate of Occupancy 
listing education as a 
purpose; and 
(4) Be in “good” 
financial standing597 
$9,570 
                                               
 596. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “DC” on 
interactive map). 
 597. Join the OSP, SERVING OUR CHILDREN, https://servingourchildrendc.org/for-
schools/join-the-osp (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing eligibility requirements 
for the DC SOC scholarship program). 
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STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
FL John M. McKay 
Scholarships for 
Students with 
Disabilities Program 
(1) Have an IEP or 
section 504 Plan; and 
(2) Enrolled in 
Florida public school 
or Florida School for 
the Deaf and Blind 
the prior year; or 
(3) Received Specialized 
Instructional Services the 
prior year; or 
(4) Is a foster child or 
has a parent that is on 
active duty with the 
military598 
(1) Comply with 
antidiscrimination 
provisions of 
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d;  
(2) Demonstrate fiscal 
soundness and 
accountability;  
(3) Meet applicable 
state and local health, 
safety, and welfare laws; 
(4) Provide to the 
department all 
documentation 
required for a 
student’s participation 
(5) Be academically 
accountable to parents 
for meeting the 
educational needs of 
the student; and 
(6) Maintain a physical 
location the student 
regularly attends599 
$7,193 
                                               
 598. McKay Scholarships:  McKay Scholarship Program FAQs, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12-
scholarshipprograms/mckay/mckay-faqs.stml (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 599. FLA. STAT. § 1002.39(8) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 1002.421. 
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STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
GA Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Resident of Georgia; 
(2) Enrolled in 
Georgia public school 
the prior year; and 
(3) Received special 
education services at 
some point during 
prior school year600 
(1) Be fully or 
provisionally accredited 
by an approved 
accrediting agency;  
(2) Have a physical 
location in Georgia 
where students physically 
attend classes; 
(3) Offer minimum core 
subjects of math, science, 
language arts, reading, 
and social studies;  
(4) Demonstrate the 
school is financially 
secure;  
(5) Meet all applicable 
state and local health, 
safety, and welfare laws;  
(6) Comply with 
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 
section 504, and the ADA;  
(7) Administer pre- 
and post-academic 
assessments and report 
to parents and Georgia 
Department of 
Education; and 
(8) Provide clear 
written quarterly 
descriptions of academic 
progress to parents, e.g. 
report cards601
$5,606 
                                               
 600. Special Needs Scholarship Program, GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., www.gadoe.org/External-
Affairs-and-Policy/Policy/Pages/Special-Needs-Scholarship-Program.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2018). 
 601. GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., GEORGIA SPECIAL NEEDS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM PRIVATE 
SCHOOL APPLICATION: 2018–2019 SCHOOL YEAR (2018). 
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STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
IN Choice Scholarship 
Program 
(1) Attended public 
school for two 
previous semesters; 
(2) Has an IEP; 
(3) Lives in the 
attendance zone and 
would be assigned to 
attend a school that 
received an F on the 
state school grading 
system; or 
(4) Previously 
received a scholarship 
under the scholarship 
tax credit program602 
(1) Located in Indiana; 
(2) Requires an eligible 
student to pay tuition; 
(3) Voluntarily agrees 
to enroll the student; 
(4) Accredited by either 
the state board or a 
national or regional 
accreditation agency;  
(5) Administers 
statewide assessments, at 
state expense; 
(6) Is not a school that 
an eligible student has a 
legal settlement with; and 
(7) Submit required 
student performance 
data to the state603
$4,342 
                                               
 602. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (following hyperlink; then click on “IN”). 
 603. See notes 402–404 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of the 
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program.  
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STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
LA Scholarship Program (1) Have a family 
income that does not 
exceed 250% of the 
federal poverty line; and 
(2) Be enrolled or 
entering kindergarten 
at a public school with a 
C, D, or F letter grade604 
(1) Use an open 
admission process that 
does not require 
additional eligibility 
criteria than those 
specified in state statute; 
(2) Notify Department 
of Education of 
students enrolled 
within ten days of the 
first day of school; 
(3) Submit an 
independent financial 
audit conducted by an 
approved certified 
public accountant to 
the Department of 
Education;  
(4) Accept scholarship 
amounts as full 
payment of all 
educational costs, 
including incidental or 
supplementary fees; and 
(5) Inform parents of 
all rules, policies, and 
procedures of the 
school, including but 
not limited to academic 
policies, disciplinary 
rules, and school 
procedures605
$5,869 
                                               
 604. Id. 
 605. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4022 (2013). 
1894 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
LA School Choice 
Program for Certain 
Students with 
Exceptionalities 
(1) Evaluated by a 
Louisiana public school 
district and determined 
to have any one of the 
following 
exceptionalities:  autism, 
developmental delay, 
mental disability, other 
health impairment, 
specific learning 
disability, or traumatic 
brain injury; AND 
(2) Have an IEP, district 
provided services plan 
or a nonpublic school 
created service plan606
Same as Louisiana 
Scholarship Program607 
$2,328 
                                               
 606. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “LA” on 
interactive map). 
 607. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4022. 
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MD Broadening Options 
and Opportunities 
for Students Today 
Program 
(1) Have a family 
income not exceeding 
100% of the federal 
free and reduced-price 
lunch program608 
(1) Participate in Aid 
to Non-Public Schools 
Program administered 
by the Maryland 
Department of 
Education;  
(2) Administer one of 
the state-approved 
academic assessments 
annually for all 
students in grades 3–8 
in English/language arts 
and mathematics and a 
science assessment once 
for students in grades 3–
5; 6–9; and 10–12; and 
(3) Comply with Title 
VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964609
$2,294610 
                                               
 608. Id. (follow hyperlink; then click on “MD” on interactive map). 
 609. S.B. 185, 2018 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2018). 
 610. Limited based on funds available. 
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ME Town Tuitioning 
Program 
(1) Reside in a town 
that does not have a 
public school at the 
student’s grade level611 
(1) Meet the 
requirements for basic 
school approval under 
state law;  
(2) Is nonsectarian;  
(3) Is incorporated 
under state law;  
(4) Comply with 
reporting and auditing 
requirements under 
state law;  
(5) Participate in 
statewide assessment 
program if 60% or more 
of enrolled students are 
publicly funded; and 
(6) Release student 
records to any school 
unit for the student to 
transfer into that unit612 
$11,162 
                                               
 611. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “ME” on 
interactive map). 
 612. ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (2005). 
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MS Dyslexia Therapy 
Scholarship for 
Students with 
Dyslexia Program 
(1) Diagnosed with 
dyslexia;  
(2) In grades 1–6; and 
(3) Attended a public 
school or qualifying 
private school 
specializing in dyslexia 
instruction the prior 
year613 
(1) Accredited by the 
state as a special purpose 
nonpublic school;  
(2) Use licensed 
dyslexia therapists to 
provide therapy to 
students;  
(3) Use daily Orton-
Gillingham-based 
therapy;  
(4) Have school 
leadership trained in 
dyslexia;  
(5) Have a current 
School Program 
Verification and 
Assurances form on 
file with the state614 
$4,980 
                                               
 613. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on 
interactive map). 
 614. Dyslexia, MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.mdek12.org/OAE/OEER/ 
Dyslexia (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
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MS Nate Rogers 
Scholarship for 
Students with 
Disabilities Program 
(1) Diagnosed with a 
speech-language 
impairment;  
(2) In grades 1–6; and  
(3) Enrolled in a public 
school or qualifying 
speech therapy school 
the prior year615 
(1) Accredited by the 
state to provide 
comprehensive speech-
language therapy 
instruction and 
interventions;  
(2) Use qualified speech-
language pathologist;  
(3) Use a specialized 
speech-language 
instructional program 
that is scientific and 
research-based;  
(4) Have a current School 
Program Verification and 
Assurances form on file 
with the DOE  
(5) Provide the DOE all 
documentation required 
for student’s participation;  
(6) Notify the DOE when 
a parent removes the 
student within ten days;  
(7) Be academically 
accountable to parent for 
meeting the educational 
needs of the student, 
annually, at a minimum;  
(8) Maintain a physical 
location in the state where 
the student regularly 
attends classes; and 
(9) Maintain current 
Letter of Accreditation 
on file with the state616 
$0617  
                                               
 615. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on 
interactive map). 
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NC Special Education 
Scholarship Grants 
for Children with 
Disabilities 
(1) Child with a 
disability who requires 
special education, as 
documented by an IEP;  
(2) Resident of North 
Carolina; and 
(3) Was enrolled in 
public school the 
prior year; or 
(4) Has a parent on 
active military duty; or 
(5) Received a grant 
the prior year; or 
(6) Is entering 
kindergarten or first 
grade618
(1) Meet health and 
safety regulations; and 
(2) Comply with state 
and federal 
nondiscrimination laws.619 
$6,401 
NC Opportunity 
Scholarships 
(1) Have a household 
income up to 133% of the 
free and reduced price 
lunch program; and  
(2) Attended a public 
school the prior 
semester; or 
(3) Is in foster care;  
(4) Was adopted in 
the past year; or 
(5) Will be enrolling 
in kindergarten or 
first grade620
(1) Accredited by the 
state or approved 
accrediting agency; and 
(2) Administer state 
assessment or 
approved national 
assessment voucher 
recipients and report 
results to the state; and 
(3) Cannot charge 
voucher students more 
tuition that  
non-voucher students.621 
$3,740 
                                               
 616. Guidance for Nonpublic Schools, MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://mdek12.org/OSE/ 
funding/special-education-speech-language-therapy-scholarship (last visited Aug. 17, 
2018) (informing non-public schools about resources and requirements related to 
speech-language therapy). 
 617. No current enrolled students. 
 618. Rules Governing the Special Education Grants for Children with Disabilities Program, 
N.C. STATE EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTH., http://www.ncseaa.edu/pdf/rules_cdg.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2018) (navigate to the document through “Program Rules” link). 
 619. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “NC” on 
interactive map). 
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NH Town Tuitioning 
Program 
(1) Reside in New 
Hampshire; and 
(2) Reside in an 
identified a “tuition 
town” that lacks a 
district school that 
offers the grade levels 
students need622
None Found None Found 
OH Cleveland 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Lives in Cleveland 
Metropolitan School 
District; and 
(2) Will be entering 
kindergarten through 
twelfth grade; and 
(3) Students with a 
household income 
below 200% of the 
federal poverty 
guideline are given 
preference in 
receiving vouchers.623 
(1) Designated as a 
nonpublic school under 
Ohio state law, by 
completing application, 
submitting an Affidavit 
of Intent Not to 
Discriminate and 
adopting states Racial 
Nondiscriminatory 
policies, and developing 
a Plan of Compliance to 
align with Operating 
Standards for Ohio’s 
schools;  
(2) Administer state 
assessments to all 
voucher students; and 
(3) Accept all voucher 
applicants unless 
applicants exceed 
school’s capacity.624 
$4,620 
                                               
 620. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “NC” on 
interactive map). 
 621. Id. 
 622. New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program, supra note 79. 
 623. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on 
interactive map). 
 624. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 14, 2018), 
http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Quality-School-Choice/Private-Schools/ 
Forms-and-Program-Information-for-Nonpublic-School/NonpublicChecklistCharterinOhio.pdf 
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OH Educational Choice 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Enrolled in OR 
would otherwise be 
assigned to a  
low-performing school 
within their resident 
school district625
Same as Cleveland 
Scholarship 
Program626 
 
$4,705 
OH Educational Choice 
Scholarship 
Expansion Program 
(1) Entering grades K–3;  
(2) Have a household 
income up to 400% of 
the poverty guideline; 
and 
(3) Priority is given to 
students with household 
income below 200% of 
the poverty guideline.627
Same as Cleveland 
Scholarship 
Program628 
 
$4,084 
OH Autism Scholarship 
Program 
(1) Identified by their 
district as a child with 
autism;  
(2) Has a current IEP 
finalized by all parties; and 
(3) Is three years of age 
or older629 
(1) Approved by the state; 
(2) Implement the 
student’s IEP and 
report progress to the 
student’s resident 
school district 
(although the law 
explicitly excuses the 
school district from 
FAPE obligation under 
the IDEA); and 
(3) Employ staff with 
appropriate special 
education credentials 
for services provided.630 
$22,748 
                                               
 625. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on 
interactive map). 
 626. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, supra note 624. 
 627. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on 
interactive map). 
 628. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, supra note 624. 
 629. Autism Scholarship Program, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov 
/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Autism-Scholarship-Program (last visited Aug. 17, 
2018) (outlining the IEP requirements for children interested in the Autism Scholarship). 
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OH Jon Peterson Special 
Needs Scholarship 
Program 
(1) Have an established 
IEP; and 
(2) Is eligible to attend 
kindergarten through 
twelfth grade631
Same as Autism 
Scholarship Program632 
$9,818 
OK Lindsey Nicole 
Henry Scholarships 
for Students with 
Disabilities 
(1) Have an IEP; and 
(2) Have attended 
public school in 
Oklahoma the prior 
year633 
(1) Accredited by the 
state or other approved 
accrediting association;  
(2) Demonstrate fiscal 
soundness;  
(3) Comply with 
antidiscrimination 
provisions in  
42 U.S.C. § 2000d;  
(4) Meet state and local 
health and safety laws;  
(5) Academically 
accountable to the 
parents for meeting 
the educational needs 
of the student; 
(6) Comply with all 
state laws regulating 
private schools;  
(7) Adhere to 
published disciplinary 
procedures prior to 
expelling scholarship 
students634
$6,161 
                                               
 630. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-103-04 (2017); School Choice Laws, supra note 84 
(follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on interactive map). 
 631. Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Special-Needs-
Scholarship (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 632. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-101-02; School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow 
hyperlink; then click on “OH” on interactive map). 
 633. Lindsey Nicole Henry (LNH) Scholarship Program for Children with Disabilities, 
OKLA. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 20, 2018), http://sde.ok.gov/sde/lindsey-nicole-henry-
lnh-scholarship-program-children-disabilities. 
2018] THE FALLACY OF CHOICE 1903 
STATE PROGRAM STUDENT ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA 
PRIVATE SCHOOL 
REQUIREMENTS 
AVERAGE 
VOUCHER 
VALUE593
UT Carson Smith 
Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Must reside in Utah; 
(2) Must have one or 
more of the following 
disabilities:  autism, 
developmental delay, 
emotional disturbance, 
hearing impairment, 
intellectual disability, 
multiple disabilities, 
orthopedic impairment, 
other health 
impairment, specific 
learning disability, 
speech/language 
impairment, traumatic 
brain injury, visual 
impairment; 
(3) Must be at least 
three years old and 
less than nineteen, 
unless has not 
graduated high 
school, then less than 
twenty-two; and 
(4) Enrolled in a 
Utah public school or 
received special 
education services in 
a private school the 
prior year635 
(1) Have a physical 
location in Utah where 
students regularly 
attend classes;  
(3) Obtain an audit 
and report from a 
licensed, independent 
certified public 
accountant;  
(4) Comply with the 
antidiscrimination 
provisions of  
42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(5) Meet state and local 
health and safety laws;  
(6) Disclose to the 
parents of each 
prospective student, 
before the student is 
enrolled, the special 
education services that 
will be provided and the 
costs of those services; and 
(7) Administer an 
annual assessment of 
each student’s 
academic progress, 
report the results to 
the parents, and make 
the results available to 
the assessment team 
evaluating the student636 
$5,905 
                                               
 634. AFFIDAVIT (Private School Compliance Statement), OKLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://sde.ok.gov/sde/sites/ok.gov.sde/files/AFFIDAVIT_0.PDF (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 635. Carson Smith Scholarship Program:  General Overview, UTAH ST. BD. OF EDUC., 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/558ca44d-ce02-4343-84a5-bc82d5c6f159 (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2018). 
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VT Town Tuitioning 
Program 
(1) Must live in a 
district that does not 
operate either an 
elementary or a high 
school, and where 
voters have approved 
the use of public 
funds for private 
school tuition637
(1) Cannot be used at 
religious schools638 
$13,152 
WI Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program 
(1) Resident of 
Milwaukee; and 
(2) Family income at 
or below 300% of the 
federal poverty level639 
(1) Administer the 
state assessment to 
voucher students in 
certain grades;  
(2) Allow voucher 
students to opt out of 
religious programs and 
activities;  
(3) Employ teachers 
with licenses or 
bachelor’s degrees;  
(4) Cannot reject 
applicants for any reason 
other than lack of space;  
(5) Cannot charge any 
tuition on top of the 
voucher for students in 
grades K–8, or for 
students in grades 9–
12 with household 
incomes up to 220% of 
the poverty guideline640 
$7,503 
                                               
 636. Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship:  Information for Private Schools Considering Becoming 
a Carson Smith Eligible School, UTAH ST. BD, OF EDUC., https://www.schools.utah.gov 
/file/4202fbce-7b2c-476f-b98e-2503e5e680a4 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 637. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “VT” on 
interactive map).g 
 638. Id. 
 639. Private School Choice Programs:  Frequently Asked Questions for Parents—2018–19 
School Year, WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/ 
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WI Parental Private 
School Choice 
Program (Racine) 
(1) Resident of Racine; 
(2) Family income at 
or below 300% of the 
federal poverty level; 
and  
(3) Applying to grades 
K4, K5, 1 or 9; or 
(4) Attended a public 
school in Wisconsin, or 
in another state, or was 
not enrolled in school, 
or participated in a 
School Choice 
Program, or was on a 
School Choice Program 
waitlist the prior year641
Same as Milwaukee 
Parental Choice 
Program642 
$7,447 
                                               
imce/sms/Choice/Student_Application_Webpage/PSCP_FAQ_2018-19_Final.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Private School Choice Programs]. 
 640. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on 
interactive map). 
 641. Private School Choice Programs, supra note 639. 
 642. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on 
interactive map). 
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WI Parental Choice 
Program (Statewide) 
(1) Reside in a 
Wisconsin school 
district other than in 
the city of Milwaukee 
or Racine; and 
(2) Applying to grades 
K4, K5, 1 or 9; or 
(3) Attended a public 
school in Wisconsin, 
or in another state, or 
was not enrolled in 
school, or participated 
in a School Choice 
Program, or was on a 
School Choice 
Program waitlist the 
prior year643
(1) Administer the 
state assessment to 
voucher students in 
certain grades;  
(2) Allow voucher 
students to opt out of 
religious programs and 
activities; and 
(3) Employ teachers that 
are licensed or have a 
bachelor’s degree644 
$7,512 
WI Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(1) Wisconsin resident; 
(2) Enrolled in 
Wisconsin public school 
for the entire prior year; 
(3) Have an IEP or 
services plan in effect at 
the time of application; 
and 
(4) Denied all open 
enrollment applications 
and all appeals of denial 
upheld for prior school 
year645
(1) Implement the 
student’s public school 
IEP and report student’s 
progress to the resident 
district;  
(2) Employ teachers 
with a license or a 
bachelor’s degree; and 
(3) Provide prospective 
students with 
information about the 
special education services 
the school offers646
$12,129 
                                               
 643. Private School Choice Programs, supra note 639. 
 644. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on 
interactive map). 
 645. Special Needs Scholarship Program (SNSP): 2017–18 Student Applications, WIS. 
DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://dpi.wi.gov/sms/special-needs-scholarship/ 
student-applications-18-19 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 646. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on 
interactive map). 
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Appendix B:  The IDEA, section 504, and the ADA:   
A Comparative Reference 
 
 THE IDEA SECTION 504 THE ADA
PURPOSE? To provide a free, 
appropriate public 
education in the least 
restrictive environment; 
protect the rights of 
children with disabilities 
and their families; assist 
States with efforts to 
educate all children with 
disabilities; and assess and 
assure effectiveness of 
those efforts.647
A civil rights law 
prohibiting any program 
that receives Federal 
funds from discriminating 
against, excluding, or 
denying benefits to an 
individual with a 
disability.648 
A civil rights law 
prohibiting 
discrimination and 
guaranteeing equal 
opportunity for 
individuals with 
disabilities.649 
PROTECTS? Children age 3–21 who 
have a qualifying disability 
under the IDEA that 
requires special education 
and related services.650 
Any individual with a 
physical or mental 
impairment that 
substantially limits one or 
more major life 
activities.651
The ADA uses the same 
definition of individual 
with a disability as section 
504. 
APPLIES TO? All public elementary and 
secondary schools, 
including charters.652 
Any program or activity 
that receives federal 
funding.653 
All services, programs, 
and activities provided to 
the public by state and 
local governments, 
businesses and non-profit 
service providers.654
                                               
 647. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012). 
 648. Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151. 
 649. Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154. 
 650. Id. § 1401. 
 651. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). 
 652. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(6), (27) (2012). 
 653. Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151. 
 654. See Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154. 
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 THE IDEA SECTION 504 THE ADA
PROVIDES FOR A 
FREE, APPROPRIATE 
PUBLIC 
EDUCATION? 
Yes.  The IDEA was passed 
to assure children with 
disabilities have a “free 
appropriate public 
education . . . designed to 
meet their unique 
needs.”655 
Yes.  Section 504 uses this 
term to describe an 
education comparable to 
their peers without 
disabilities.656  The right is 
about leveling the playing 
field not providing 
educational benefit.657
None. 
PROCEDURAL 
SAFEGUARDS? 
The IDEA includes a 
rigorous set of explicit 
procedural safeguards, 
including, but not limited 
to, written prior notice in 
parents native language, a 
right to review records, 
and a right to an 
independent educational 
evaluation.658
Section 504 includes 
limited procedural 
safeguards, including, 
notice, parent right to 
review records, a review 
procedure, and an 
impartial hearing under 
limited circumstances.659 
None. 
DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
PROCESS? 
The IDEA details specific 
requirements for 
complaints, mediations, 
impartial hearings, and 
appeals to resolve 
disagreements between 
schools and parents.660
Section 504 provides for 
impartial hearings to 
resolve disputes but leaves 
the administrative details 
to the discretion of the 
school.661 
None. 
                                               
 655. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(2012). 
 656. DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, supra note 304 (discussing the primary 
differences in the rights of students and parents under IDEA and section 504). 
 657. Wright & Wright, supra note 321. 
 658. Id. 
 659. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2017). 
 660. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 661. See Wright & Wright, supra note 321. 
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 THE IDEA SECTION 504 THE ADA
DISCIPLINARY 
PROTECTIONS? 
Under the IDEA, if a 
school removes a child for 
more than ten days in one 
school year, the IEP team 
must meet to determine 
the most appropriate 
educational placement 
and supports for the 
child. The IDEA protects 
a child’s right to FAPE 
despite disciplinary 
action.662
There is no explicit 
protection in the statute. 
However, the Office of 
Civil Rights has issued 
guidance that schools may 
not discriminate against 
students with disabilities 
in disciplinary actions 
without additional 
safeguards.663 
None. 
ENFORCEMENT? The IDEA is enforced on 
an individual level 
through dispute 
resolution procedures 
and on a systemic level by 
the Office of Special 
Education Programs, part 
of the U.S. Department of 
Education.664
Section 504 is enforced by 
The Office for Civil Rights 
for the U.S. Department 
of Education.665 
The DOJ enforces the 
ADA through settlements 
and lawsuits.666 
 
 
                                               
 662. See supra Section II.B.3; see also supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 663. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON HOW TO ADMINISTER 
STUDENT DISCIPLINE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATING 1, 20 (Jan. 8, 2014), 
https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (stating that the ED will examine 
school disciplinary policies to ensure that they are clear and nondiscriminatory). 
 664. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012); see also supra Section II.B.3; supra notes 239–41 
and accompanying text. 
 665. Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151. 
 666. ADA Responsibilities:  ADA Enforcement, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.ada.gov/ 
enforce_footer.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
